Amor-Fati is one of Nietzsche’s most well-known philosophical notions. It is also one of his hardest thoughts to penetrate for it is bound up with his ‘thought’ of the Eternal-Recurrence-of-the...Show moreAmor-Fati is one of Nietzsche’s most well-known philosophical notions. It is also one of his hardest thoughts to penetrate for it is bound up with his ‘thought’ of the Eternal-Recurrence-of-the-Same. In this thesis I mean to provide an account of these notions. This will be done by interpreting what I take to be key aphorisms in Nietzsche’s work. Besides interpreting and explaining these notions an extensive account will be given on nihilism. For I take the notions of the eternal-recurrence and Amor-Fati to be a response to the problem that nihilism poses.Show less
In this thesis, I will argue that the individual can resist the status quo, that is the existing state of affairs. A resistance through art. I do not interpret art as just a painting, but I use a...Show moreIn this thesis, I will argue that the individual can resist the status quo, that is the existing state of affairs. A resistance through art. I do not interpret art as just a painting, but I use a broader conceptualization in which all aspects of human life guided by aesthetics, that is guided by a demand for a creative and beautiful sensual existence, can be seen as art. I will explore resistance as an aesthetic practice by reading the twentieth-century philosophers Herbert Marcuse and Michel Foucault alongside one another. Both authors analysed how individuals are constituted within systems of power and how dominant structures of power can be resisted. I will argue that their theories are not only compatible with each other, but that they also complement one another. Taken together, both theories present the individual with the opportunity to resist the status quo through a form of aesthetic practices.Show less
The current situation with regard to the covid-19 pandemic has given rise to an explosion of new conspiracy theories within the public debate. It is claimed that the virus was artificially created...Show moreThe current situation with regard to the covid-19 pandemic has given rise to an explosion of new conspiracy theories within the public debate. It is claimed that the virus was artificially created by the Chinese government to use as a weapon, that it is used as a ploy by our own government to secretly install harmful 5G radiation towers and that the vaccine against the virus contains a microchip by Bill Gates to track and control us. How do these wildly different stories relate? In this essay we will investigate what they have in common and how they work. Instead of simply dismissing conspiracy theories as lunacy, we will try to understand them and examine their claims and purpose. What exactly do they claim and why? Such a serious investigation into the concept of conspiracy theories is needed, as they do often seem to contain a kernel of truth. Conspiracy theories are rightly suspicious of authorities and the knowledge that is provided by these authorities. We will investigate this suspicion and evaluate conspiracy theories. Most importantly, we will be focusing on the link between conspiracy theories and ideology. How do conspiracy theories resemble social theory that cites ideology as a factor, and are we justified to say that conspiracy theories embody a critique of ideology?Show less
Alhoewel Levinas niet volledig doof was voor het pleidooi van dieren schrijft Levinas opvallend weinig over dieren. Voor een denker met zo veel aandacht voor de Ander, lijkt het bizar dat dieren...Show moreAlhoewel Levinas niet volledig doof was voor het pleidooi van dieren schrijft Levinas opvallend weinig over dieren. Voor een denker met zo veel aandacht voor de Ander, lijkt het bizar dat dieren die met ons, voor ons en na ons leven zo weinig aandacht van Levinas ontvangen. Waar Levinas wel aandacht besteedt aan ideeën over dieren lijkt Levinas tegenstrijdige standpunten in te nemen omtrent het verschil tussen mensen en dieren. Waar Levinas namelijk stelt dat dieren fundamenteel verschillen van mensen, maakt hij tegelijkertijd toespelingen op feiten die dit fundamentele verschil doen wankelen. Ik zal mij in dit essay dan ook richten op de discrepantie tussen Levinas’ opvattingen over dieren en Levinas’ filosofie door me te richten op de positie van dieren in de filosofie van Levinas. Ik zal beargumenteren dat Levinas een a priori onderscheid maakt tussen mensen en dieren, iets wat tegen zijn filosofie indruist.Show less
Deze studie richt zich op Martin Heideggers vervelingsanalyse uit het eerste deel van de collegereeks Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Heidegger behandelt de verveling niet slechts als een gevoel...Show moreDeze studie richt zich op Martin Heideggers vervelingsanalyse uit het eerste deel van de collegereeks Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Heidegger behandelt de verveling niet slechts als een gevoel of een emotie maar ziet verveling als een fundamentele zijnstoestand: een grondstemming. Metafysica kan volgens Heidegger alleen plaatsvinden vanuit een toestand van gegrepenheid, en deze filosofische gegrepenheid komt tot stand wanneer we de grondstemming in onszelf wekken. Er is echter een probleem: Hoe moeten we deze grondstemming interpreteren? Is de grondstemming een diagnose van onze tijd (oftewel cultuurfilosofie) of is het de mogelijkheid tot filosofie überhaupt? Ik beargumenteer dat Heidegger zowel een tijdsdiagnose geeft en dus niet helemaal kan ontsnappen aan zijn eigen kritiek op cultuurfilosofie maar dat hij ook een fundamenteler filosofisch project heeft: het blootleggen van een verwijderd-zijn van onszelf als Dasein. Om deze interpretatie hard te maken zet ik allereerst uiteen dat Heidegger de mogelijkheid tot filosofie überhaupt ziet in gegrepenheid. Deze gegrepenheid veronderstelt dat we gestemd zijn en dat we onszelf kunnen begrijpen als Da-sein; in de stemming toont ons’ zijn zich als er-zijn. Vervolgens verken ik Heideggers fenomenologische analyse van de verveling. Heidegger onderscheid drie vormen: het verveeld-worden door iets, het zich-vervelen bij iets en de diepe verveling. In deze drie vormen komt geleidelijk steeds fundamenteler de leeggelatenheid en de opgehoudenheid terug die ons op het Dasein wijzen. Het feit dat de diepe verveling hiertoe in staat is, geeft aan dat het onze grondstemming is: het toont ons het ‘hoe en wat’ van het Dasein, en daarmee geeft het ons toegang tot het filosofisch vragen. De diepe verveling is onze grondstemming.Show less
