This thesis investigates the political effect of the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act, a non-reciprocal trade agreement granting eligible Sub-Saharan African states tariff free...Show moreThis thesis investigates the political effect of the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act, a non-reciprocal trade agreement granting eligible Sub-Saharan African states tariff free access to the US-American market. In both the scholarly literature and real-world politics, the threat of AGOA suspension seems to spook African leaders. The exclusion mechanism is highly exploitable and political compliance therefore important to stay included in the agreement. The economic impact of AGOA is however highly limited. This thesis tackles the puzzle of why an agreement with no major economic impact leads to political compliance to the US by its member states. My argument is the limitation of AGOA’s utilization to a capacity-abundant elite, which can afford to overcome the utilization barriers (high transportation costs, permits, etc.) and earn the agreements benefits. Following the elite theory, this benefitting elite is then able to influence its government to comply with US policies, in order for AGOA benefits to retain.Show less
Abstract: Since four decades actual liberal democracies are characterized by the development that material wealth increasingly concentrates in the hands of a small fraction of society. This...Show moreAbstract: Since four decades actual liberal democracies are characterized by the development that material wealth increasingly concentrates in the hands of a small fraction of society. This development is especially problematic for the most central value of liberal societies: liberty. This is because individuals enjoy liberty only if they are guaranteed equal democratic codetermination. In the first chapter I argue, that massive concentrations of material wealth undermine the democratic process because material power can be transferred to political power. To safeguard liberty new economic institutions have to be found that guarantee equal political codetermination necessitating the prevention of massive concentrations of wealth in the hands of a minority of society. In the second chapter I introduce Alan Thomas’ proposal that aims at giving a feasible solution for liberal societies that face the threat of a loss of liberty by dominating economic elites. Thomas suggests rearranging the economic institutions such that democratic equality is guaranteed. This he sees met by the institutions of a property-owning democracy that characterises especially by the widespread dispersion of capital among citizens. Thomas claims that a property-owning democracy is superior to other types of economic organization because it is not only structuring social interaction such that outcomes are just, but he also sees it mastering the task to reconcile economic efficiency with democratic equality. The feasibility of Thomas’ proposal to safeguard liberty are centre of the discussion in the third chapter.Show less
