The Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949) has long been overlooked in large parts of international historiography, which is a shame. The war, which saw the nationalist Indonesian Republic...Show moreThe Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949) has long been overlooked in large parts of international historiography, which is a shame. The war, which saw the nationalist Indonesian Republic prevail over its Indonesian competitors for national sovereignty and the Dutch, who were intent on re-establishing their colonial presence in the archipelago, took place on the intersection of the twentieth century's most significant themes, such as World War II, the Cold War and decolonisation. With the archipelago's future at stake, including its population of nearly seventy million inhabitants in 1945 and its large reserves of strategic resources, the conflict was pushed to the top of the international diplomatic agenda with a central role for the United States. According to the existing historiography, the US' attitude towards the conflict was relatively passive and reactive, while its policy was predominantly informed and executed through formal diplomacy. This seems out of character for the United States, given its WWII intelligence achievements and Cold War reputation for covert action, and raises the question if the historiography on the Indonesian War of Independence suffers from a 'missing dimension'. This thesis aims to explore and explain the role of the American intelligence community in shaping the American information position and policy on the Indonesian question, based on a wide variety of secondary literature and primary sources from American and Dutch collections and archives. Due to its classified nature, much of the intelligence-related archival material from this period was only declassified from the 1990s onwards, allowing for a reassessment of the major diplomatic histories on the conflict primarily written between 1960 and 1985. After charting the US intelligence presence and capabilities in Indonesia from 1945 to 1949, considering the relevant organisations for both human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT), it will be assessed how effectively intelligence was integrated into the State Department's foreign policy formulation process. This assessment will be made based on the intelligence cycle framework, distinguishing between the stages of planning and direction, collection, analysis, processing and dissemination. The story of American intelligence in the Indonesian War of Independence is also the story of the radical transformation the American intelligence community underwent in the years immediately following World War II, as the haphazardly created wartime intelligence apparatus was laboriously adapted into the country's first foreign intelligence apparatus in peacetime. Over a period of several years and via various short-lived interim agencies such as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the wartime Office of Strategic Services Unit (OSS) finally evolved into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Throughout the Indonesian War of Independence, signals intelligence would remain a military affair in the hands of the Army Security Agency (ASA) and the Navy's OP-20-G. However, these forebears to the National Security Agency (NSA) went through a tumultuous period as well. Fearing competition in their foreign reporting privileges, State Department officials generally resisted the idea of intelligence gathering in peacetime. The strained 1 relationship with the upcoming intelligence community in which this resistance resulted will also form a central theme throughout this thesis. Although the lack of institutional continuity, absence of a clear mandate, continuous shortages of capacity and assets and the novelty of peacetime intelligence to policymakers generally prevented the American intelligence organisations from having a radical impact on the country's course, the story of American intelligence in the Indonesian War of Independence adds an intriguing perspective to the historiography on this complex and multi-layered conflict. In addition, the events of the Indonesian War of Independence proved to be one of the early American intelligence community's formative experiences, which were crucial in laying the foundations for the organisations that would gain notoriety in the Cold War soon afterwards.Show less
The already tense relationship between the EU and Russia has resulted in a geopolitical power race in cyberspace. Also, the development of the EU cyber diplomacy toolbox in 2017 already resulted in...Show moreThe already tense relationship between the EU and Russia has resulted in a geopolitical power race in cyberspace. Also, the development of the EU cyber diplomacy toolbox in 2017 already resulted in economic and diplomatic sanctions being imposed on Russia, further intensifying the relationship between two central powers in cyberspace and hinting at the use of a deterrence strategy by the EU. To further gain knowledge about the impact of the EU cyber diplomacy toolbox on Russia, this research aims to identify how the toolbox intents to functions against Russia. By doing so, the key characteristics of the deterrence strategy will function as the theoretical framework in this research, resulting into an overview of the key characteristics of the deterrence strategy. Furthermore, the purposes of the installation of the toolbox will be analysed. Likewise, with the use of case studies, the actual effects of the toolbox on Russia will be outlined to portray that the EU cyber diplomacy does intent to function as a method of a deterrence strategy against Russia.Show less
The purpose of this study is to examine the foreign policy of the Greek city-state of Syracuse between the second half of the fifth and the first half of the fourth centuries BC, and in particular...Show moreThe purpose of this study is to examine the foreign policy of the Greek city-state of Syracuse between the second half of the fifth and the first half of the fourth centuries BC, and in particular from the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431 BC, to the death of Dionysius the Elder in 367 BC. This study is specifically focused on ancient contemporary as well as modern perceptions of Syracuse as an imperialist, expansionist power. The study aims to demonstrate that Syracuse was a typical city-state which to a large extent reacted to external events and pursued a limited and modest foreign policy aimed at preserving the city in light of an increasingly unstable political environment, while occasionally taking advantage of unique opportunities to pursue limited expansion. By the end of the study, the reader should be able to discern the bias of ancient authors, understand their motivations, and form a more pragmatic and realistic assessment of Syracusan foreign policy. It will be demonstrated that Syracuse was a typical city-state with limited resources, and well-defined, consistent goals, as opposed to the more adventurous imperialistic and at times opportunistic goals ascribed to Syracuse by authors influenced by Classical Athenian imperialism. It will be shown how and why Syracuse fell short of the exaggerated expectations of friend and foe alike, concerning the city’s capabilities and the role which it was envisaged playing in various regions of the Classical world.Show less
This thesis seeks to examine how the reliance of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) on the mutasaddi (governor) of the imperial harbour town of Surat differed between the governorship of Diânat...Show moreThis thesis seeks to examine how the reliance of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) on the mutasaddi (governor) of the imperial harbour town of Surat differed between the governorship of Diânat Khan (1699-1701) and the governorship of Haider Quli Khan (1716-1719). As the years surrounding the death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 saw local mutasaddi strengthen their position, the VOC reconsidered its approach to problem-solving. The comparison between these two governorships makes it clear that the VOC displayed a clear preference for a local solution negotiated with the governor. During the governorship of Diânat Khan, reaching out to the emperor was still considered as an option. However, it was seen as a more expensive and less effective alternative that required support from local government officials to work. Two decades later during the governorship of Haider Quli Khan, the VOC made it clear that they had lost faith in the emperor’s authority within Surat. They relied more heavily on the governor than before for matters of security, trade and conflict-resolution. Examining these periods shows that the VOC dealt with a much wider range of officials than often assumed, preferred the efficiency of a deal with the governor over a deal with the emperor, and worked with local government to approach the emperor when local authority was not enough to solve an issue.Show less
When the Dutch East India Company (VOC) came to Asia, its presence was contingent on relations with Asian polities. Elephant gift-giving was one of the practices the VOC conducted and experienced...Show moreWhen the Dutch East India Company (VOC) came to Asia, its presence was contingent on relations with Asian polities. Elephant gift-giving was one of the practices the VOC conducted and experienced with Asian rulers alongside trade. The VOC acted as a giver and a receiver; it received gift-elephants from Southeast Asian polities plus Kandy and transferred them westward. This study examines the Dutch-Asian elephant diplomacy and sociocultural foundations behind the diplomatic scene during the seventeenth century. It argues that the existing Dutch acknowledgment of elephant gift-giving traditions and imaginations and perceptions of the emblematic elephant facilitated the elephant diplomacy between the VOC and Asian polities. In other words, these mentalities were integral to the commensurability in the Dutch-Asian elephant gift-giving. Furthermore, the case of the emblematic elephant imagined and perceived by the Dutch shows that the seventeenth-century historical change in worldview from emblematic to empirical was more nuanced and not linear.Show less
