Supply chain attacks have emerged as a significant threat to national and international security, these attacks enable states to get political leverage which can help them further exploit their...Show moreSupply chain attacks have emerged as a significant threat to national and international security, these attacks enable states to get political leverage which can help them further exploit their opponents. However, states often deny involvement in such attacks, contributing to the issue of attributing responsibility and ensuring accountability in cyber warfare. Thus, it is crucial to study the use of plausible deniability in supply chain attacks. This thesis investigates the relationship between plausible deniability and supply chain attacks in state-sponsored cyber operations. The main inquiry question is: To what extent is plausible deniability used as a tactic when states engage in supply chain attacks? To answer this question, the severity of the attacks and the targeted infrastructures were examined in relation to the use of plausible deniability. A quantitative research design was employed, involving descriptive and correlational research methods to determine the extent to which plausible deniability is utilised as a tactic in state-sponsored supply chain attacks. This study aims to bridge the gap between research on supply chain attacks and plausible deniability by establishing a relationship between the type of targeted infrastructures and the use of plausible deniability. The findings of this study provide compelling evidence that states employ plausible deniability as a strategy to avoid attribution for sponsored supply chain attacks. Specifically, a clear causal mechanism is observed between the target type and the occurrence of supply chain attacks. Overall, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of the tactics employed by states in supply chain attacks, focusing on the role of plausible deniability in cyber warfare.Show less
