On 27th June, 2017 AP Maersk became collateral damage in a ransomware attack that originated from the Russian Federation and was intended to disrupt Ukrainian society. The NotPetya ransomware...Show moreOn 27th June, 2017 AP Maersk became collateral damage in a ransomware attack that originated from the Russian Federation and was intended to disrupt Ukrainian society. The NotPetya ransomware attack was just one example of the Russian Federation using cyberoperations to support their efforts in the Russo-Ukraine conflict that was raging since the #Euromaidan uprising in Ukraine in 2013. From the start of the Russo-Ukraine conflict multiple cyberoperations are attributed to the Russian Federation that clearly target Ukraine. After the invasion on 24th February, 2022 these attacks have only increased. This thesis asks how the methods, frequency, targets and actors of cyberoperations have evolved during the Russo-Ukraine conflict (2014 - present day)? To answer this question it uses secondary analysis of publicly available data to study the evolution of cyberoperations conducted in the context of the Russo-Ukraine conflict starting in 2013 until the summer of 2023. This thesis finds that cyberoperations are conducted both in support of Ukraine and in support of the Russian Federation, but their impact appears to be limited except from a few isolated events. This thesis also finds that non-state, hacktivist and criminal actors play a significant role, which is not limited to the Russian Federation and Ukraine. This might influence the way in which conflicts between states are studied in the political sciences. The thesis also reveals the limitations of using western oriented publicly available data to study a conflict between to non-western statesShow less
