This thesis takes an institutional approach to patronage networks in Indonesia and describes how institutional vulnerabilities facilitated the expansion of patronage networks in Indonesia after the...Show moreThis thesis takes an institutional approach to patronage networks in Indonesia and describes how institutional vulnerabilities facilitated the expansion of patronage networks in Indonesia after the adoption of the open list proportional representation (OLPR) system. It is demonstrated how institutional factors such as decentralization, a powerful bureaucracy, Suharto's legacy, weak and underfunded political parties, resourceful economic actors, and lacking enforcement of anti-corruption regulations have increased the opportunity and incentive for politicians, bureaucrats, economic actors and voters to establish patronage networks. This thesis concludes that careful deliberation of institutional factors is essential before adopting the OLPR system in order to prevent widespread clientelism.Show less
Research master thesis | Political Science and Public Administration (research) (MSc)
open access
Post-election violence is often associated with structural conditions including poverty and ethnicity, and/or the strategic behavior of ‘big bosses’ and/or the electoral institutions. This thesis...Show morePost-election violence is often associated with structural conditions including poverty and ethnicity, and/or the strategic behavior of ‘big bosses’ and/or the electoral institutions. This thesis explains the post-election violence in Kenya 2007-8 by structurally testing existing explanations of this kind of violence. The analysis shows that constituencies in which the opposition won the elections with a small margin of victory experienced most violence after the elections. In these cases the election battle was most severe. After the elections politicians use violence to punish voters of their rival party by organizing violent action including protests and the deployment of criminal gangs. Besides, violence is used as negotiation strategy by both the opposition and the incumbent to influence the formation of a government. Politicians seduce individual citizens to use violence since their supporters depend on clientelist rewards in exchange for their political support. The allocation of state resources follows ethnic lines for which the political competition and the subsequent violence are ethnical in nature.Show less
