The underlying claim of the investigation is that images don’t act as just mnemonic or decorating devices for the text but are instead an integral part of the philosophical knowledge disseminated...Show moreThe underlying claim of the investigation is that images don’t act as just mnemonic or decorating devices for the text but are instead an integral part of the philosophical knowledge disseminated through the text. By denying the auxiliary or even decorative role of images and viewing them as an integral part of a philosophical system, the thesis challenges the common-sensical view that image doesn’t have a place within the philosophical text which is seen as closer and more connected to thinking. As it can be noticed, the investigation relies on a historical account, an analysis of seventeenth-century accounts on the conception and role of images in thinking, followed by a contemporary phenomenological and embodied analysis, informed by neuroscientific finds, to give an answer to the main research question. Namely, what is the role that printed images have within an early modern philosophical publication for thinking and understanding?Show less
The ethical writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias and of Plotinus both contain discussions on the thesis of the mutual implication of the virtues, which states that having one virtue implies having...Show moreThe ethical writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias and of Plotinus both contain discussions on the thesis of the mutual implication of the virtues, which states that having one virtue implies having them all. Their discussions are furthermore marked by the same term, namely antakolouthein (‘to be reciprocally implied’). Combined with the fact that there are other already established connections between Alexander and Plotinus, these facts raise the interesting question of to what degree Plotinus participates in the debate on the mutual implication of the virtues as is visible in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Ethical Problems and Mantissa? This thesis provides an answer to this question by comparing both philosophers on the topic of mutual implication of the virtues and by pointing out the differences and similarities. The debate on the mutual implication and the different perspectives will be discussed, as well as the Stoics as opponents in the debate, Aristotle as background to Alexander and the origin of the debate and of the term antakolouthein.Show less
The concept of reification (from Latin res [‘thing’] and -fication, a suffix related to facere [‘to make’]) first played a prominent role in the thought of Georg Lukács and later in that of...Show moreThe concept of reification (from Latin res [‘thing’] and -fication, a suffix related to facere [‘to make’]) first played a prominent role in the thought of Georg Lukács and later in that of critical theorists such as Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno. For Adorno, reification is both a social phenomenon and a mode of thinking. This thesis seeks to provide a novel study of reification in synergy with Adorno’s writings on autonomous music, since music has outstanding capacities for critiquing reification. How does autonomous music offer for Adorno a possibility for knowledge and critique of reification?Show less
The influential relationship between the two twentieth century philosophers Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida has profoundly challenged the way we perceive philosophy’s responsibility toward the...Show moreThe influential relationship between the two twentieth century philosophers Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida has profoundly challenged the way we perceive philosophy’s responsibility toward the other. While these philosophers in an ongoing exchange broach the question of the other’s response, there remains the question if the other can also respond to what they say. Challenging the attainability of “successful” dialogue, this thesis examines the limits of thinking the response of the other philosophically. It does this through an innovative reading of “At This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am,” a remarkable text by Derrida in which he examines what it means to write a response to the works of Levinas. It shows how such a response, in view of what Levinas writes, must necessarily fail. My reading of this text shows that we must nevertheless embrace the possibility of failure, even if it means putting Levinas’s entire work at risk, since the very finitude of my own response is also what allows the other to come in and respond. Seen this way, I propose that a reading specifically aimed at the “failures” at work in Derrida’s response to Levinas can be a viable strategy not only to arrive at a better understanding of this text, but also to come up with responses of our own.Show less
In this thesis I argue that Jacques Derrida takes a mediating position in between Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt with regards to the relationship between law and reality. I do so by showing that...Show moreIn this thesis I argue that Jacques Derrida takes a mediating position in between Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt with regards to the relationship between law and reality. I do so by showing that Derrida wants to reside within the system - just like Schmitt - while he also partially argues for deconstructing the system - similar to Benjamin. The big difference with Benjamin is that Derrida wants to tear up the system from within.Show less
This thesis examines the differences between Camus and Levinas on the topic of interaction with the Other, and what these differences ultimately mean for their philosophies from the focal question...Show moreThis thesis examines the differences between Camus and Levinas on the topic of interaction with the Other, and what these differences ultimately mean for their philosophies from the focal question of ‘how can we interact with the Other?’. My claim is that the symmetry in Camus’ understanding of the relationship with the Other results in an interaction which allows for the creation of meaning between the subject and Other that Levinas does not leave room for. I first do a basic comparison of their philosophies, then detail the use of the term ‘transcendence’ in order to establish a ground upon which the comparison between them can be made, since their approaches and terminology are quite different. I then lean on Derrida to criticize Levinas’ concept of Otherness, and end by discussing how Camus evades these pitfalls by having a concept of the Other which allows for a symmetrical relationship.Show less
