Research master thesis | Middle Eastern Studies (research) (MA)
open access
Al-Hashd al-Shaʿbi or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is an umbrella of armed groups in Iraq that united in 2014 in cooperation with the government in order to defeat IS. Officially, the...Show moreAl-Hashd al-Shaʿbi or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is an umbrella of armed groups in Iraq that united in 2014 in cooperation with the government in order to defeat IS. Officially, the organization is under the control of the Prime-Minister (PM). In reality, however, it has retained operational and administrative independence, often directly ignoring orders from the PM and even attacking foreign forces in Iraq and the region. This thesis addresses the question of how the PMF has been able to retain much of its independence throughout the six years of its existence, in which the government has often attempted to rein it in. It also considers the implications of the PMF’s independence for the notion of the sovereignty of the Iraqi government. It finds that the PMF is not a singular organization, but rather a collective of independent groups that vie with each other for funding, influence, and power. The key grouping within the PMF is that of the Iranian-backed Hashd. Many other PMF groups rely on this alliance because of its control of the PMF’s central administration, which distributes funding. Iran and its allies in Iraq benefit from the PMF’s independence from potentially anti-Iranian PMs, and the cover and plausible deniability that the lack of oversight grants them. This is abetted by the support the PMF enjoys in the Iraqi parliament through its own presence there, and through political opportunists or pro-Iranian ideologues. The PMF uses its military, social, and political power to actively undermine the government in different ways. Iraq’s security sector can only properly be understood as an ‘armed political order’ in which different actors and groupings continuously vie for influence in violent and non-violent ways. The office of the PM is one venue for contestation, and the person of the PM only one of its actors. Coercive organizations of all sorts participate in this contestation. An anti-governmental Hashd group is not inherently different in this regard than a unit of the Iraqi Army. Its position is different because of the different structural constraints on both groups, and their alignment towards the government. The competition between the different Hashd groups and the recent protests which led to the appointment of PM al-Kadhimi indicate that no one – including the pro-Iranian camp – is truly dominant in the Iraqi armed order.Show less
