On the 24th of February,1848, the Belgian ambassador in London informed the English Foreign Minister Palmerston of the Belgian stance regarding the new developments in France. The ambassador told...Show moreOn the 24th of February,1848, the Belgian ambassador in London informed the English Foreign Minister Palmerston of the Belgian stance regarding the new developments in France. The ambassador told Palmerston that “a republican France was an aggressive and conquering France.” The memories of the French Revolutionary Wars and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars were still fresh in Europe. Had it not been a French Republic that had threatened the European Balance of Power, subduing the existing states and creating puppet states across the continent? A French Republic that had turned on its rightful king and deposed him before trying to subjugate the lawful order in Europe? The same Republic that had turned into an imperial power under the guidance of Napoleon the likes of which had not been seen since the days of Rome? The parallels to the events of 1789 had to have been frightening to the crowned heads of Europe and their governments. On the 24th, Frederick William IV of Prussia informed Victoria of Britain that he looked at France in fear of a new European war. In the newly formed nation of Belgium, the news of the new French Revolution was met with dread in governmental circles. In the Netherlands, the messages from the French capital of Paris were met with anticipation and uneasiness. When Tsar Nicholas heard of the news he reacted calmly, but immediately stated that Russia would march to war if any infractions were made on existing treaties. He also put a million more rubles at the disposal of the war ministry. Additionally, he wrote a letter to Victoria that a Russo-British union as discussed in 1844 may be needed to ensure stability in Europe. The general consensus at the time among the leaders of European nations was that war was inevitable. France was militarily, by virtue of its population, still one of the most powerful nations on the continent and if it would lead to war, it would mean untold destruction in a display that would appear to be a replica of the events that had happened a little over three decades ago. In the Low Countries, the subject of this thesis, the consequences of the Belgian Revolution of 1830 were still felt strongly. The Belgian Revolution had broken out after the July Revolution in Paris, that had seen the Orleanist take-over of France. It seemed likely that this new French Revolution, a Republican Revolution this time, would also move beyond the borders of France into the Low Countries and bring about another time of violence and war in Belgium and the Netherlands. Except history does not move in predictable patterns. Knowledge of the past does not make one a seer and although a war may have seemed inevitable, it was avoided nonetheless. The diplomatic crisis surrounding this new French Revolution however, is often downplayed in historical works, which have mostly focused on the spread of Revolution across the continent when discussing 1848. Yet, revolution and war were intrinsically linked at the time, especially if that revolution occurred in France. A Revolutionary France would mean a threat to European peace and the balance of power, but it was also a beacon for revolutionaries across the continent who felt supported by a Republican France that might come to their aid, militarily if need be. It may ultimately have been the case that no war in Europe erupted in 1848, but this does not mean that war had not loomed large over the governments of the Low Countries and Europe in general. A manifesto by the French Foreign minister of the Provisional Government Lamartine was sent to all the other courts of Europe one week after the initial Revolution in Paris. It had the intent of unlinking war and revolution (in France), because they were so intrinsically linked in the mind of the 19th century governments. The main objective of the manifesto was legitimising the rule of the Provisional Government and to make sure the reactionary powers would not see the new French Republic as an existential threat. The traumas of the French Revolutionary Wars were specifically addressed. If we consider Lamartine’s manifesto and the Belgian ambassador’s words, this parallel of revolution in France and war was very much on the minds of the contemporary players of the international game of diplomacy.Show less
