In the international system, ISIS and Hezbollah are non-state actors involved in the power struggle characterizing the Middle East, and they found themselves opposed in the Syrian Civil War since...Show moreIn the international system, ISIS and Hezbollah are non-state actors involved in the power struggle characterizing the Middle East, and they found themselves opposed in the Syrian Civil War since 2011. Although they are different by virtue of their confessional identity, they share multiple similarities. Both are the product of the international intervention in Iraq/Syria and Lebanon; both share, until recently, a powerful military apparatus as well as a functional organizational system; both are recognised as terrorist or criminal organization by part of the international community. They share another characteristic too: the pursuit of the Islamic State, a utopia rooted in the teachings of the Qu’ran and Mohammad that calls for the demise of the Western-type of state in the Middle East. Nevertheless, their ideals of Islamic State are essentially different, and different are their historical and political contexts as well as their ideological motivations. One group has declared the Islamic State whereas the other has not. This work aims to unravel under what conditions non-state armed groups claim territorial sovereignty. Consequently, ISIS and Hezbollah are two cases subjected to deep analysis. Building on the concept of rebel governance, I argue that rebel’s strategies are affected respectively by the place and time-frame but mostly by the group’s relationship with the population, other armed groups, and the international community. Notwithstanding, ideology is still the building block of the rebel’s approach. I sustain that historical and political developments have structured the actors’ ideologies which in turn have affected their approaches and consequently the self-determination claim. The difference in the outputs then lies in the ideological and socio-political divide between ISIS and Hezbollah. The contrasting developments of these groups, which replied differently to national and international menaces, and their different regional priorities, as well as their distant ideas of Islamic State, allow us to understand what led to the creation of the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” and the “Party of God”. Inter alia, how the refusal of any compromise and the creation of a new Sunni identity rejecting the nation-state favoured the self-determination, whereas the entry into politics to gain resilience from a plethora of confessional realities has suggested the suspension of the Islamic State.Show less
The exposure of Libya’s political fragmentation and societal disintegration after 2011 was picked up by academics, journalists, and policy researchers who have written on that aspect of the Libyan...Show moreThe exposure of Libya’s political fragmentation and societal disintegration after 2011 was picked up by academics, journalists, and policy researchers who have written on that aspect of the Libyan reality more than any other. Libya is perceived as a fragile state with hundreds of armed groups, multiple claims of governance and tens of warring tribes. Both local and international actors have contributed to this image, but this thesis attempts to argue that there is more than the fragile and disorganized state discourse to describe Libya. The fact that Libyan unity, sovereignty, and independence have survived this extreme level of fragmentation is a question that deserves to be investigated. Thus, through the use of wide range of theories, academic and policy papers, news articles, survey data, and political agreements reports, this thesis aims to answer why and how Libya managed to preserve its status as a state in such an environment. It treats the question as a question of sovereignty by arguing that the traditional definition of sovereignty limits our ability to comprehend the state issue in Libya fully. By focusing on different aspects of sovereignty and by selecting broader definitions of the concept, this thesis argues that Libya’s unity and sovereignty have been preserved so far because international and local actors benefit from this arrangement even though they may be (in)directly contributing to fragmentation in the country. The international community is not willing to let states fall-apart, and the Libyan people do not seem to favor division and separation movements. Local state and non-state actors realize this arrangement, and they have not challenged thus far.Show less
Under the circumstances of a protracted war situation, failures to establish a political solution and no meaningful dialogue on the current security situation in Syria, refugee repatriation and...Show moreUnder the circumstances of a protracted war situation, failures to establish a political solution and no meaningful dialogue on the current security situation in Syria, refugee repatriation and reconstruction dilemmas have become the new subject of matter for Syrian refugee host countries, both European and neighboring, and Syrian government-supporting actors, including Russia and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Since 2017, several actors in Lebanon actively facilitate and promote the repatriation of Syrians refugees. UNHCR stated that the requirements under international law for the United Nations to organise or encourage voluntary repatriation are not yet in place in Syria. However, UNHCR officers do meet with the returning refugees and are present at all current departure points of the returns facilitated by the Lebanese General Security based on the believe that people’s voluntary choice to return must be respected. This study examines the role of UNHCR in the Syrian repatriation process in Lebanon in order to understand how non-state actors operate vis-à-vis sovereign states and to give insight into the role of international organizations in world politics. The thesis is partly based on field research in Lebanon.Show less
Relations between Italy and Iran seem to escape common conceptual definitions commonly used by international relations (IR) scholars. The two countries are not allied. They belong to different...Show moreRelations between Italy and Iran seem to escape common conceptual definitions commonly used by international relations (IR) scholars. The two countries are not allied. They belong to different international blocs and diverge on a number foreign policy issues. They have different preferences and goals. Yet, their relations have been connoted by consistent mutual empathy. The fact that Italy is a “Western” country – being one of the founders of United Europe and a member of NATO – has never jeopardised its relations with Tehran, even when an anti-Western attitude was strategically preferred by Iran for both domestic and international purposes. Not even Khomeini’s revolution and the international sanctions did completely stop their relations, and Italy has long been Iran’s main trading partner.We can say that two thousand years of history and cultural traditions make the two countries closer than it may superficially appear and are the basis for a deep political discourse. In my analysis I will examine how the two countries have managed to safeguard their respective interests within a reciprocal relationship that has remained constant despite the arising of internal ideologically antithetical situations, e.g. in Italy the opposition between DC and PCI1 during the cold war, and in Iran the transition from the Pahlavi regime to Khomeini’s theocracy. The interests, the will to keep commercial and business channels in general open have been the winning cards that can make us say today that the ‘special liaison’ exists, is factual and can be fully analysed in the IR field.Show less
The number of residents of Nordic countries, who have joined the contemporary conflicts of Iraq and Syria as foreign fighters, is high in relation to their populations. While most of these...Show moreThe number of residents of Nordic countries, who have joined the contemporary conflicts of Iraq and Syria as foreign fighters, is high in relation to their populations. While most of these individuals have indeed travelled to the conflict zones to become foreign fighters in the ranks of ISIS or other Islamist groups, there are also Nordic residents who have joined factions fighting against the Islamists. This thesis studies the background factors and motivational reasons in becoming a foreign fighter of 26 individuals from Nordic countries in Kurdish factions in the conflicts of Iraq and Syria, combining both primary and secondary sources in the research and linking the findings of the research into existing literature in the emerging field of foreign fighter studies.Show less