The idea of a common European identity is formed and influenced by many different factors. Orientalism and internal religious and cultural differences have historically been the main pillars on...Show moreThe idea of a common European identity is formed and influenced by many different factors. Orientalism and internal religious and cultural differences have historically been the main pillars on which the concept of Europe was founded. However, these foundations seem outdated within the modern framework, arguably to be seen in recent crises such as the Eurozone crisis, rising nationalist tendencies and a decreasing sense of European solidarity. Therefore, this essay explores the possibility of a reimagination of the European identity in such a way that it can cope better with the challenges modern Europe faces. To this end, the first part of the essay will investigate the historical foundation on which current European identity is based, and the limits this identification has. After which, the essay explores both Charles Taylors concept of the politics of recognition – a communitarian multicultural identity politics – and Francis Fukuyama’s model of a liberal democratic identity politics. While a ‘perfect fit’ model to reimagine European identity lays far beyond the scope of this enquiry, the third chapter shall conclude with lessons that can be learned from the Fukuyaman and Tayloresque models to reimagine the European identity.Show less
In this paper, I criticize a common feature found in theories of moral responsibility, namely that moral responsibility (MR) is supposed to be a property of agents. It shall be argued that MR...Show moreIn this paper, I criticize a common feature found in theories of moral responsibility, namely that moral responsibility (MR) is supposed to be a property of agents. It shall be argued that MR should instead be thought of as a different type of quality. On my account, moral responsibility is an attribute that can be correctly ascribed to agents. I establish firstly four desiderata used to evaluate the adequacy of any theory of moral responsibility. Using these, I argue that neither libertarian nor compatibilist theories of free will provide a sure bulwark of moral responsibility as a property. This, combined with the rationale involving the problematic nature of this property, leads me to a conclusion similar to that of the hard determinist: the property of moral responsibility cannot exist. However, in order to avoid responsibility nihilism that follows from this moral responsibility scepticism, I propose that MR may exist as an attribute that can be correctly ascribed to human and non-human agents by following fair rules. Finally, I opt to explain why such account of attributive moral responsibility (AMR) provides a more adequate response to the desiderata than rival accounts.Show less
In recent years, the philosophy of Iris Murdoch has seen a rise in attention, both from philosophers who seek to use elements from her philosophy for their ethical theories, and from those more...Show moreIn recent years, the philosophy of Iris Murdoch has seen a rise in attention, both from philosophers who seek to use elements from her philosophy for their ethical theories, and from those more directly interested in understanding her metaphysics. These latter authors have often either criticised or tried to solve the ambiguity of the metaphysical status of the idea of the Good in her writing. I, too, address the problems in her metaphysics: in what sense does Good exist for Murdoch, and is she able to offer a ‘sophisticated’ form of realism? My theses are, first, that Good, for Murdoch, is a transcendental element in consciousness, i.e., a condition of possibility for the experience of the world, and an ideal end point suggested by experience. To answer the second question I will argue that once Good is read as I argue for, and its role in knowing reality is understood, it becomes clear that Murdoch’s view does not fall into subjectivism or any other form of idealism. Important in this account is love, which, attracted by Good, motivates the work needed for a better grasp of the world.Show less
Based on the interpretations of Plato, Epicurus and Augustine, it is not possible to clarify Socrates’ death with one solid answer. Therefore, it is necessary to return to Frey’s interpretation of...Show moreBased on the interpretations of Plato, Epicurus and Augustine, it is not possible to clarify Socrates’ death with one solid answer. Therefore, it is necessary to return to Frey’s interpretation of suicide. With the explanation of Frey’s other-inflicted suicide it is possible to make sense of Socrates’ death. Socrates has placed himself knowingly and willingly in a position where he had to die. Because he manipulated the state, he was forced to drink the hemlock. This approach of hurting himself cannot be seen as a rejection of the gods, yet he can achieve his desired premature death. It is possible to solve the discrepancy in Phaedo about Socrates’ death with the clarification that Socrates has committed other-inflicted suicide.Show less
In deze scriptie wordt de discussie tussen W.V.O. Quine ("On What There Is") en Rudolf Carnap ("Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology") beschreven t.a.v. woorden als referenten voor dingen in de...Show moreIn deze scriptie wordt de discussie tussen W.V.O. Quine ("On What There Is") en Rudolf Carnap ("Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology") beschreven t.a.v. woorden als referenten voor dingen in de wereld. Carnap weet een stap te zetten t.o.v. Quine, maar de 'ontologische' status van zijn antwoord ('frameworks') blijft onduidelijk. Aan de hand van Ludwig Wittgensteins opmerkingen over het herhalingskarakter van taal in de Philosophische Untersuchungen wordt een oplossing gezocht.Show less