Germany went into the war in the belief that the war would be intense, but that it would be comparatively short and manageable. This way of thinking was not particularly driven by well thought out...Show moreGermany went into the war in the belief that the war would be intense, but that it would be comparatively short and manageable. This way of thinking was not particularly driven by well thought out theories, instead it was a product of necessity. Because there was no substitute for the Schlieffen plan, in combination with the slow descent of the conflict in into a static bloodbath, German politicians and military leaders tried to find another way out of the catastrophe that the war had devolved into. These factors would eventually result in increasing pressure for the conclusion of the war through a peace initiative. This research paper set out to outline three major arguments. Firstly, that the main German peace offers were sincere in trying to conclude a negotiated peace. Secondly, that there was significant support for peace initiatives both in the general populace and in the military and political elite, although it did vary greatly per initiative. And finally, that the war dragged on because the minimum terms of both sides were deemed unacceptable by the governments and populations which put significant pressure on governments. This view directly contradicts the long-held argumentation along the lines of the Fischer-these and its later iterations which state that the peace initiatives were mainly a ruse and that the sole goal of the German government was the domination of Europe through extensive annexations and creating a network of puppet states. Especially the 1916 general peace offer is a strong piece of evidence that there were significant elements surrounding Bethmann-Hollweg and the Kaiser in the German state that were ready to conclude a peace without these extensive demands. Furthermore, the plethora of enthusiastic newspaper articles in combination with the support of mass-parties like the SPD and Zentrum for some of the proposals indicate that at least some of these peace initiatives could count on significant support from the German population.Show less
This thesis analyses how the French government and American diplomats utilised and subsequently shaped the French-language press due to their influence and propaganda efforts during the American...Show moreThis thesis analyses how the French government and American diplomats utilised and subsequently shaped the French-language press due to their influence and propaganda efforts during the American Revolutionary War. The role of the press in the Ancien Régime can reveal developing political, social, and diplomatic cultures. The rigid censorship policy of the French monarchy places the newspapers in a middle ground between the government and the literate portion of the population. There were competing notions amongst the most popular European publications as to what constituted news and how it should be communicated, thus the coverage of the American Revolutionary War varied across geographical and temporal boundaries. This thesis seeks to assess the social and political upheaval that was the American Revolution in 1775, and its impact on France, through the lens of governmental control of newspapers. France’s role in the American Revolution has been well documented, as the monarchy utilised this opportunity to gain prestige and damage Britain’s standing as a global power. France officially sent military and financial aid to the rebels from 1778, and many French soldiers such as the Marquis de Lafayette became heroes who fought alongside their American counterparts to overthrow the control of King George III in the colonies. However, getting France to agree to this was difficult. It was therefore necessary for the Americans to send diplomats to Versailles to vouch for their cause and elicit support. Thus ensued a major propaganda campaign which would entangle both state and non-state actors, and would have significant implications for the development of press culture in France. France heavily censored newspapers and imposed strict regulations on the influx of foreign information from countries with a freer press environment, such as the Netherlands. In Britain, the licensing act lapsed in 1695, and provincial and national newspapers consequently multiplied in number and prospered. After the British government allowed the publication of parliamentary reports in 1772, French-language newspapers were able to reprint them, leading to increased scrutiny on their response to events in the colonies. This meant that readers of foreign French-language newspapers illegally circulating in France at the time were being exposed to alternative sources of news. The national newspapers largely reflected and upheld elite values that were ingrained into French society at the time, and left little room for debate or opposition. However, this was radically altered by the presence of the American diplomats in Paris. Leading figures, such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, were greatly admired by the French public, and they utilised this wave of popularity to bolster their political agenda. This agenda had undoubtedly been influenced by French Enlightenment thought - particularly regarding the individual rights of man, political representation, and freedom of speech and the press. This thesis explores how this philosophical and political transfer influenced the French government’s approach to the medium of the press. It identifies four main newspapers as indicators of how the war was impacting the way in which the government wanted to portray itself on the diplomatic stage. The American Revolution showed the world how it was possible to uproot a system of political injustice and to justify it using fundamental ideas of democracy. The use of the