The Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949) has long been overlooked in large parts of international historiography, which is a shame. The war, which saw the nationalist Indonesian Republic...Show moreThe Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949) has long been overlooked in large parts of international historiography, which is a shame. The war, which saw the nationalist Indonesian Republic prevail over its Indonesian competitors for national sovereignty and the Dutch, who were intent on re-establishing their colonial presence in the archipelago, took place on the intersection of the twentieth century's most significant themes, such as World War II, the Cold War and decolonisation. With the archipelago's future at stake, including its population of nearly seventy million inhabitants in 1945 and its large reserves of strategic resources, the conflict was pushed to the top of the international diplomatic agenda with a central role for the United States. According to the existing historiography, the US' attitude towards the conflict was relatively passive and reactive, while its policy was predominantly informed and executed through formal diplomacy. This seems out of character for the United States, given its WWII intelligence achievements and Cold War reputation for covert action, and raises the question if the historiography on the Indonesian War of Independence suffers from a 'missing dimension'. This thesis aims to explore and explain the role of the American intelligence community in shaping the American information position and policy on the Indonesian question, based on a wide variety of secondary literature and primary sources from American and Dutch collections and archives. Due to its classified nature, much of the intelligence-related archival material from this period was only declassified from the 1990s onwards, allowing for a reassessment of the major diplomatic histories on the conflict primarily written between 1960 and 1985. After charting the US intelligence presence and capabilities in Indonesia from 1945 to 1949, considering the relevant organisations for both human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT), it will be assessed how effectively intelligence was integrated into the State Department's foreign policy formulation process. This assessment will be made based on the intelligence cycle framework, distinguishing between the stages of planning and direction, collection, analysis, processing and dissemination. The story of American intelligence in the Indonesian War of Independence is also the story of the radical transformation the American intelligence community underwent in the years immediately following World War II, as the haphazardly created wartime intelligence apparatus was laboriously adapted into the country's first foreign intelligence apparatus in peacetime. Over a period of several years and via various short-lived interim agencies such as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the wartime Office of Strategic Services Unit (OSS) finally evolved into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Throughout the Indonesian War of Independence, signals intelligence would remain a military affair in the hands of the Army Security Agency (ASA) and the Navy's OP-20-G. However, these forebears to the National Security Agency (NSA) went through a tumultuous period as well. Fearing competition in their foreign reporting privileges, State Department officials generally resisted the idea of intelligence gathering in peacetime. The strained 1 relationship with the upcoming intelligence community in which this resistance resulted will also form a central theme throughout this thesis. Although the lack of institutional continuity, absence of a clear mandate, continuous shortages of capacity and assets and the novelty of peacetime intelligence to policymakers generally prevented the American intelligence organisations from having a radical impact on the country's course, the story of American intelligence in the Indonesian War of Independence adds an intriguing perspective to the historiography on this complex and multi-layered conflict. In addition, the events of the Indonesian War of Independence proved to be one of the early American intelligence community's formative experiences, which were crucial in laying the foundations for the organisations that would gain notoriety in the Cold War soon afterwards.Show less