Economic sanctions are a coercive diplomacy tool often used by sender states to elicit behavioral change in the target state. Prior research focused on the domestic elements of the target state,...Show moreEconomic sanctions are a coercive diplomacy tool often used by sender states to elicit behavioral change in the target state. Prior research focused on the domestic elements of the target state, thus this research tests the cooperative theory in which the focus is on the international behavior of the target state when assessing the effectiveness of economic sanctions. The research question driving this thesis is: are economic sanctions more effective in a non-cooperative authoritarian state or a cooperative authoritarian state? The two case studies are China (cooperative authoritarian state) and Iran (non-cooperative authoritarian state). Through five mechanisms, budget of the target state, opposition within the target state, type of sanction, commitment of the sender state, and dependence of the target state on the international community, the effectiveness of the sanctions is analyzed. Noticeably there is a stronger link between effective sanctions and the cooperative authoritarian state (China) in comparison with the non-cooperative authoritarian state (Iran), the international mechanisms mostly drive the effectiveness of the sanctions in the cooperative authoritarian state, and neo-realism is a very noticeable factor in utilizing economic sanctions.Show less
Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported about the possible clandestine goals of Iran’s nuclear program , the P5+1 group (consisting of the US, the UK, France, Russia and China ...Show moreSince the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported about the possible clandestine goals of Iran’s nuclear program , the P5+1 group (consisting of the US, the UK, France, Russia and China + Germany) suspects Iran of covertly building a nuclear weapon . The aim of the thesis is to demonstrate why states abide by the nuclear non-proliferation norm in general. Specifically, the research aims to gain insights into the Iranian political decision-making on the nuclear issue in order to answer the question whether the choice in 2013 to abide by the nuclear non-proliferation norm is caused by the logic of consequences, the logic of appropriateness, or both. The research takes a constructivist approach and uses Checkel’s (1997) model of domestic norm implementation and the spiral model of Risse and Sikkink (1999) to analyze how these logics of behavior and the domestic political structure influence the Iranian elite decision-making process. It is expected that, in accordance with these models, the election of a new president in June 2013 has fostered further domestic norm implementation. Negotiation proposals of both Iran and the P5+1 group, together with IAEA and United Nations Security Council resolutions, are analyzed through process tracing. The results show that while from 2005 to 2013 the Iranian governments followed a logic of consequences and defied international sanctions, the current government’s behavior seems to be based predominantly on a logic of appropriateness and cooperates more willingly with the P5+1 and appears to abide by the nuclear non-proliferation norm.Show less
Bachelor thesis | Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology (BSc)
open access
Veiling, het bedekken van het vrouwelijk lichaam, wordt vaak verbonden met het Midden Oosten. Vrouwen worden geacht zich op een kuise manier te bedekken zodat zij niet opvallen voor het mannelijke...Show moreVeiling, het bedekken van het vrouwelijk lichaam, wordt vaak verbonden met het Midden Oosten. Vrouwen worden geacht zich op een kuise manier te bedekken zodat zij niet opvallen voor het mannelijke geslacht. Veiling is een breed begrip met een andere betekenis in een andere situatie. Het beleid omtrent veiling verschilt per land en is niet altijd constant geweest. Door veranderingen binnen de nationale overheden van landen in het Midden Oosten bestaat er een rijke geschiedenis van het uiterlijk van de vrouw binnen de samenleving. Het doel van deze scriptie is het naast elkaar leggen van twee verschillende landen binnen het Midden Oosten en het bekijken van het beleid omtrent veiling op nationaal niveau. Iran is een land waar strenge kledingvoorschriften bestaan, vooral voor de vrouwen. De revolutie van 1979 heeft grote veranderingen gebracht in het straatbeeld van Iran. Tijdens de revolutie stonden gesluierde en ongesluierde vrouwen naast elkaar in het verzet tegen het regime. Mensen met verschillende achtergronden namen deel aan de revolutie en dit bracht hoop op een gelijke samenleving met zich mee (Sedghi 2007: 203). Kort na de val van het oude regime verdween deze hoop op gelijke rechten na de instelling van reveiling (her-sluieren). Ayatollah Khomeini verplichtte de Iraanse vrouw een hijab te dragen (Sedghi 2007: 201). In de periode na de revolutie werd er gestreefd naar een Islamitische identiteit. Het symbool van de staatsopbouw in Iran werd de vrouw, en vooral de verhulling van haar lichaam. Hiernaast werden gender segregatie en ongelijkheid integraal aan de staatsopbouw, waar niet iedereen het mee eens was (Sedghi 2007: 201). De situatie voorafgaand aan de revolutie was verdwenen en om dit vast te houden werd met harde hand controle gehouden. Na een periode van ‘unveiling’ (ontsluieren) werden Iraanse vrouwen geacht zich te houden aan het ‘reveiling’ (her-sluieren) beleid. Het land wat ik naast Iran wil gaan leggen is een westers georiënteerd land dat meegerekend wordt bij het Midden Oosten: Turkije. Het land is een parlementaire democratie en het heeft een seculiere staatsinrichting. In Turkije is secularisatie gericht op het scheiden van de openbare en religieuze sfeer (Barras 2009: 1240). Het is een nieuwe regeling die de staat aanneemt als onderdeel van het beleid waar zij controle uitoefenen op religie binnen de samenleving (Barras 2009: 1238). Turkije heeft de staat openlijk bestuurd aan de hand van de Islam door middel van zijn ‘State Directorate of Religious Affairs’ (‘Diyanet’) (Barras 2009: 1241). Dit houdt in dat er controle wordt gehouden op islamitische religieuze educatie en de aanstelling van religieuze ambtenaren; er is geen sprake van een duidelijke scheiding van de kerk en de staat. Turkije richt zich op het verwijderen van religieuze symbolen uit de publieke ruimtes. Het wil een samenleving creëren die geen religieuze symbolen bevat en dit leidt in 1981 tot een verbod op het dragen van een hoofddoek (Barras 2009: 1241). In de ogen van Turkije hoort het dragen van een hoofddoek niet bij het idee van secularisatie.Show less