In this thesis I will make a critical assessment of the Kantian formal conception of the will in light of Schelling and Cohen. My research question is twofold: how to assess the Kantian concept of...Show moreIn this thesis I will make a critical assessment of the Kantian formal conception of the will in light of Schelling and Cohen. My research question is twofold: how to assess the Kantian concept of will, given its notorious 'formality'? And under which conditions could Schelling's and Cohen's conception of the will meet the (assumed) flaws of the Kantian notion of the will? How could we evaluate Kant’s concept of the will in terms of its ‘formality’? What is the strength of Kant’s concept of the will and what is its weakness? Kant has provided us with a theory of how every rational human being can be ethical. We universally derive our ethical obligation, Kant claims, from the pure form of reason. This form of reason, motivating our will to act well, keeps our will formal. How can we assess this formality? On the one hand, the form of reason ensures that the individual can autonomously will and correspond to the ethical laws of a rational subject. This is the strength of Kant’s formal ethics. On the other hand, the form of reason makes our will lifeless, because Kant eliminates everything material. According to Kant, the will ought not be motivated by emotional inclinations nor serve a material purpose. Kant is not concerned with the matter of the action or what is to result from it, but solely with the form and the principle from which it does itself follow (Kant, 1984, 61). Kant’s morality is based on the presupposition that there ought to be a purely formal disposition to do good. Is there also a practical and vital disposition to do good? In other words, what would make the will dynamic? Could Schelling and Cohen perhaps solve the issue raised here? The problem of the lifelessness of the will lies in the transcendental nature of Kant’s will. The faculty of thinking and willing are united in Kant’s practical philosophy. In both Schelling and Cohen a new road is opened for a will that is not limited by reason. They both propose that there is a spirit that motivates the will, instead of reason. They also allow a dynamic power that has a disposition towards this spirit of the will. Both philosophers have a vital concept that replaces Kant’s formal concept of disposition, namely the concepts of Yearning and tendency. These concepts are not a motive of thinking but purely a motive of willing. Under the condition of making the will independent of the faculty of thinking, Schelling and Cohen are able to meet the flaws of Kant’s notion of the will.Show less
In this thesis, Bergson's and Du Prel's notion of layered consciousness is explained and reviewed. In light of their theories, we discuss the possibility and (a) possible explanation(s) of artists...Show moreIn this thesis, Bergson's and Du Prel's notion of layered consciousness is explained and reviewed. In light of their theories, we discuss the possibility and (a) possible explanation(s) of artists who claim to be inspired by their dreams. In this way, we see how the idea of consciousness as layered can act as a condition of possibility for the notion of 'dreaminspiration'.Show less
Volgens Heidegger voltooit en beëindigt Nietzsche met zijn denken over de wil tot macht de hele geschiedenis van de metafysica. In deze scriptie zal ik de these onderbouwen dat Heidegger met zijn...Show moreVolgens Heidegger voltooit en beëindigt Nietzsche met zijn denken over de wil tot macht de hele geschiedenis van de metafysica. In deze scriptie zal ik de these onderbouwen dat Heidegger met zijn denken zelf echter nog met een been in dit einde staat en Nietzsche op zijn beurt blijk geeft al verder te zijn dan dit einde en een vermoeden heeft van de nieuwe richting die Heidegger met zijn denken inslaat, zonder deze nieuwe weg nog vanuit zijn eigen denken te kunnen begrijpen. Dit in elkaar overlopen van het einde van de eerste aanvang en begin van de andere aanvang, deze overgang waar zowel Heidegger als Nietzsche deel aan hebben blijkt uit hun ervaring van dát ogenblik, waarin de mens in een verhouding staat met de onverborgenheid van het zijnde, waarbij het zijnde zich kan tonen zoals het op zichzelf is en als zodanig door de mens ervaren kan worden zodat er sprake is van waarheid. Heidegger heeft toegang tot deze waarheid vanuit zijn begrip van waarheid als onverborgenheid, maar ook voor hem is het onmogelijk om te weten of het zijnde zich daadwerkelijk toont zoals het op zichzelf is, of slechts als schijn. Nietzsche kan deze waarheid vanuit zijn eigen denken over waarheid, dat alle waarheid slechts illusie is, niet begrijpen, maar heeft geeft wel blijk van een vermoeden van de mogelijkheid van deze waarheid, zo blijkt uit zijn ervaring van het oneindig kleine ogenblik.Show less
This thesis intends to use The 120 Days of Sodom to contribute to a reflection upon sovereignty in political philosophy. The overarching aim is to determine the extent to which Sade’s conception of...Show moreThis thesis intends to use The 120 Days of Sodom to contribute to a reflection upon sovereignty in political philosophy. The overarching aim is to determine the extent to which Sade’s conception of transgression in The 120 Days can illumine the problem of sovereignty. The thesis will argue that this novel presents a sustained revelation of a particular paradox evident in sovereign theory. This paradox is explicitly dealt with in the political philosophy of the German jurist Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). It is the contention of this thesis that the political philosophy of de Sade, as outlined in The 120 Days, contains precise affinities with Schmitt’s theory of the exception. Like Schmitt, Sade articulates the transgressive capacity of sovereign power. Sovereignty rests upon mere attribution, not moral or normative considerations. Sovereign authority, once attributed, is legitimate because the sovereign has the power and authority to decide that it is legitimate. This ‘decision’ creates our paradox: the transcendent preserver of law is ultimately not bound to the law that is ordered. Consequently, the sovereign power alone is capable of legitimate transgression, going beyond the normal order with the aim of sustaining the normal order. Any suspension of law on behalf of the sovereign is an act of transgression. In the suspension of law, the sovereign transgresses the limits of the juridical order, with the aim of sustaining the legal order, hence the paradox. This thesis will focus on The 120 Days of Sodom as a philosophical novel about the possibility of absolute sovereignty. In the ‘real world’, the suspension of law sustains the juridical order, the transgression ultimately serving a practical purpose which is to uphold juridical normalcy. In Sade’s fictive space, however, he details no such bounds. The 120 Days is a wildly destructive exercise; it imitates the justification of sovereign power found in the decision to create a situation of infinite transgression of boundaries and limits. Sade forms an impossible universe wherein the exception becomes a normative principle. Sade accelerates the principle of sovereign power – the decisionistic aspect of the law – portraying seemingly endless attempts to sustain the “miracle” moment.Show less
