This thesis shall examine two conceptions of justice, proposed by Rawls and Young respectively, and the society that flows from said conceptions, in order to evaluate them and conclude that they...Show moreThis thesis shall examine two conceptions of justice, proposed by Rawls and Young respectively, and the society that flows from said conceptions, in order to evaluate them and conclude that they are not able to resolve and prevent injustices. These philosophers are the focus of this thesis as they both attempt to measure and resolve injustice, with Rawls focused on equality and distributive issues whilst Young takes an approach based on resolving oppression by respecting group differences. Existing debates in political philosophy can largely be separated into two categories. Arguably the biggest debates are to be found in the category in which Young’s and Rawls’s work can also be found, revolving around the question of what the best possible society would look like. These discussions, however, assume that there is a satisfying answer to debates that fall in the other category, which includes all discussions surrounding the question of whether states are or can be good at all. By evaluating the societies proposed by Rawls and Young this thesis is situated in the first category of discussion, though avoids the assumption that a state is good or justifiable. Instead, this thesis will attempt to bridge the gap between the discussions by noting the injustices caused by these proposed systems of government, opening the door for the inclusion of anarchist philosophy in discussions about the best possible way to order a society.Show less
The claim that democratic citizens are morally obligated to obey unjust laws has been defended by several political thinkers, among whom John Rawls and Thomas Christiano. In essence, both believe...Show moreThe claim that democratic citizens are morally obligated to obey unjust laws has been defended by several political thinkers, among whom John Rawls and Thomas Christiano. In essence, both believe that citizens have to obey the law, even when it is unjust, that is to say, when citizens disagree with it, in a just democracy. As an example of an existing unjust law that would have to be obeyed on both Rawls’ and Christiano’s account, I discuss the Dutch law on euthanasia. My critique of their theories is that they do not take into account the distinction between laws addressing self-regarding and other-regarding conduct. It is my thesis, strengthened by John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, that every individual has a most basic and innate right to be the sole authority on her self-regarding conduct, and therefore that democratic authority is limited to citizens’ other-regarding conduct. Discussing in particular euthanasia in cases of a completed life ('voltooid leven'), I defend euthanasia as self-regarding conduct and therefore as a choice that everyone should be able to make freely. Rawls and Christiano are right to claim that democratic citizens have a moral obligation to obey unjust laws only insofar as they concern other-regarding conduct. To uphold the claim, they have to incorporate said right into their theories and protect it accordingly.Show less
The rapid development of technological innovation has yielded increasing returns on capital investment relative to labour. At the same time, the accumulation of capital seems to be concentrating...Show moreThe rapid development of technological innovation has yielded increasing returns on capital investment relative to labour. At the same time, the accumulation of capital seems to be concentrating more and more into the hands of a select few, resulting in the development of far-reaching economic inequalities. With the development of technological innovation having gained considerable momentum in modern times, the need to design effective policies centred around dealing with the economic, social and political effects of its development arguably seems more important than ever. Property-owning democrats –drawing on John Rawls' conception of justice as fairness- have set out proposals for curbing what they conceive to be undesirable developments in inequality, focusing mainly on the establishment of a socio-economic framework characterized by the widespread dispersal of capital assets. Some scholars such as Vallier (2015), however, have cast doubts on the desirability and effectiveness of adopting a property-owning democracy as the socio-economic arrangement fit to meet these challenges. This thesis attempts to settle the debate. I argue that the satisfaction of the Rawlsian fair value of political liberties favours the justification of a property-owning democracy over that of welfare-capitalism. Furthermore, I assert that the satisfaction of Rawls’ difference principle depends on the exact definition of ‘benefiting’ the least well off, so that this principle may favour the justification of either socio-economic arrangement. I further argue that meeting Rawls’ principle of equality of opportunity would be better served in the context of welfare-state capitalism, taking into account the critiques set out by O’Neill (2009) and Vallier. In addition, I identify further theoretical issues regarding property-owning democrats’ definition of private property that have, in my view, not been sufficiently addressed. Lastly, I identify a number of practical issues regarding the implications of a property-owning democracy in an economic context. Given that only the fair value of political liberties points directly towards the justification of a property-owning democracy -with its justification on the basis of the difference principle and equality of opportunity being questionable and thus unjust- I conclude that a property-owning democracy is not justifiable on Rawlsian grounds.Show less
