In this paper, I shall argue that in Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom (Henceforth referred to as the Freedom Essay), Schelling oscillates between two incompatible...Show moreIn this paper, I shall argue that in Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom (Henceforth referred to as the Freedom Essay), Schelling oscillates between two incompatible concepts of freedom: radical and limited. Radical freedom is spontaneous and identical to the agent's own act. It is founded on undetermined intelligibility and stands outside the theological system's domain. Limited freedom is a decided intelligibility that one-sidedly determines human actions. It is located within the domain of the theological system and meets its requirements. I will make the case that these two concepts of freedom are vulnerable to the charge of arbitrariness. First, I shall argue that equating radical freedom with the agent's own act does not provide determinacy for this concept of freedom. Second, I shall contend that the agent's decision on her intelligibility in limited freedom is undetermined, which consequently renders this freedom undetermined. I will suggest the source of Schelling's oscillation in the Freedom Essay is the existence of two incompatible tendencies: a commitment to provide a concept of freedom with unlimited power, and to indwell that freedom in an ordered theological system. I maintain that the simultaneous fulfilment of these two tasks is impossible.Show less
When it is presented as a strictly epistemological problem, both Kant and Nietzsche are critical of the possibility of self-knowledge. Kant, in his Anthropology, issues a warning for self...Show moreWhen it is presented as a strictly epistemological problem, both Kant and Nietzsche are critical of the possibility of self-knowledge. Kant, in his Anthropology, issues a warning for self-observation of unintentional or involuntary perceptions of our thoughts and feelings, because this leads to ‘enthusiasm’ and ‘madness’. This is because of different forms of self-deception and the fact that Kant holds that self-observation should be observation of voluntary mental representations. With this warning, I argue, the risk of self-observation becomes a problem of moral psychology. Nietzsche also offers a warning or atleast a stipulation of the fact that ‘digging into one’s self’ might lead to hurting ourselves. Instead, Nietzsche argues for self-observation through ‘the outside path’ of the world, which we can then relate back to ourselves. This enables us to be self-creating individuals. In this self-creation however there is still a risk of isolation, but Nietzsche takes this for granted. I compare both thinkers and what I have laid out about their views on the risk of self-observation. I argue that both thinkers recognize risks involved in self-observation, but for different reasons. I also offer a Nietzschean argument against the warning of Kant. Nietzsche would and does argue that not everything we think is voluntary and that philosophy in general is related to the morality we aim at. This also goes for Kant and the warning he issues in the Anthropology, which Nietzsche would argue springs from Kant’s universal morality.Show less
Binnen de ethiek zijn er door de jaren heen verschillende opvattingen ontstaan over de aard van het deugdelijk handelen. In de Ethica Nicomachea stelt Aristoteles dat deugdelijk handelen essentieel...Show moreBinnen de ethiek zijn er door de jaren heen verschillende opvattingen ontstaan over de aard van het deugdelijk handelen. In de Ethica Nicomachea stelt Aristoteles dat deugdelijk handelen essentieel is om een gelukkig leven te leiden. In de Fundering stelt Kant dat genot geen rol moet spelen bij het uitvoeren van morele handelingen. Deze scriptie zal antwoord geven op de volgende hoofdvraag; Is deugdelijk handelen iets om van te genieten of is het onaangenaam? Om deze vraag te beantwoorden analyseer ik de rol van genot in zowel de deugdethiek als de deontologie, zoals beschreven in de bovenstaande literatuur. Vervolgens beschrijf ik de Kantiaanse kritiek op de ethiek van Aristoteles om duidelijk te maken dat het Kantiaanse concept van heteronomie onverenigbaar is met de motivatie voor moreel handelen binnen de deugdethiek. Hierna zullen de sterktes en zwakte van beide standpunten worden benoemd door te kijken naar praktische ethische vraagstukken. Tot slot volgt de conclusie dat zowel Kant als Aristoteles ongelijk heeft, omdat het ervaren van genot in morele handelingen afhankelijk is van de situatie waarin de actor zich bevindt.Show less
This thesis is a contribution to the debate about the relation between art and politics. I argue that art is political insofar as it is transformative, but that any further political determination...Show moreThis thesis is a contribution to the debate about the relation between art and politics. I argue that art is political insofar as it is transformative, but that any further political determination exceeds the bounds of the essence of art. Aesthetic art does not serve any specific political agenda as its reorganizational effect is unpredictable and dispersive. This does not exclude that art can also be an ordinary political tool when engaged with non-aesthetically, activist art being an example of art with a high probability of affording such an engagement. As such, activist art – being merely a (more elaborate) form of propaganda – does not do justice to the specialness of art. I will conclude by submitting that aesthetic art is a strange political tool as it aids in forming our aesthetic sense – thereby affording us to unveil our being organized in the world and facilitating general emancipation.Show less
