The outcome in the Netherlands of the 2016 Ukraine referendum was influenced by Eurosceptic voting. Both this thesis and The National Referendum Research show that a lack of trust in the European...Show moreThe outcome in the Netherlands of the 2016 Ukraine referendum was influenced by Eurosceptic voting. Both this thesis and The National Referendum Research show that a lack of trust in the European Union corresponds with a ‘No’ vote. This thesis takes the analysis of the role of Eurosceptic voting a step further by using more explanatory models of Euroscepticism, giving insight on not only the relationship with Euroscepticism as a linear factor, but also as a multi-dimensional concept and a benchmark concept. With these models, this thesis shows that perceived utility of the EU - separate from trust in the EU - is an important factor that influenced the outcome of this Ukraine referendum. Beyond this, it shows that the referendum voters’ average trust in the EU’s policy and regime is lower than their trust in the national policy and regime. This leads to the conclusion that the Dutch voters have sent a message to The Hague and Brussels that they must put more effort in showing the Netherlands’ benefits through EU membership, for lack of confidence in the EU’s utility has been a key element in not accepting this international association agreement. On a methodological level, this thesis aims to contribute to a new research method predicated on the idea of ‘average towns’ because its data is collected based on the comparability of the municipality of Heemskerk with the Netherlands as a whole, in both demographics and voting outcomes.Show less
Throughout its existence, the European Union has been challenged and criticized by populist parties from both the left-wing and right-wing of the political spectrum. As the growing support for...Show moreThroughout its existence, the European Union has been challenged and criticized by populist parties from both the left-wing and right-wing of the political spectrum. As the growing support for populist parties within Europe could have negative consequences for the future of the EU, this thesis is concerned with the Eurosceptic behaviour of populist parties in one member state of the EU, namely the Netherlands. This thesis conducts an analysis of the discourse and voting behaviour of a Dutch left-wing populist party, the Socialist Party, and right-wing populist party, the Party for Freedom, regarding the European Union in order to find out to what extent populist parties with different ideological persuasions share a Eurosceptic stance due to their shared populism. As a result, the research question of this thesis is: In what ways do populist left-wing and populist right-wing parties’ discourse and voting behaviour on the issue of the EU differ in the Netherlands? Based on the analysis of the chosen sources, which include party manifestos, parliamentary debates and votes in the Dutch House of Representatives, the final results of this analysis reveal that the left-wing SP and right-wing PVV do have some similar stances on the EU due to their populist background, but predominantly have different motivations for their Eurosceptic stance due to their ideological persuasions. Therefore, this thesis concludes that we cannot speak of a unified populist Eurosceptic narrative.Show less
This research sheds light on the effect of political parties’ positions regarding European integration on the collective action frames they use in the Eurobonds debate, focusing on The Netherlands....Show moreThis research sheds light on the effect of political parties’ positions regarding European integration on the collective action frames they use in the Eurobonds debate, focusing on The Netherlands. Parliamentary debates about Eurobonds during both the Eurozone crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic are studied. As a result, this study reveals how collective action framing was used to steer towards acceptance of the shared debt, which is a characteristic of Eurobonds, of the Next Generation Europe (NGEU) recovery program, while The Netherlands had initially positioned itself as a firm opponent. Six collective action frames are identified. These frames demonstrate how political parties use discourse to legitimize or delegitimize policy ideas and choices made on the EU level based on their position on European integration.Show less
This thesis analyses the role of directness of EU policy influence on the frame building by Eurosceptical parties in the context of politicisation of European integration. The thesis consists of a...Show moreThis thesis analyses the role of directness of EU policy influence on the frame building by Eurosceptical parties in the context of politicisation of European integration. The thesis consists of a structured focused comparison of two cases in which domestic policy contestation took place regarding two European(ised) issues that differed in regards to the directness of EU policy influence present. These cases concern the EU’s ban on pulse fishing and the Dutch nitrogen crisis. In analysing the frame building present in each case an inductive qualitative content analysis is conducted on parliamentary contributions by the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) and Forum for Democracy (FvD) and their party manifestos are reviewed. The findings show that although both topics as such have become politicised in the domestic arena the frame building differs per case. When EU policy influence can be considered more direct, frames more directly involve the