This thesis argues that during the Abe and Suga administrations, Japan has been successful at pushing some of its key security objectives into the agendas of strategically important Southeast Asian...Show moreThis thesis argues that during the Abe and Suga administrations, Japan has been successful at pushing some of its key security objectives into the agendas of strategically important Southeast Asian states through the process of tactical hedging. Tactical hedging has allowed the Abe and Suga administrations to be flexible with its policy approach to the rise of China, allowing Japan to be firm on security issues in Southeast Asia when needed, while allowing room for friendly economic competition. This flexibility made security cooperation with Japan more viable for Southeast Asian states, as none of the countries wish to pursue a hard-line China containment policy. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, which has seen notable alterations by the Abe and Suga administration to address the needs of their Southeast Asian partners, and Japan refraining from openly criticizing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are examples of Japan taking the concerns of its Southeast Asian partners into account. While still at an early stage, the results of Japan’s tactical hedging can be seen within Japan’s improved security relations with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. These three countries, which belong to the largest economies of ASEAN, and are faced with China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, will therefore be used to support the importance of tactical hedging for security cooperation in East Asia.Show less
This thesis argues that during the Abe and Suga administrations, Japan has been successful at pushing some of its key security objectives into the agendas of strategically important Southeast Asian...Show moreThis thesis argues that during the Abe and Suga administrations, Japan has been successful at pushing some of its key security objectives into the agendas of strategically important Southeast Asian states through the process of tactical hedging. Tactical hedging has allowed the Abe and Suga administrations to be flexible with its policy approach to the rise of China, allowing Japan to be firm on security issues in Southeast Asia when needed, while allowing room for friendly economic competition. This flexibility made security cooperation with Japan more viable for Southeast Asian states, as none of the countries wish to pursue a hard-line China containment policy. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, which has seen notable alterations by the Abe and Suga administration to address the needs of their Southeast Asian partners, and Japan refraining from openly criticizing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are examples of Japan taking the concerns of its Southeast Asian partners into account. While still at an early stage, the results of Japan’s tactical hedging can be seen within Japan’s improved security relations with Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. These three countries, which belong to the largest economies of ASEAN, and are faced with China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, will therefore be used to support the importance of tactical hedging for security cooperation in East Asia.Show less
