The central thesis of this paper is that something exists if and only if it is causally connected to me. Using this as a means to find an answer to the question of what it means to exist, the...Show moreThe central thesis of this paper is that something exists if and only if it is causally connected to me. Using this as a means to find an answer to the question of what it means to exist, the thesis is treated as a principle, which sets up a specific, unorthodox kind of defense. Following a Kantian line of thinking, this principle is first interpreted, then and compared to alternatives, upon which finally the specific, concrete implications of its truth are explained. This leads not only to a clear understanding of existence as defined by a causal connection to us, but also a specific understanding of the nature of principles and their proper philosophical application.Show less
Over the last few decades, Western scholars discovered similarities between the planetary models of Nicolaus Copernicus (1473 - 1543) and the works of medieval Arab predecessors. These similarities...Show moreOver the last few decades, Western scholars discovered similarities between the planetary models of Nicolaus Copernicus (1473 - 1543) and the works of medieval Arab predecessors. These similarities raised questions and started a debate whether Copernicus elaborated his models fully independently or borrowed some of his ideas from Arab predecessors. What is notable in this debate is that the participating historians of sciences have not all come to the same conclusion, although they had the same historical facts at their disposal. Apparently, next to the historical facts, some further assumptions or commitments of those historians also influenced their conclusions. In search of possible candidates for such further assumptions or commitments, an issue in philosophy of sciences came to the fore: the contingency/inevitability (C/I) issue. This issue is about the question whether the development of science follows a predetermined (inevitable) narrow path with limited possibilities or an undetermined (contingent) broad path with a multitude of possibilities. This thesis shows the influence of assumptions and commitments concerning the C/I issue on the interpretation of the history of planetary astronomy. None of the participants in the Copernicus debate referred to the C/I issue, although their positions on the C/I issue strongly affected their views in the Copernicus debate. In this way, this example substantiates the claim of this thesis: in some instances, an interpretation of the history of science is strongly influenced by assumptions and commitments of the historians involved, as well as by the historical facts.Show less
I appeal to analytic functionalism and the ability hypothesis to address the problems posed by inversions arguments. I argue that it is reasonable to reject inversion arguments if we accept a...Show moreI appeal to analytic functionalism and the ability hypothesis to address the problems posed by inversions arguments. I argue that it is reasonable to reject inversion arguments if we accept a combination of analytic functionalism and the ability hypothesis, and that alternative theories are fundamentally more problematic.Show less
As many philosophers and scientists have noticed, the way in which mathematics is used in the natural sciences for describing and predicting natural phenomena is remarkably effective. Furthermore,...Show moreAs many philosophers and scientists have noticed, the way in which mathematics is used in the natural sciences for describing and predicting natural phenomena is remarkably effective. Furthermore, this effectiveness requires an explanation. Assuming metaphysical naturalism it seems especially difficult to provide such an explanation. In this thesis the tenability of naturalism is investigated in light of the effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences.Show less
This thesis aimed to explain the differences between the substitutional and the referential quantifier. It did so firstly by presenting an analysis of the discussion between Wallace and Kripke,...Show moreThis thesis aimed to explain the differences between the substitutional and the referential quantifier. It did so firstly by presenting an analysis of the discussion between Wallace and Kripke, secondly by analysing Tarski’s reasons for introducing satisfaction, and finally by looking at whether Kripke’s definition manages to avoid the issues that motivated Tarski. It concluded that an essential part of the recursive truth-definition given by Kripke is the assumption of a pre-given truth-definition for an atomic language. However, if this atomic language is of infinite size, satisfaction is needed to provide this definition. Rather than differing in whether they make use of satisfaction, this thesis argues that the substitutional and the referential quantifiers differ in where in the definition of truth they make the connection between truth and the world.Show less
This essay argues that naturalism about mental representations is a failure: the matrix of explanatory requirements, ontological commitments and intuitions in naturalist accounts fails to result in...Show moreThis essay argues that naturalism about mental representations is a failure: the matrix of explanatory requirements, ontological commitments and intuitions in naturalist accounts fails to result in a self-consistent notion of representation. Mental representations are posited to explain an intentional agent’s behaviour and this explanatory role depends crucially on what the representation is about. Therefore it is necessary that representations have determinate content in virtue of which they cause behaviour. Naturalist accounts try to combine these explanatory requirements with a physicalist ontology in which intentional properties must be reduced to, or be supervenient on, the physical. Moreover, it is often demanded that two intuitions are respected: that representations are interpreted, and that there is a strong dividing line between mental and non-mental which should be recoverable from an account of mental representation. I argue