This thesis aimed to establish how Gibridnaya Voyna became a popular framework in Russia to describe Russia’s relationship with the West. Using the process-tracing method, this thesis traced the...Show moreThis thesis aimed to establish how Gibridnaya Voyna became a popular framework in Russia to describe Russia’s relationship with the West. Using the process-tracing method, this thesis traced the two main aspects of the Gibridnaya Voyna framework, NATO expansion and color revolutions, throughout major Russian documents from 1991 to 2016.Show less
The central objective of this research is to examine the evolution of the Kremlin’s counteractive strategy toward the “color revolutions” in post-Soviet states in light of the most recent case of...Show moreThe central objective of this research is to examine the evolution of the Kremlin’s counteractive strategy toward the “color revolutions” in post-Soviet states in light of the most recent case of protest-based regime change, the Velvet Revolution in Armenia. The latter is conceptualized as a successor to the initial interrelated wave of “color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, which illustrates a changing pattern of opposition movements’ learning-drawing behavior to neutralize Russian interference. The Russian counteractive approach toward the revolutions is analyzed through the use of prospect theory, further revealing that the Kremlin’s strategy has evolved from taking an active to a more passive stance. The findings do not to confirm that Russia has developed a specific strategy or that its approach has evolved through a self-learning basis despite its increasing willingness to take on a more balanced position. To better understand this shift, three hypotheses (“the actor-centered hypothesis,” “the Western support hypothesis” and “the sitting regime hypothesis”) are formulated and tested as alternative explanations through the use of process tracing. The analysis of the evidence reveals that there is, indeed, a causal link between the oppositions’ evolving political agenda and the corresponding passivity of the Kremlin’s approach, which is observed in Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. However, there is no solid evidence to confirm that Western support during a revolution or that the active attempts of the incumbents to stay in power have specifically triggered the Russian response. Nevertheless, Russian authorities have actively used the alleged Western interference as a tool to delegitimize the revolutions.Show less
