Russian actions in the Russo-Ukrainian War have been widely interpreted as a holistically coordinated, integrative approach to war – dubbed hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare has, in recent decades,...Show moreRussian actions in the Russo-Ukrainian War have been widely interpreted as a holistically coordinated, integrative approach to war – dubbed hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare has, in recent decades, been accepted as a strategic concept into the doctrinal documents of key Western military actors, including NATO and the EU. This paper argues that analysts misinterpret Russia’s operational, context-dependent opportunism in Ukraine as a holistic strategic method. So, in order to examine the extent to which Russian actions in Ukraine are actually strategic and whether the contemporary hybrid warfare concept improves or stifles that understanding, this paper examines the following: to what extent is Russian so-called hybrid warfare in Ukraine strategic? Three key events in the Russo-Ukrainian War are analysed using classical theory on strategy as a guiding framework, making use of a thematic case study analysis. It is shown that Russian actions in Ukraine are classically strategic to a highly limited extent because (1) battle is not always central and (2) Russian political coordination is either absent or opportunistic. Russian actions in Ukraine thus do not indicate a holistically integrated strategic method – which Western observers have eagerly dubbed hybrid warfare. Rather, the reality shows a method of operational opportunism enabled by a permissive political and battlespace-context. Hybrid warfare therefore does not merit adoption as a strategic concept, because it is not strategic. Using hybrid warfare as a strategic concept thus dilutes what we perceive to be strategic – and what we perceive to be warfare – proving the importance of testing new concepts against classical wisdom.Show less
In this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic)...Show moreIn this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic) narrative. He focuses on two arguments: (1) domestic politics cause friction for both actors, (2) international pressure (from state and non-state actors) causes friction for both actors. This international pressure also includes image. Using a variety of observation techniques and limited quantitative analysis, the author finds that (1) domestic political rivalry facilitates escalation for the strong and the weak actor and has no bearing on de-escalation; escalation erodes and diminishes domestic political rivalry. (2) International pressure and image facilitates de-escalation on both sides in order to maintain a positive image. (3) The weak actor must start de-escalating in response to the strong actor’s de-escalation; else it may very well damage its own capacity to achieve its political objectives. He then discusses the policy implications that this conclusion has, most notably (1) the way that policy-makers may change their behavior in order to improve their own image, or the image of the actor they represent. (2) They may or may not be more cautious when dealing with domestic rivalry, as they may seek to avoid escalating, and would rather tackle the actual cause of domestic rivalry. Opportunities for future research in the thesis. Most notable opportunities for future research include (1) the relationship between strong actor de-escalation and weak actor de-escalation and the way the former enables the latter. (2) The effect of the situation on the ground, rather than on the purely political level, on each actor’s decision to de-escalate.Show less