European dimension and tap more into external EU delegitimising discourses. However, when EU policy influence can be considered more indirect the domestic dimension is addressed more prominently and focus lies more on chastising the government and disputing the issue on party ideological grounds. These findings hint at the potential causal relevance of such a concept of ‘directness of EU policy influence’ that consolidates insights from the literature on Europeanisation and Multi-Level Blame Games. The thesis forwards a conceptualisation of this directness involving (1) the underlying authority structure of the European(ised) policy, (2) the degree of policy misfit it involves, (3) the soft or hard nature of the policy and (4) the visibility of the European dimension in the policy. The insights of the thesis might be of interests to scholars of politicisation of European integration, particularly post-functionalist scholars, as they help illuminate how the politicisation of a European(ised) policy does not necessarily bring about equivalent politicisation of European integration as a whole.Show less
This thesis is concerned with the behaviour of Eurosceptic parties, especially in light of Eurosceptic success. Specifically studying the Eurosceptic response to Brexit, this thesis conducts a case...Show moreThis thesis is concerned with the behaviour of Eurosceptic parties, especially in light of Eurosceptic success. Specifically studying the Eurosceptic response to Brexit, this thesis conducts a case study of three Dutch Soft Eurosceptic parties and their rhetoric and behaviour in the years after the Brexit vote. The results of this qualitative content analysis are mixed, with every party analysed showing different results. Overall, though, it seems that a party’s ideological orientation has more of a role in determining its response to Brexit than its Eurosceptic identity. This conclusion adds to doubts, previously articulated by other scholars, concerning the strength of classifying a party as Soft Eurosceptic. This thesis therefore calls for a renewed focus on national case studies in future research in order to expand our knowledge on what shapes Eurosceptic (parties’) behaviour.Show less
Trust in the European Union is a complex issue with many factors affecting it. Some of the factors that could also be influencing each other. This research focusses on how the relation between...Show moreTrust in the European Union is a complex issue with many factors affecting it. Some of the factors that could also be influencing each other. This research focusses on how the relation between Eastern orthodoxy and trust in the European Parliament is influenced by nationalism. The question central to this thesis is: To what degree does nationalism affect the relation between Eastern orthodox religiousness and an individual's level of trust in the European Union in Bulgaria and Cyprus? The objective of the research is to find how strong the relation is between Eastern orthodoxy and European trust in an environment where the potential link between Eastern orthodoxy and nationalism is at its strongest. Excising literature suggested that in majority Orthodox countries, there seems to be a strong tie between nationalism, a variable with a historic negative relation to European support, and Eastern orthodoxy, a variable that has a historic positive relation with European support. Therefore the expectation is that when excluding nationalism from the analysis, the relation between Eastern orthodoxy and European trust would be more negative compared to the analysis with nationalism included. However, through a multiple regression analysis using the data from the European Social Survey, this hypothesis finds no supporting evidence for the supposed relation between Eastern orthodoxy and European trust. The inclusion of nationalism into the regression does not make a significant change to this result. Instead, nationalism seems to be a strong predictor for European trust without heavily affecting the effect of Eastern orthodoxy. This leads to the conclusion that to understand Euroscepticism, factors like country of residence and emotional attachment to a country make for stronger predictors of Euroscepticism compared to religion.Show less
The Dutch Socialist Party (SP) has often been categorised as a populist and (soft) Eurosceptic party. Lately, however, the party’s Eurosceptic and populist degree have been called into question....Show moreThe Dutch Socialist Party (SP) has often been categorised as a populist and (soft) Eurosceptic party. Lately, however, the party’s Eurosceptic and populist degree have been called into question. Some scholars claimed that the party’s Euroscepticism is becoming ambiguous, whereas others diverge on the SP’s populist nature. Some scholars (i.e., March, 2011; Otjes and Louwerse, 2015) claim that the SP is a populist party portraying the main characteristics of anti-elitism and people-centrism. Others in contrast, stress that the SP is not populist (e.g., Lucardie & Voerman, 2012). Accordingly, this research elaborates on two issues. First, a better understanding is grasped towards the party’s Eurosceptic and populist views. This is done alongside the frameworks provided by Vasilopoulou (2018), Keith (2017), Mudde, (2004) and Hameleers (2018). Secondly, this research examines whether the party has been shifting in its populist and Eurosceptic degree over the past few years in which emphasis is placed on the timeframe 2014-2021. As a result, the research question central to this thesis is: How can the Eurosceptic and populist character of the SP be understood and in what ways did the party shift in their Eurosceptic and populist degree between 2014 and 2021? Qualitative methods in the form of content analysis have accordingly been employed. Party manifestos and additional primary sources such as speeches and electoral campaigning videos have been selected and analysed. Based on the analysis of the main sources, the final results of this thesis reveal that the SP can be categorised as conditional Eurosceptic and populist. The party shows a constant Eurosceptic level, but its populist degree is shifting constantly. This seems to be a result both electoral success, poor electoral performances and party leadership change.Show less
