In this thesis I argue that the book On Touching-Jean-Luc Nancy by Jacques Derrida, whilst having touching as its main theme, is informed by Derrida's ethics. In On Touching Derrida argues that the...Show moreIn this thesis I argue that the book On Touching-Jean-Luc Nancy by Jacques Derrida, whilst having touching as its main theme, is informed by Derrida's ethics. In On Touching Derrida argues that the history of philosophy is haptocentric, meaning that touch is privileged over the other senses. This privilege consists in a lack of liminality and alterity in the philosophy of touching. I argue that this is problematic for Derrida because alterity is an important factor in his thinking of ethics, where the alterity of the other informs the double bind between the responsibility for the general and the singular alterior other. The double bind is important because of its implications in the impossible yet necessary jump from ethics to politics and justice for Derrida. A reading of On Touching and a contextualizing of the book within Derrida's broader oeuvre have led to these conclusions.Show less
In the philosophy of logic, Mohanty and Matilal formulate well-nigh identical responses to Husserlian charges that accuse Indian Nyaya logic of being unacceptably psychologistic. Husserl holds that...Show moreIn the philosophy of logic, Mohanty and Matilal formulate well-nigh identical responses to Husserlian charges that accuse Indian Nyaya logic of being unacceptably psychologistic. Husserl holds that logical psychologism regards logic as a branch of empirical psychology. Thereby, logical psychologism cannot, unacceptably so, accommodate the necessity and objectivity of characteristic contents of logical theories, such as logical laws. Since Nyaya logic is centred around the study of mental processes of inference, it may be prima facie classified as unacceptably psychologistic in Husserl’s spirit. In response, Mohanty and Matilal defend Nyaya logic by pointing to its commitment to the existence of intentional structures, that is, universal and formal structures underlying the content of so-called cognitions. In this thesis, I intend to achieve two aims. The first aim is to comparatively explicate conceptual points of connection between Husserl’s framework, logical psychologism and Nyaya logic in more detail compared to Mohanty’s and Matilal’s commentaries on this matter. The second aim is to critically expand Nyaya logic and its given defence by Mohanty and Matilal, so that the Nyaya logician may better resist Husserlian accusations of Nyaya logic being psychologistic. This expansion is based on my own logical realist proposal. According to this proposal, specific mind-independent features of reality account for the necessity and objectivity of certain characteristic contents of logical theories, such as logical laws or certain rules of inference. In the first section, I introduce logical psychologism as well as highlight the key features of Husserl’s framework relative to it. In the second section, I introduce Nyaya logic as it is situated within the Nyaya framework to then explain Mohanty’s and Matilal’s given defence. The third section draws from the first two sections and comprises my critical expansion of Nyaya logic and this defence using my logical realist proposal.Show less
This thesis discusses the thinking on time by Husserl and Heidegger. Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit and Husserl’s Vorlesungen are the two main sources of study. Husserl’s primary purpose with...Show moreThis thesis discusses the thinking on time by Husserl and Heidegger. Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit and Husserl’s Vorlesungen are the two main sources of study. Husserl’s primary purpose with Vorlesungen is to deliver a phenomenological analysis of the consciousness of time. The preliminary goal that Heidegger sets for himself in Sein und Zeit is to provide an interpretation of time as a possible horizon of Dasein. The main question of this thesis is: What role does the concept of ‘horizon’ play in Seit und Zeit by Heidegger and in Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins by Husserl, and how do these concepts relate to one another? Over the past decades, a number of comparative studies on Husserl’s and Heidegger’s concepts of time have appeared, many of which argue that Husserl’s Vorlesungen strongly depend on a metaphysical thinking on time. Heidegger too is critical towards Husserl, directly or indirectly, due to the fact that to his judgement, Husserl reduces all experience to transcendental subjectivity, which results in everything being present to the subject. The purpose of this thesis, however, is to demonstrate that with Husserl as much as with Heidegger, we can speak of an ontology of time. This is clarified, amongst other things, using Husserl’s concept of ‘horizon’. The horizon concept that Husserl uses, appears to be merely empirical and ontic, as opposed to Heidegger’s existential-ontological horizon concept. Yet this thesis demonstrates that Husserl’s horizon does in fact have ontological attributes. To conclude so appears to be a small contribution to existing studies on Husserl and Heidegger, yet it certainly has consequences for an accurate interpretation and comparison of time concepts by Husserl and Heidegger. Even though the ontological character of time with Husserl is not thematic, it can certainly be found in Vorlesungen and therefore cannot be ignored. As a result, Husserl’s ideas can no longer be considered exclusively metaphysical.Show less
The thesis argues that the concept of landscape fails to do justice to the experience of it. Through an analysis of the concept and of its origins, it locates the presuppositions of the concept in...Show moreThe thesis argues that the concept of landscape fails to do justice to the experience of it. Through an analysis of the concept and of its origins, it locates the presuppositions of the concept in its understanding of self and world. A phenomenological approach reveals that current understanding of landscape perpetuates the distinction of subject and object, disabling the experience of being in a landscape. Drawing on the later works of Husserl and Heidegger, the concluding chapters works towards an understanding of landscape as awareness of earth.Show less
Dit essay is de weergave van een onderzoek naar de mogelijkheden en de grenzen van de fenomenologische reductie, waarbij de zogenoemde 'erotische reductie' in de filosofie van Jean-Luc Marion de...Show moreDit essay is de weergave van een onderzoek naar de mogelijkheden en de grenzen van de fenomenologische reductie, waarbij de zogenoemde 'erotische reductie' in de filosofie van Jean-Luc Marion de leidraad vormt. Onderzocht wordt, welke ontwikkeling het fenomenologische reductiebegrip heeft doorgemaakt in het werk van Edmund Husserl en Martin Heidegger, om vervolgens uit te komen bij Marions filosofie van de liefde.Show less
Voor Heidegger en Levinas is de sterfelijkheid een wezenlijk kenmerk van het menselijk leven. Het nadenken over de eigen dood biedt de mens volgens beide denkers belangrijke inzichten in het...Show moreVoor Heidegger en Levinas is de sterfelijkheid een wezenlijk kenmerk van het menselijk leven. Het nadenken over de eigen dood biedt de mens volgens beide denkers belangrijke inzichten in het bestaan. Bewustwording van het gegeven dat de mens gaat sterven, is volgens hen cruciaal om de waarde van het leven te beseffen. Bovendien menen beiden dat de dood doorleefd kan worden, door dit fenomeen naast biologisch, ook ontologisch en metafysisch te interpreteren. Op deze manieren begrepen, is de doodsbeleving bij zowel Heidegger als Levinas een levensvernieuwende gebeurtenis. Over de precieze betekenis van het fenomeen van de sterfelijkheid en wat de dood ons leert over het leven zijn ze het echter volledig oneens. Levinas’ ideeën over het wezen van de mens en de invulling van het goede leven verschillen sterk van die van Heidegger. Ze zijn een fundamentele kritiek op Heideggers ontologische filosofie in Sein und Zeit. Dit onderzoekt maakt aannemelijk dat deze kritiek op Heideggers denken samenkomt in Levinas’ alternatieve doodsanalyse. Het nieuwe inzicht dat deze zienswijze oplevert, is een verheldering van Levinas’ kritiek op Heidegger via de fenomenologie van de dood.Show less