French-language press by the Americans and the French government to further their interests, therefore, exposed a reading audience to political ideas that might have otherwise been suppressed. It is in this context that the newspapers take on significance. The attempted control of the content of these papers through the manipulation of texts, propaganda and the production of war narrative that favoured French and American interests shaped how French readers came to view the conduct of their government in a way not previously seen. Furthermore, the personal relationships formed between government figures, American political leaders and philosophers, and the editors of highly influential and widely-read papers sheds light on the deep entanglement of the press with politics. While the limitations of readership in Ancien Régime France are taken into account, this thesis argues that the French involvement in the American Revolutionary War shaped French government relations with the press, and contributed to a shaping of its diplomatic engagements with America both during and after the war.Show less
The Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949) has long been overlooked in large parts of international historiography, which is a shame. The war, which saw the nationalist Indonesian Republic...Show moreThe Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949) has long been overlooked in large parts of international historiography, which is a shame. The war, which saw the nationalist Indonesian Republic prevail over its Indonesian competitors for national sovereignty and the Dutch, who were intent on re-establishing their colonial presence in the archipelago, took place on the intersection of the twentieth century's most significant themes, such as World War II, the Cold War and decolonisation. With the archipelago's future at stake, including its population of nearly seventy million inhabitants in 1945 and its large reserves of strategic resources, the conflict was pushed to the top of the international diplomatic agenda with a central role for the United States. According to the existing historiography, the US' attitude towards the conflict was relatively passive and reactive, while its policy was predominantly informed and executed through formal diplomacy. This seems out of character for the United States, given its WWII intelligence achievements and Cold War reputation for covert action, and raises the question if the historiography on the Indonesian War of Independence suffers from a 'missing dimension'. This thesis aims to explore and explain the role of the American intelligence community in shaping the American information position and policy on the Indonesian question, based on a wide variety of secondary literature and primary sources from American and Dutch collections and archives. Due to its classified nature, much of the intelligence-related archival material from this period was only declassified from the 1990s onwards, allowing for a reassessment of the major diplomatic histories on the conflict primarily written between 1960 and 1985. After charting the US intelligence presence and capabilities in Indonesia from 1945 to 1949, considering the relevant organisations for both human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT), it will be assessed how effectively intelligence was integrated into the State Department's foreign policy formulation process. This assessment will be made based on the intelligence cycle framework, distinguishing between the stages of planning and direction, collection, analysis, processing and dissemination. The story of American intelligence in the Indonesian War of Independence is also the story of the radical transformation the American intelligence community underwent in the years immediately following World War II, as the haphazardly created wartime intelligence apparatus was laboriously adapted into the country's first foreign intelligence apparatus in peacetime. Over a period of several years and via various short-lived interim agencies such as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the wartime Office of Strategic Services Unit (OSS) finally evolved into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Throughout the Indonesian War of Independence, signals intelligence would remain a military affair in the hands of the Army Security Agency (ASA) and the Navy's OP-20-G. However, these forebears to the National Security Agency (NSA) went through a tumultuous period as well. Fearing competition in their foreign reporting privileges, State Department officials generally resisted the idea of intelligence gathering in peacetime. The strained 1 relationship with the upcoming intelligence community in which this resistance resulted will also form a central theme throughout this thesis. Although the lack of institutional continuity, absence of a clear mandate, continuous shortages of capacity and assets and the novelty of peacetime intelligence to policymakers generally prevented the American intelligence organisations from having a radical impact on the country's course, the story of American intelligence in the Indonesian War of Independence adds an intriguing perspective to the historiography on this complex and multi-layered conflict. In addition, the events of the Indonesian War of Independence proved to be one of the early American intelligence community's formative experiences, which were crucial in laying the foundations for the organisations that would gain notoriety in the Cold War soon afterwards.Show less