The central thesis of this paper is that something exists if and only if it is causally connected to me. Using this as a means to find an answer to the question of what it means to exist, the...Show moreThe central thesis of this paper is that something exists if and only if it is causally connected to me. Using this as a means to find an answer to the question of what it means to exist, the thesis is treated as a principle, which sets up a specific, unorthodox kind of defense. Following a Kantian line of thinking, this principle is first interpreted, then and compared to alternatives, upon which finally the specific, concrete implications of its truth are explained. This leads not only to a clear understanding of existence as defined by a causal connection to us, but also a specific understanding of the nature of principles and their proper philosophical application.Show less
To the minds of many commentators, there appears to exist tantalising similarities embedded in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein, waiting to be clarified. However, continued...Show moreTo the minds of many commentators, there appears to exist tantalising similarities embedded in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein, waiting to be clarified. However, continued disagreement as to how these similarities are to be articulated, and consequently quite what they should amount to, has led some to suspect such musings to be a sophistical mirage. Additionally, further complicating their comparison is also the interpretive disagreements that have persisted in relation to the writings of both philosophers, respectively. Nevertheless, both figures are undoubtedly responsible for framing large swathes of modern philosophical thought – perhaps none more so than Kant in the course of his Critique of Pure Reason. As Putnam attests, “almost all the problems of philosophy attain the form in which they are of real interest only with the work of Kant.”1 Despite this accolade however, it can be stated with only the odd contrarian objection that in their respective attempts to establish Transcendental Idealism in the course of the Critique, and Logical Atomism through the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, that both Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s doctrines constitute technical failures. That being said, both figures also sought to change our fundamental understanding of the task of philosophy, and in this sense, their works should remain valuable points of reference in the continuing discourse on meta-philosophy. Hence, it is here considered in what sense this latter perspective of them has been retained in the contemporary reflections upon either philosopher.Show less
In recent years, the philosophy of Iris Murdoch has seen a rise in attention, both from philosophers who seek to use elements from her philosophy for their ethical theories, and from those more...Show moreIn recent years, the philosophy of Iris Murdoch has seen a rise in attention, both from philosophers who seek to use elements from her philosophy for their ethical theories, and from those more directly interested in understanding her metaphysics. These latter authors have often either criticised or tried to solve the ambiguity of the metaphysical status of the idea of the Good in her writing. I, too, address the problems in her metaphysics: in what sense does Good exist for Murdoch, and is she able to offer a ‘sophisticated’ form of realism? My theses are, first, that Good, for Murdoch, is a transcendental element in consciousness, i.e., a condition of possibility for the experience of the world, and an ideal end point suggested by experience. To answer the second question I will argue that once Good is read as I argue for, and its role in knowing reality is understood, it becomes clear that Murdoch’s view does not fall into subjectivism or any other form of idealism. Important in this account is love, which, attracted by Good, motivates the work needed for a better grasp of the world.Show less