Anaylsis of speeches given by leaders of the UK Conservative Party leaders during Britain's time in the European Union. Explaining how they contributed to the discourse of sovereignism that defined...Show moreAnaylsis of speeches given by leaders of the UK Conservative Party leaders during Britain's time in the European Union. Explaining how they contributed to the discourse of sovereignism that defined much of the leave campaign in the 2016 Brexit referendum.Show less
This thesis researches how Dutch PRRPs agree or disagree over EU policy areas and whether this changes over time. At the national level, it is important to know how their EU positions vary for...Show moreThis thesis researches how Dutch PRRPs agree or disagree over EU policy areas and whether this changes over time. At the national level, it is important to know how their EU positions vary for gauging the possibility of long-term cooperation and the exact areas that they might influence in the future. The content analysis based on election manifestos shows that there is a variety of views on the EU, while all parties are generally Eurosceptic. Further, it is shown that PRRPs do adopt a stable position on the EU and that the source of significant position change is a split of a PRRP. So, it is expected that PRRPs will stay Eurosceptic and therefore keep trying to complicate further European integration in the future.Show less
In the last decade, several Eastern members of the European Union (EU) have regressed in their democratic quality. This ‘democratic backsliding’ has most notably occurred in Hungary where the...Show moreIn the last decade, several Eastern members of the European Union (EU) have regressed in their democratic quality. This ‘democratic backsliding’ has most notably occurred in Hungary where the populist government led by Viktor Orbán continues to infringe upon the liberal democratic values championed by the EU. As the Hungarian populist government employs a Eurosceptic narrative, its continued success in combination with the rather pro-EU population is puzzling. Applying a multidimensional framework of EU attitudes, this study conducts a quantitative analysis of public opinion to explain the aforementioned puzzle and gauge the impact Euroscepticism has on the continued success of populism. It is argued that the government uses the underlying dimensions of EU attitudes to varying extent to mobilise public support. The binary regression’s results show that popular EU attitudes are not a definitive predictor for populist support. Nonetheless, the findings illustrate that the continued success of the Hungarian government is attributable to nationalist sentiments in the unique post-communist context.Show less
Over the last several years, a shift toward Eurosceptic populism has been apparent in the Dutch political landscape. The rise of Eurosceptic populism and the subsequent erosion of traditional...Show moreOver the last several years, a shift toward Eurosceptic populism has been apparent in the Dutch political landscape. The rise of Eurosceptic populism and the subsequent erosion of traditional centrist parties have been described as one of the most prominent changes of the last decade. One party that is relatively new to the Dutch political landscape is Forum for Democracy (FvD). This party soon has been characterised as hard Eurosceptic, anti-EU, and populist by political opponents and mass media. Although far-right political parties are often labeled Eurosceptic and populist, Euroscepticism is not a phenomenon with a single explanation. Political parties differ in their critical attitude toward the EU, and distinctions can be made between categories of populist right-wing parties. This thesis, therefore, examines the Eurosceptic and populist nature of FvD. In addition, it analyses what factors contribute to the success of far-right Dutch political parties, such as FvD. Qualitative research has been used to examine the degree of Euroscepticism, the populist nature and the factors contributing to the success of populist Eurosceptic parties. The FvD party is used as a case study in this paper. This research project is based on party manifestos, speeches and debates. The results show that FvD can be classified as a hard rejectionist Eurosceptic party and as populist radical right-wing. The success of far-right populist political parties can be explained on the basis of different aspects, such as anti-immigration sentiments, political distrust among voters, increased volatility, and charismatic leadership. Each aspect can be found in the manifestos and other related texts of FvD. Hence, these aspects can be considered one of the main reasons explaining the rise of far-right parties such as FvD. However, it should be noted that the factors based on voter motivations have largely been excluded. An additional focus on the factor of voter motives could have drawn a bigger picture and provided a better explanation for the recent rise of far-right political parties. Therefore, it is recommended that more research shall be conducted.Show less