The purpose of this study is to examine the foreign policy of the Greek city-state of Syracuse between the second half of the fifth and the first half of the fourth centuries BC, and in particular...Show moreThe purpose of this study is to examine the foreign policy of the Greek city-state of Syracuse between the second half of the fifth and the first half of the fourth centuries BC, and in particular from the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431 BC, to the death of Dionysius the Elder in 367 BC. This study is specifically focused on ancient contemporary as well as modern perceptions of Syracuse as an imperialist, expansionist power. The study aims to demonstrate that Syracuse was a typical city-state which to a large extent reacted to external events and pursued a limited and modest foreign policy aimed at preserving the city in light of an increasingly unstable political environment, while occasionally taking advantage of unique opportunities to pursue limited expansion. By the end of the study, the reader should be able to discern the bias of ancient authors, understand their motivations, and form a more pragmatic and realistic assessment of Syracusan foreign policy. It will be demonstrated that Syracuse was a typical city-state with limited resources, and well-defined, consistent goals, as opposed to the more adventurous imperialistic and at times opportunistic goals ascribed to Syracuse by authors influenced by Classical Athenian imperialism. It will be shown how and why Syracuse fell short of the exaggerated expectations of friend and foe alike, concerning the city’s capabilities and the role which it was envisaged playing in various regions of the Classical world.Show less
This thesis seeks to examine how the reliance of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) on the mutasaddi (governor) of the imperial harbour town of Surat differed between the governorship of Diânat...Show moreThis thesis seeks to examine how the reliance of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) on the mutasaddi (governor) of the imperial harbour town of Surat differed between the governorship of Diânat Khan (1699-1701) and the governorship of Haider Quli Khan (1716-1719). As the years surrounding the death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 saw local mutasaddi strengthen their position, the VOC reconsidered its approach to problem-solving. The comparison between these two governorships makes it clear that the VOC displayed a clear preference for a local solution negotiated with the governor. During the governorship of Diânat Khan, reaching out to the emperor was still considered as an option. However, it was seen as a more expensive and less effective alternative that required support from local government officials to work. Two decades later during the governorship of Haider Quli Khan, the VOC made it clear that they had lost faith in the emperor’s authority within Surat. They relied more heavily on the governor than before for matters of security, trade and conflict-resolution. Examining these periods shows that the VOC dealt with a much wider range of officials than often assumed, preferred the efficiency of a deal with the governor over a deal with the emperor, and worked with local government to approach the emperor when local authority was not enough to solve an issue.Show less
When the Dutch East India Company (VOC) came to Asia, its presence was contingent on relations with Asian polities. Elephant gift-giving was one of the practices the VOC conducted and experienced...Show moreWhen the Dutch East India Company (VOC) came to Asia, its presence was contingent on relations with Asian polities. Elephant gift-giving was one of the practices the VOC conducted and experienced with Asian rulers alongside trade. The VOC acted as a giver and a receiver; it received gift-elephants from Southeast Asian polities plus Kandy and transferred them westward. This study examines the Dutch-Asian elephant diplomacy and sociocultural foundations behind the diplomatic scene during the seventeenth century. It argues that the existing Dutch acknowledgment of elephant gift-giving traditions and imaginations and perceptions of the emblematic elephant facilitated the elephant diplomacy between the VOC and Asian polities. In other words, these mentalities were integral to the commensurability in the Dutch-Asian elephant gift-giving. Furthermore, the case of the emblematic elephant imagined and perceived by the Dutch shows that the seventeenth-century historical change in worldview from emblematic to empirical was more nuanced and not linear.Show less
