Within the Council of the European Union, Qualified Majority Voting is being implemented in a growing number of policy areas. This thesis tries to answer the question “What is the effect of...Show moreWithin the Council of the European Union, Qualified Majority Voting is being implemented in a growing number of policy areas. This thesis tries to answer the question “What is the effect of substituting unanimity with qualified majority voting on behaviour of member states’ representatives in meetings of the Council of the European Union?”. To answer this question, one case is selected, the council configuration of Agriculture and Fisheries. Through conducting interviews with member states’ representatives active in this policy area, a general overview of the negotiations there is constructed. It is found that shifting the decision rule results in more rational behaviour during the negotiations. Actors showcase more bargaining behaviour when the decision rule is Qualified Majority Voting, and more arguing when it is unanimous decision making. It was not possible to accurately pinpoint what type of negotiating was more common at a certain moment in the negotiations due to the inability to access certain dataShow less