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is like soccer: there are supporters and opponents. Supporters credit BMD with providing full security against rogue states. Opponents fear a renewed arms race with...Show moreBallistic Missile Defense (BMD) is like soccer: there are supporters and opponents. Supporters credit BMD with providing full security against rogue states. Opponents fear a renewed arms race with Russia or China. There is another analogy: playing in the major league is awarding. Land-based and seabased missile defense each are attractive options, offering pros and cons to foreign policy makers, while military planners have to make tough decisions on how to allocate scarce defense resources in the face of austerity. A small or medium-sized state like the Netherlands has only a few policy options: emulate the policy of the hegemon, strive for national or European innovative solutions or (continue to) do nothing at all. Neoclassical realism holds that the state is not a black box in the anarchy of international relations, but that the foreign policy elite makes resource allocation decisions on the basis of its own perception of the external vulnerability of the state. State institutions, domestic influence groups and party politics in turn influence both threat perception and resource allocation. Resource allocation should ideally support the best foreign policy option to counter the perceived threat. Of course, external state actors, industrial and transnational organizations influence the foreign policy elite as well. Against this backdrop, the author uses the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism to research and describe the influence that domestic influence groups can exert on policy decisions regarding the Netherlands’ BMD capabilities. After a brief introduction into neoclassical realism, the external vulnerability is described in terms of the existing ballistic missile threat posed by Iran. The threat perception is approached form the eye of the beholder: regional actors, NATO as our primary security alliance and of course domestic actors. Then the primary BMD resources available to the Netherlands are described: operational capabilities, technological innovation and defense industrial base. External factors and domestic interest groups that affect resource allocation decisions, such as the international defense industry and national civic societal actors, are analyzed. The dominant foreign policy mantra that the Netherlands’ international reputation is at stake after incessant defense budget cuts and relinquishing our NATO commitments is also taken into account as a factor of influence. Finally, four adaptive strategies are researched as BMD policy options: blindly emulate US policy (with high investment costs), join European innovation policies (with high political and investment costs), do nothing (which eventually leads to a free rider status) or a mixed innovative emulation strategy (which attains foreign policy objectives appropriate for a small or medium power while at the same time promoting Dutch industrial interests). Research indicates that very few domestic actors actually oppose the Dutch role in BMD. The author concludes that the Netherlands cannot afford to lose its leading position in European BMD capabilities. Our reputation is firmly based on our Patriot capability, and for a long time we have punched above our weight. Our credibility is at risk – and maritime BMD is one of the very few niche capabilities that we hold as bargaining chip to promote our interests in international relations. The stakes are high – but so are the potential rewards.Show less
In the past, the threat of nuclear arms and the states and actors that might gain access to such technology has resulted in the pre-emptive use of military force against states. Israel attacked...Show moreIn the past, the threat of nuclear arms and the states and actors that might gain access to such technology has resulted in the pre-emptive use of military force against states. Israel attacked Iraq (Operation Opera in 1981) and Syria (Operation Orchard in 2007) in order to prevent or forcefully disrupt their nuclear proliferation efforts. Currently, concern about Iran’s nuclear program has raised debate about the possibility of an Israeli pre-emptive attack. This thesis employs hypotheses from realist, constructivist and liberal theory to explain the use of force in counter-proliferation, using a strategy of within-case and across-case analysis of both prior attacks. I locate determining conditions that led Israel to use force in counter proliferation. The hypotheses explore conditions such as uncertainty about state identity, the perception of threat, the risk of shift in regional power balance, prior military hostility, hostile public statements made by state leaders, undeterrability and the domestic support of state leaders. Most of these conditions are present in the current case of Iran, when considering the possibility of a pre-emptive Israeli attack. If Iran’s military support to Hezbollah is interpreted as indirect military hostility, all the conditions for an Israeli pre-emptive attack would be present, when considering the conditions leading to the previous two Israeli attacks in counter proliferation. The analysis suggests there is a high chance that this will cause Israel to use pre-emptive force in order to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, as the “Begin Doctrine”, on which Israel’s security policy is based, will not accept such high security risks.Show less
