This thesis will seek to explore the Obama administration’s reasoning behind its foreign policy of ‘leading from behind’ in the NATO alliance. While the United States proved willing to account for...Show moreThis thesis will seek to explore the Obama administration’s reasoning behind its foreign policy of ‘leading from behind’ in the NATO alliance. While the United States proved willing to account for an excessive share of the burden during, for example, the intervention in the former Yugoslavia of 1999, Washington DC called for a wider shared responsibility during the 2011 intervention in Libya. It will be argued that the core arguments of the hegemonic stability theory, which are generally neglected in debates about military burden-sharing, render useful in explaining this shift in American contributions made to the NATO alliance. By analysing and comparing the two major NATO air campaigns in the former Yugoslavia and Libya, it will be revealed that the shift from a unipolar to a multi-polar world has resulted in this new direction in US foreign policy. This thesis will demonstrate that the unipolar world in which the intervention in the former Yugoslavia took place allowed the US to retain – and even strengthen – its hegemonic position in the global order. However, the Obama administration took the relative decline of US power into account in its decision to lead from behind in Libya. As predicted by the hegemonic stability theory, hegemons that lose power become less willing to accept free-riding in alliances and reconsider the way in which they spend their resources. The intervention in Libya should, therefore, be considered as a tipping point that reflected this new direction in US foreign policy.Show less
