Does the deliberative model of democracy as theorized by Jürgen Habermas yield illegitimate outcomes? To answer this question, I trace the foundations of Habermas' deliberative model and explore...Show moreDoes the deliberative model of democracy as theorized by Jürgen Habermas yield illegitimate outcomes? To answer this question, I trace the foundations of Habermas' deliberative model and explore several critiques outlined by Aletta Norval. I argue that Habermas' model does not produce illegitimate outcomes in the three ways that Norval suggests. Firstly, the elitist argument fails because it either misconceives the reconstructive core of deliberative theory or it underestimates the ability of the public sphere to accommodate difference. Secondly, Norval’s argument that the need for compromise-formation weakens the deliberative model such that it should be reconsidered as a whole, fails as well, because bargaining depends on that same discourse model in order to produce fair agreements. Compromise-formation is thus indirectly yet decisively subjected to the discourse principle. Lastly, the post-structuralist critique fails. For Habermas, an orientation towards consensus does not mean that agreement is the goal of discourse, as Norval claims. Discussion, not consensus, is what is central to deliberation. Furthermore, the principle of neutrality does not preclude differences from being discussed. It is not a normative principle, but rather a result from the reconstruction of actual practices of argumentation.Show less