Since its introduction, the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) has become a central Chinese foreign policy project and has consequently received a lot attention in the international sphere. By...Show moreSince its introduction, the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) has become a central Chinese foreign policy project and has consequently received a lot attention in the international sphere. By referring to ancient Silk Road times, China shows it is dedicated to take an inclusive approach by its desire to develop the initiative in all the countries that are willing to cooperate. One could argue that it is a product of China’s rise to becoming an economic and political heavy-weight over the last decades. Therefore, it is important for scholars to better understand the Chinese BRI. This paper seeks to contribute to this understanding by investigating the specific case of the BRI in Kazakhstan. As the largest country of the Central Asian region in terms of land, Kazakhstan holds a key position in the BRI as the area that will connect China to the Middle-East and Europe. This study aims to build on the idea that the BRI qualifies as a Chinese strategy in conducting this case study research. To produce such a study, this paper will draw on the framework of power as introduced by influential political scientist and assistant Secretary of Defense under former president Bill Clinton, Joseph S. Nye. In the remainder of this paper, Nye’s concepts of hard, soft and smart power will be understood as mechanisms for influence when looking at the Chinese BRI in Kazakhstan. More specifically, the ambition of this paper is to investigate whether China is combining hard and soft power elements in Kazakhstan into a strategy that could be understood as smart power.Show less
Why is it that states that are best endowed with power resources do not always achieve the outcomes they desire? This phenomenon is what Baldwin (1979) calls the “paradox of unrealized power”. Dahl...Show moreWhy is it that states that are best endowed with power resources do not always achieve the outcomes they desire? This phenomenon is what Baldwin (1979) calls the “paradox of unrealized power”. Dahl (1957) famously defines power as A getting B to do something that B would otherwise not have done. An example of this paradox is the outcome of the battle between the European Union and the Russian Federation over Ukraine. Since 2004 both the EU and Russia have sought closer integration with Ukraine (Wilson and Popescu 2009). In 2014 Ukraine signed an Association Agreement with the EU, while regions in east Ukraine declared independence and Crimea even acceded to Russia (AlJazeera 2014; BBC 2014a; Reuters 2014a; Centrum for Strategic and International Studies 2014). Paradoxically, although the EU in total possesses more power resources than Russia, it was the Kremlin that achieved their desired outcome of closer integration in the east of Ukraine. In the literature on power two major explanations aim to account for such phenomena: A’s faulty power conversion strategies and A’s failed contextual analysis (Baldwin 1979). Yet one crucial element that is absent in the contextual explanation is a theoretical model about what ultimately motivates B to comply. In order to assess whether the combination of the power conversion and the refined contextual explanation accounts for the paradox, the causal process behind the outcomes of the Ukrainian crisis of 2013/2014 is analyzed using process-tracing. The analysis of behavioral motivations suggests that B’s self-identification determines the boundaries within which A can realize its power, and that B’s identity is largely beyond the control of A. The results also indicate that A’s power conversion strategy needs to include tangible means of power to achieve the goal of territorial expansion.Show less
