In this essay I will defend the thesis that Aquinas’ account of practical reason does not entail, and is inconsistent with, the autonomy of morality. That is to say, I believe that Aquinas holds...Show moreIn this essay I will defend the thesis that Aquinas’ account of practical reason does not entail, and is inconsistent with, the autonomy of morality. That is to say, I believe that Aquinas holds the position that morality depends upon theoretical reason and upon our given desires. In order to defend this position, I will make two claims. On the one hand, I will defend the thesis that Aquinas does not accept the existence of the is-ought gap. That is to say, Aquinas believes that we sometimes can justly conclude a normative assertion from a set of factual premises. On the other hand, I also have to justify my belief that Aquinas holds an instrumentalist account of practical reasoning. In other words, Aquinas claims that reasons for actions supervene upon our inner desires. I will try to justify my belief in these two claims by explaining two major concepts in Aquinas’ philosophy. Firstly, I will explain how the notions of goodness and being relate to each other semantically and metaphysically in Aquinas’ philosophy. We will see that ‘being’ and ‘goodness’ are synonymous in denotation. Secondly, I will explain the meaning and use of ‘prudence’ in Aquinas’ practical philosophy. The content of our decision how to act is ‘determined by’ or ‘supervenes upon’ our prior desires.Show less
In dit essay vragen wij ons af of het dictum lex injusta non est lex te verenigen is met het bestaan van politieke verplichtingen. Wij zullen deze vraag beantwoorden aan de hand van een beschouwing...Show moreIn dit essay vragen wij ons af of het dictum lex injusta non est lex te verenigen is met het bestaan van politieke verplichtingen. Wij zullen deze vraag beantwoorden aan de hand van een beschouwing van twee leviathans binnen de natuurrechtfilosofie: John Finnis en Thomas van Aquino. De rode draad van onze beschouwing is geweven van vier begrippen: Autoriteit, morele verplichting, motivatie en onrechtvaardige wet. Nadat we beschikken over de juiste interpretatie van deze vier begrippen zullen we concluderen dat er geen tegenstrijdigheid bestaat tussen aan de ene kant de bewering ‘onrechtvaardige wetten zijn geen wetten’ en aan de andere kant de bewering ‘iedere burger heeft politieke verplichtingen’.Show less
