This thesis concerns the impact of the EU lobbying behaviour of the regions on the gatekeeping powers of the central government. Through an extensive analysis of the behaviour of the Dutch...Show moreThis thesis concerns the impact of the EU lobbying behaviour of the regions on the gatekeeping powers of the central government. Through an extensive analysis of the behaviour of the Dutch provinces at the EU level based on interviews, a survey and content analysis, this study concludes that the provinces aim at cooperating with their central government but are capable of bypassing it as well when their interests are strongly opposed to those of the central government. Contradictory to assumptions made in the literature, the institutional strength of the subnational actor appears not to play a decisive role. The inclusiveness of the subnational actors into the national EU policy-shaping process, the length of exposure to the EU integration process and the financial means of the subnational actor seem to explain the occasional bypassing behaviour on the EU level of the provinces. Although the provinces are capable of effectively influencing the EU decision-making process independently from their central government, this study argues that the gatekeeping powers of the Dutch central government are not significantly affected by the lobbying behaviour of the provinces. The central government remains the dominant actor regarding the Council and the implementation phase. This result confirms the assumption of the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism that the central government is the gatekeeper between the influence of national actors and the EU decision-making process. In the agenda-setting phase, the central government has however lost its gatekeeping powers. This proves that the relation on the EU level between the Dutch provinces and their central government also entails some characteristics of a multi-level governance structure.Show less