This thesis offers a qualitative descriptive analysis to explain what drivers affect the development of Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party (UK) between 1990 and 2016. Three drivers are...Show moreThis thesis offers a qualitative descriptive analysis to explain what drivers affect the development of Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party (UK) between 1990 and 2016. Three drivers are found to have enormous impact on Conservative Euroscepticism. These are as follows: inner party divide, radical right threat and issue salience within party strategy. The Conservatives became increasingly divided over European integration throughout the time frame. Through the attempts to mend this divide by Conservative leaders, most importantly John Major and David Cameron, they increasingly adopted harsher Eurosceptic policies to please their pro/anti EU divided party. UKIP, a radical right party, experienced electoral success throughout the time frame, which is seen as a threat towards the Conservatives, and thus a driver of Conservative Euroscepticism. Lastly, UKIP’s success largely interplays with issue salience. This thesis sees issue salience as a driver of Conservative Euroscepticism, as both parties adopted shifts in political strategy in order to compete for electoral success in light of EU issue salience. All three factors interplay; meaning the one affects the other.Show less
Nationalism, Euroscepticism and populism are intertwined concepts in many Western European political parties. Discourse reveals the relationship between nationalism and Euroscepticism to be the...Show moreNationalism, Euroscepticism and populism are intertwined concepts in many Western European political parties. Discourse reveals the relationship between nationalism and Euroscepticism to be the adherence of discursive rules based on Kohn’s dichotomy. The political parties PVV and UKIP are discursively analysed, resulting in an illustration of their reasoning justified by xenophobia, ethno-cultural homogeneity and Western-centrism through populist language.Show less
While we can find evidence in the literature of a shift in the discourse of far-right Eurosceptic parties after the 2005 referendum in France and the Netherlands, its effects on the discourse of...Show moreWhile we can find evidence in the literature of a shift in the discourse of far-right Eurosceptic parties after the 2005 referendum in France and the Netherlands, its effects on the discourse of the far-left are largely understudied. This thesis then strives to investigate the impact of the failed Dutch and French referendums on far-left Euroscepticism, and figure out if it can partly explain its rise before the 2008 economic crisis. In the end, we find that far-left Eurosceptic parties have indeed shifted their discourse post-2005, and that the campaign and result of the referendum can account for a part of this shift.Show less
Right-wing populism is becoming increasingly popular in Western Europe, this is also evident when looking at the Netherlands. Geert Wilders, party leader of the Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV), has...Show moreRight-wing populism is becoming increasingly popular in Western Europe, this is also evident when looking at the Netherlands. Geert Wilders, party leader of the Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV), has been the face of right-wing populism in the Netherlands for a long time, however, it seems that he has now been replaced by Thierry Baudet. Baudet is the party leader of the Forum voor Democratie (FvD), the two-year-old party has managed to win the provincial elections back in March of this year. With the rise of right-wing populist rhetoric, also the exclusion of people has become prominent. This thesis aims to research and analyse how the rhetoric of contemporary right-wing parties contributes to discrimination and xenophobia in the Netherlands.Show less
“During 21st century, right-wing populist parties in Europe have gained an unprecedented momentum and are slowly changing its political realms. World events of 2016 such as the UK’s vote to exit...Show more“During 21st century, right-wing populist parties in Europe have gained an unprecedented momentum and are slowly changing its political realms. World events of 2016 such as the UK’s vote to exit the European Union and United States’ presidential election of Donald Trump further underlined the general turn to the populist right. Therefore, it becomes increasingly important to identify and explain the key triggers of voting preferences for such anti-establishment parties in a previously democratic context. The research presents the top five traditional scholarly explanations for increasing support for the populist far-right (immigration, Euroscepticism, new media, globalization, modernization and economic crisis), and further tests them through a comparative analysis of two distinct European states largely affected by the populist resurgence – Hungary and France. The analysis in this paper is based on polling data from the Eurobarometer survey, alongside secondary literature, and attempts not only at testing the above-mentioned scholarly explanations, but pinpointing the similarities and differences of voting preferences for the populist far-right between Eastern and Western European voters, which currently remain under researched.”Show less
