This thesis aims to shed light on legal practice of the nineteenth century in France and The Netherlands and contrast it with legal theory and current historiography. In both older and newer French...Show moreThis thesis aims to shed light on legal practice of the nineteenth century in France and The Netherlands and contrast it with legal theory and current historiography. In both older and newer French and Dutch historiography, the nineteenth century is described as the century of legalism, also referred to as exegetical thinking. This exegetical school of law considers the codified law to be the highest and practically the only source of law on which the judge and legal scholar must rely. This historiography is mainly based on the development of legal theory as practised at universities. Implicitly or sometimes even explicitly, legal practice is equated with this legal theory. This fallacy obscures the practice of law, which did not take place in the university or the chambers of scholars, but in the courtroom. To address this lacuna, the following question was answered: To what extent was legalism in the Netherlands and the exegetical school in France really the dominant approach in legal practice and how can possible differences between both countries be explained? In order to know the practice of law and to assess whether judges, like legal theorists, were under the spell of exegetical thinking, judgments of courts were analysed. These can be found in case law journals that emerged in the nineteenth century. This study looked specifically at the judges' references to case law; the work of colleagues. The reference to case law is contrary to the doctrine of the exegetical school which accepts codification as the sole source of law. Referral to sources of law outside the codification by the courts, either implicit or explicit, imply a freer attitude towards the codification than legal scholars of the nineteenth century and current historiography would have us believe. Analysis of approximately two thousand Dutch and French judgments throughout the nineteenth century showed a difference in the quantity and nature of the references between both countries. In France, judges themselves referred explicitly to specific case law or to case law in general, whereas in the Netherlands judges did not refer to case law themselves, but relied on the arguments of the litigants and the Advocate-General, who did explicitly invoke case law. My research gives cause to adjust the image of nineteenth century legal history. The nineteenth-century judge was a child of his time, but not a puppet of legal theory. Lex semper dabit remedium: The law always provides a remedy; this was the starting point, but case law often supplemented it. The demonstrated difference between legal theory and legal practice fits within a broader development in current historiography, emphasising continuity of politics, culture, and in this case legal practices, in the wake of the French Revolution.Show less