that no consistent notion of representation can balance all these demands. The most labile commitments are the pre-theoretical intuitions, so I suggest either we radically alter these in light of theoretical results to persevere with a physicalist ontology, or we keep them and accept that physicalism cannot do them justice. Finally, I present a reason for choosing the latter position. I argue that the leading naturalist accounts still fail to yield determinate content in virtue of which representations are used to cause behaviour (i.e., they fail William Ramsey’s job description challenge (JDC)). I suggest one plausible solution to this (‘Representation as’), but which would be unacceptable to a naturalist. If there are no other options for naturalist accounts to secure the required determinate content other than ‘Representation as’ it follows that no naturalist account can pass the JDC. I suggest this results from the naturalist starting point that representations are subpersonal entities: only entities at the personal level are equipped to pass the JDC as Ramsey lays it out. Therefore, true representations are only at the personal level. Subpersonal posits in explanations of cognition may have explanatory value, but there is little relevant similarity between them and non-mental representations so as to validate thinking of them as representational as such.Show less
In his dialogue Meno, Plato compares the finding of a mathematical theorem (that of “doubling the square”) to an initiation into the mysteries, and to other decidedly unscientific phenomena such as...Show moreIn his dialogue Meno, Plato compares the finding of a mathematical theorem (that of “doubling the square”) to an initiation into the mysteries, and to other decidedly unscientific phenomena such as the remigration of souls, remembrance (anamnêsis), and divine madness. The present MA-thesis explains how this comparison between mathematics and the mysterious is not simply allegorical, but issues from Socrates’ peculiar treatment of mathematics, which does not follow the axiomatic-deductive method and order of rigorous proof, but seizes on misleading thought tendencies, the apparent transparency of colloquial Greek, opaque features of diagrams (especially concerning the constructibility of √2), and the avoidance of technical vocabulary.Show less
Social media have increased the ways in which people can and do communicate with each other. This could have consequences for speech act theory as founded by J.L. Austin and refined by J. Searle....Show moreSocial media have increased the ways in which people can and do communicate with each other. This could have consequences for speech act theory as founded by J.L. Austin and refined by J. Searle. This thesis shows that the introduction of social media has led to the existence of a new illocutionary act that is not covered by existing speech act theory: the illocutionary act of hashtagging. It is argued that hashtagging is a meta-speech act that has no counterpart offline and is deserving of its own category within existing speech act theory.Show less
In his posthumously published "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics" Ludwig Wittgenstein devotes a small section on the First Incompleteness Theorem by Kurt Gödel. This remarks have been...Show moreIn his posthumously published "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics" Ludwig Wittgenstein devotes a small section on the First Incompleteness Theorem by Kurt Gödel. This remarks have been harshly criticized by early commentators, who have accused Wittgenstein of lacking understanding of the topic. In this thesis Wittgenstein's remarks are reevaluated and compared with other remarks on the topic, which are scattered throughout his published works and his Nachlass. It turns out that Wittgenstein wasn't actually commenting on the mathematical aspects of the Theorem, but that his critique is about the conceptual and metaphysical aspects of Gödel's work.Show less
De centrale vraag die ik in deze masterthesis probeer te beantwoorden is: met welk resultaat voor zijn argumentatie zet Boëthius delen van de 'Timaeus' in 'De consolatione philosophiae' in? Met...Show moreDe centrale vraag die ik in deze masterthesis probeer te beantwoorden is: met welk resultaat voor zijn argumentatie zet Boëthius delen van de 'Timaeus' in 'De consolatione philosophiae' in? Met andere woorden, wordt Boëthius’ argumentatie beter door de 'Timaeus' in te zetten of had hij er goed aan gedaan een andere strategie te kiezen? Ik focus op de wijze waarop Boëthius de 'Timaeus' als bron heeft gebruikt om specifieke filosofische accenten te leggen en daar een agenda uit af te leiden. Echo’s van de 'Timaeus' vinden we bij Boëthius met name in de passage 3m9. Ik poog voor het voetlicht te brengen wat Boëthius met zijn 'Timaeus'-selectie in 'De consolatione philosophiae' aan het doen is. Om die selectie te verklaren, achterhaal ik het Plato-beeld in 'De consolatione philosophiae', beschrijf welke argumenten voor Boëthius belangrijk waren en redeneer, per via negativa, wat Boëthius zou missen in 'De consolatione philosophiae' als hij de 'Timaeus' niet zou gebruiken. Er is veel specialistisch onderzoek naar Boëthius verricht. Zo heeft Qi Wang in 2014 het belang van de basislogica en de wiskunde van Boëthius voor de filosofie onderzocht. Tot dusver heeft echter noch iemand in het algemeen de argumentatieve structuur achter de 'De consolatione philosophiae' onderzocht, noch de reden waarom Boëthius aan Plato’s 'Timaeus' refereert in het bijzonder. Dus, ik hoop een gat in de literatuur te vullen door een uitleg te geven van de argumentatieve rol van de 'Timaeus' in de Consolatio. Ik kom tot de conclusie dat het de combinatie is van, een, de kosmologie van Plato die tegen moreel relativisme en een doelloze kosmos ingaat, twee, de wiskunde van Pythagoras in de kosmologie van de 'Timaeus' waarvoor Boëthius sympathie had, drie, het veronderstelde primaat van de filosofie ten opzichte van de politiek, en vier, de epistemologie en de exegese van het begrip 'schepping' in de 'Timaeus' waarom Boëthius de 'Timaeus' in 'De consolatione philosophiae' aanhaalt.Show less
