Intelligence agencies have been traditionally depicted as rogue elements within the state apparatus. In this thesis, I assess the validity of this alleged independent agency during the ‘Golden Age’...Show moreIntelligence agencies have been traditionally depicted as rogue elements within the state apparatus. In this thesis, I assess the validity of this alleged independent agency during the ‘Golden Age’ of convert operations: the Cold War. Throughout the said period, more subversive and clandestine activities became the norm instead of the erstwhile use of direct military force. The two most active Intelligence Agencies of the period, the CIA and the KGB were key actors in supporting and executing government overthrows mostly throughout the Third World. The two case studies I examine are the CIA coup against the Mohammed Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953 and the KGB overthrow of Hafizullah Amin in Afghanistan in 1979. However, my concern is not only the agencies’ role in carrying out the coups d’état but how they influenced the decision-making process within their foreign policy making bodies (the US National Security Council and the Soviet Politburo) to make these coups happen in the first place. By using the Bureaucratic Politics paradigm and other theoretical tools regarding the execution of coups d’état I underline how these intelligence agencies not only carried them but also were the main agents provocateurs behind the decision to intervene.Show less
The Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949) has long been overlooked in large parts of international historiography, which is a shame. The war, which saw the nationalist Indonesian Republic...Show moreThe Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949) has long been overlooked in large parts of international historiography, which is a shame. The war, which saw the nationalist Indonesian Republic prevail over its Indonesian competitors for national sovereignty and the Dutch, who were intent on re-establishing their colonial presence in the archipelago, took place on the intersection of the twentieth century's most significant themes, such as World War II, the Cold War and decolonisation. With the archipelago's future at stake, including its population of nearly seventy million inhabitants in 1945 and its large reserves of strategic resources, the conflict was pushed to the top of the international diplomatic agenda with a central role for the United States. According to the existing historiography, the US' attitude towards the conflict was relatively passive and reactive, while its policy was predominantly informed and executed through formal diplomacy. This seems out of character for the United States, given its WWII intelligence achievements and Cold War reputation for covert action, and raises the question if the historiography on the Indonesian War of Independence suffers from a 'missing dimension'. This thesis aims to explore and explain the role of the American intelligence community in shaping the American information position and policy on the Indonesian question, based on a wide variety of secondary literature and primary sources from American and Dutch collections and archives. Due to its classified nature, much of the intelligence-related archival material from this period was only declassified from the 1990s onwards, allowing for a reassessment of the major diplomatic histories on the conflict primarily written between 1960 and 1985. After charting the US intelligence presence and capabilities in Indonesia from 1945 to 1949, considering the relevant organisations for both human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT), it will be assessed how effectively intelligence was integrated into the State Department's foreign policy formulation process. This assessment will be made based on the intelligence cycle framework, distinguishing between the stages of planning and direction, collection, analysis, processing and dissemination. The story of American intelligence in the Indonesian War of Independence is also the story of the radical transformation the American intelligence community underwent in the years immediately following World War II, as the haphazardly created wartime intelligence apparatus was laboriously adapted into the country's first foreign intelligence apparatus in peacetime. Over a period of several years and via various short-lived interim agencies such as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the wartime Office of Strategic Services Unit (OSS) finally evolved into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Throughout the Indonesian War of Independence, signals intelligence would remain a military affair in the hands of the Army Security Agency (ASA) and the Navy's OP-20-G. However, these forebears to the National Security Agency (NSA) went through a tumultuous period as well. Fearing competition in their foreign reporting privileges, State Department officials generally resisted the idea of intelligence gathering in peacetime. The strained 1 relationship with the upcoming intelligence community in which this resistance resulted will also form a central theme throughout this thesis. Although the lack of institutional continuity, absence of a clear mandate, continuous shortages of capacity and assets and the novelty of peacetime intelligence to policymakers generally prevented the American intelligence organisations from having a radical impact on the country's course, the story of American intelligence in the Indonesian War of Independence adds an intriguing perspective to the historiography on this complex and multi-layered conflict. In addition, the events of the Indonesian War of Independence proved to be one of the early American intelligence community's formative experiences, which were crucial in laying the foundations for the organisations that would gain notoriety in the Cold War soon afterwards.Show less
This research examines support for the Mujahideen insurgency in Afghanistan during the Cold War. It provides critical literature analysis of intelligence reports created during the conflict. It...Show moreThis research examines support for the Mujahideen insurgency in Afghanistan during the Cold War. It provides critical literature analysis of intelligence reports created during the conflict. It then explains key choices within the proxy war through International Relations theory.Show less
This research examines support for the Mujahideen insurgency in Afghanistan during the Cold War. It provides critical literature analysis of intelligence reports created during the conflict. It...Show moreThis research examines support for the Mujahideen insurgency in Afghanistan during the Cold War. It provides critical literature analysis of intelligence reports created during the conflict. It then explains key choices within the proxy war through International Relations theory.Show less
In deze scriptie is de publieke perceptie in Amerika en Nederland over de CIA na Watergate onderzocht (1972-1982). Het is gebleken dat de kranten over het algemeen positief schreven over de CIA,...Show moreIn deze scriptie is de publieke perceptie in Amerika en Nederland over de CIA na Watergate onderzocht (1972-1982). Het is gebleken dat de kranten over het algemeen positief schreven over de CIA, ook na Watergate. Het is verder opvallend dat er in de Amerikaanse kranten The Washington Post en The New York Times weinig is gepubliceerd over de CIA na Watergate.Show less
Een vergelijkende studie naar de Amerikaanse en Nederlandse inlichtingencultuur als verklarende factor voor organisatorische verschillen tussen de Amerikaanse en Nederlandse inlichtingengemeenschap
This thesis uses the theoretical lenses of neo- gramscian 'hegemony' and World System theory as described by Wallenstein to provide explanations as to why the CIA has intervened in the opium trade...Show moreThis thesis uses the theoretical lenses of neo- gramscian 'hegemony' and World System theory as described by Wallenstein to provide explanations as to why the CIA has intervened in the opium trade in Afghanistan since 1979, while the rhetoric of the US leaders was based upon a 'war on drugs'. If further investigates, through a case- study of the Badakshan Province, the changes in the political and economical structures and the societal changes brought around by the existence of the opium trade.Show less
This Bachelor dissertation will focus on America’s policy regarding the Iraqi Kurds and their quest for autonomy between 1958 and 1975, in the context of Washington’s seventeen year-long Cold War...Show moreThis Bachelor dissertation will focus on America’s policy regarding the Iraqi Kurds and their quest for autonomy between 1958 and 1975, in the context of Washington’s seventeen year-long Cold War competition during these years with the Soviet Union for influence in Iraq. Was foreign policy of the United States towards the Iraqi Kurds contradictory or consistent between 1958 and 1975? What factors determined Washington’s policy towards the Iraqi Kurds between 1958 and 1975? And what factors caused it to change? These are the main research questions which should provide sufficient insight in Washington’s motives and goals which determined its policy on the Iraqi Kurds, and should explain how that policy finally took shape. First of all, Washington’s main policy interests in relation to the Iraqi Kurds during General Qasim’s regime from 1958 till 1963 will be examined. Second, the main U.S. policy interests regarding the Iraqi Kurds during the Ba’athist regime of 1963 and during the presidencies of the brothers Arif will be investigated. And finally, these same U.S. policy interests will be examined during the Ba’athist regime of President al-Bakr from July 1968, until the 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq. During these three separate periods, this dissertation will also focus on how these U.S. interests were eventually pursued.Show less