Between 1639 and 1854 was the Netherlands the only European country allowed to trade with Japan. After 1854, when Commodore Perry uses gunboat diplomacy to open diplomatic contact with Japan, the...Show moreBetween 1639 and 1854 was the Netherlands the only European country allowed to trade with Japan. After 1854, when Commodore Perry uses gunboat diplomacy to open diplomatic contact with Japan, the unique position of the Netherlands had changed drastically. Nonetheless, the Dutch government was not eager to give up its monopoly on Japan that easily. As a result, after Japan opened, the Dutch government can be observed undertaking many projects in Japan to convince the Japanese that unique relations with the Dutch were still in the Japanese interest. Especially in Nagasaki, where the Dutch had a trading post for since the 17th century, the Dutch undertook many projects and this started to shape the city going forward. This thesis examines how Dutch influence shaped three prominent sectors in Nagasaki throughout the nineteenth century; the rising military & industrial sectors and the declining trade sector in Nagasaki. The developments in these sectors are framed within wider Japanese history of that era and also the decline of Dutch influence in the nineteenth century. The conclusion of this thesis is that the Dutch still fulfilled a prominent position within Japanese, and then especially Nagasaki, after the years of the opening in 1854. The Dutch worked hard to introduce Japan with new military and industrial knowledge, while simulataneously aiming to include within a new trade network. The Dutch supplied new materials, worked as teacher and also worked as intermediaries with other Western nations. Eventually the Dutch could not keep up with other Western nations and by the 1870s most Dutch experts had disappeared from Japan. Nonetheless, by this time their influence had played a major role in Nagasaki. The basis had been laid for the rise of many factories in the city, the city had become a centre for military knowledge and trade had dwindled from the city. Byt the time the last of the Dutch experts left, Nagasaki had been set on a course to become a military-industrial complex, which would play an important part in the next century.Show less
In the spring of 1656, almost eight years after the signing of the Peace of Münster, the States General decided to send a representative to Madrid. This thesis focusses on the life and work of...Show moreIn the spring of 1656, almost eight years after the signing of the Peace of Münster, the States General decided to send a representative to Madrid. This thesis focusses on the life and work of Hendrik van Reede van Renswoude, the first Dutch ambassador in Spain.Show less
In de tweede helft van de 17e eeuw stuurde de Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie drie gezantschappen naar het Chinese hof te Peking in een poging om daar handelsbetrekkingen aan te knopen. In deze...Show moreIn de tweede helft van de 17e eeuw stuurde de Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie drie gezantschappen naar het Chinese hof te Peking in een poging om daar handelsbetrekkingen aan te knopen. In deze scriptie worden de eerste twee van die gezantschappen naast elkaar gelegd. Ook wordt er gekeken naar pogingen van andere Europese landen, in die periode, om via het Keizerlijk hof toegang tot de Chinese markt te krijgen. Er worden twee vragen gesteld;allereerst is de vraag welke tactiek de Nederlanders in China volgden. Kort door de bocht kan gesteld worden dat de VOC twee werkwijzen had in Azië. Aan de ene kant was er de agressieve aanpak die zij in de Indonesische archipel met succes gebruikten tegen staten daar en waarmee ze op veel plekken een handelsmonopolie wisten af te dwingen. Aan de andere kant was er de meegaande aanpak, in Japan, bijvoorbeeld, werden de bevelen van de Shōgun strikt opgevolgd, in de hoop niet te worden uitgezet. De vraag is dus wat zij in China deden. Vervolgens is de vraag of de twee gezantschappen van elkaar leerden en, zo ja, wat er dan aan hun aanpak veranderde.Show less
In this study, I focused on how historians looked at British and American handling of the ‘Polish Question’ in World War II. This was from the moment the discovery of the mass graves at Katyn led...Show moreIn this study, I focused on how historians looked at British and American handling of the ‘Polish Question’ in World War II. This was from the moment the discovery of the mass graves at Katyn led to a break between the Soviet Union and the Polish government-in-exile in April 1943 to the end of the Warsaw Uprising in September 1944. I was particularly interested in what ways the United States and Great Britain wanted to solve this problem in accordance with the wishes of the Polish government-in-exile. It seems as if historians are biased on this subject. They mainly see a pleasing Allied side, desperately trying to keep Stalin in the War. Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to please Stalin so much, according to these historians, that they were willing to sell out their Polish allies and to forget about the Soviet crimes committed in the Easter-European country. Instead of this biased historical look on affairs, summarized in the schools of innocence and blame, I argue for the school of reconstruction or a more objective look at this subject.Show less