Deze scriptie betreft een discussie over het autonomiemodel van Christman. Hij benadert autonomie historisch: een persoon is autonoom ten aanzien van een preferentie indien hij factoren die zijn...Show moreDeze scriptie betreft een discussie over het autonomiemodel van Christman. Hij benadert autonomie historisch: een persoon is autonoom ten aanzien van een preferentie indien hij factoren die zijn preferenties beïnvloeden niet heeft afgewezen, of niet zou hebben afgewezen indien hij de mogelijkheid had deze preferenties af te wijzen. Benson bekritiseert dit model aan de hand van socialisering. Socialisering doet mensen preferenties niet afwijzen, ook als zij dit wel hadden gedaan zonder socialisering. Wat Benson betreft zijn deze mensen niet autonoom ten aanzien van preferenties die het gevolg zijn van socialisering, ook al hebben zij het proces van socialisering nooit afgewezen. Deze scriptie voegt drie elementen toe aan de discussie. Ten eerste wil wordt Bensons kritiek verbreed door te stellen dat deze niet slechts geldt voor socialisering, maar dat bijna al onze reflectie is beïnvloed door externe factoren. Daarnaast wordt uitgelegd hoe dit betekent dat Christmans model (impliciet) een eigen zelf veronderstelt, los van externe factoren. Tot slot wordt de onenigheid tussen beide auteurs verklaard door te stellen dat beiden een andere intuïtie van autonomie articuleren.Show less
In this thesis I will make a critical assessment of the Kantian formal conception of the will in light of Schelling and Cohen. My research question is twofold: how to assess the Kantian concept of...Show moreIn this thesis I will make a critical assessment of the Kantian formal conception of the will in light of Schelling and Cohen. My research question is twofold: how to assess the Kantian concept of will, given its notorious 'formality'? And under which conditions could Schelling's and Cohen's conception of the will meet the (assumed) flaws of the Kantian notion of the will? How could we evaluate Kant’s concept of the will in terms of its ‘formality’? What is the strength of Kant’s concept of the will and what is its weakness? Kant has provided us with a theory of how every rational human being can be ethical. We universally derive our ethical obligation, Kant claims, from the pure form of reason. This form of reason, motivating our will to act well, keeps our will formal. How can we assess this formality? On the one hand, the form of reason ensures that the individual can autonomously will and correspond to the ethical laws of a rational subject. This is the strength of Kant’s formal ethics. On the other hand, the form of reason makes our will lifeless, because Kant eliminates everything material. According to Kant, the will ought not be motivated by emotional inclinations nor serve a material purpose. Kant is not concerned with the matter of the action or what is to result from it, but solely with the form and the principle from which it does itself follow (Kant, 1984, 61). Kant’s morality is based on the presupposition that there ought to be a purely formal disposition to do good. Is there also a practical and vital disposition to do good? In other words, what would make the will dynamic? Could Schelling and Cohen perhaps solve the issue raised here? The problem of the lifelessness of the will lies in the transcendental nature of Kant’s will. The faculty of thinking and willing are united in Kant’s practical philosophy. In both Schelling and Cohen a new road is opened for a will that is not limited by reason. They both propose that there is a spirit that motivates the will, instead of reason. They also allow a dynamic power that has a disposition towards this spirit of the will. Both philosophers have a vital concept that replaces Kant’s formal concept of disposition, namely the concepts of Yearning and tendency. These concepts are not a motive of thinking but purely a motive of willing. Under the condition of making the will independent of the faculty of thinking, Schelling and Cohen are able to meet the flaws of Kant’s notion of the will.Show less
Er bestaat een verschil tussen materie en leven, tussen verstandelijke berekenbaarheid en het onmiddellijke ervaren van een gegeven geheel. In een tijd waarin quasiwetenschappelijke slagzinnen als ...Show moreEr bestaat een verschil tussen materie en leven, tussen verstandelijke berekenbaarheid en het onmiddellijke ervaren van een gegeven geheel. In een tijd waarin quasiwetenschappelijke slagzinnen als ‘depressie is een gebrek aan serotonine’ en ‘wij zijn ons brein’ meervoudig en onkritisch worden aangehaald, is het juist van belang om vanuit een filosofisch fundament de betekenisreductie te kunnen belichten, die zich mogelijk binnen zowel het academische als publieke denken voltrekt. Dat filosofische fundament wordt in dit werkstuk met name gezocht in een aantal manuscripten van Wilhelm Dilthey, waarin hij met het traditionele voorstellende denken van de Avondlandse filosofie breekt. Door basaal filosofische vraagstukken over tijd en betekenis te volgen binnen Dilthey's denken, komt een andere denkwijze aan bod die het reducerende materie-denken waar nodig weet te weerstaan, en als demarcatiecriterium kan gelden ten aanzien van betekenis en betekenisloosheid, onberekenbare levendigheid en manipuleerbare materie.Show less
Een kritische bezinning op het ontwikkelde tijdsbegrip in de Kritik der reinen Vernunft aan de hand van de kritiek van de jonge Dilthey. Een navoltrekking van Kants transcendentale esthetica met...Show moreEen kritische bezinning op het ontwikkelde tijdsbegrip in de Kritik der reinen Vernunft aan de hand van de kritiek van de jonge Dilthey. Een navoltrekking van Kants transcendentale esthetica met bijzondere aandacht voor aanwijzingen voor de noodzaak van een belevingsfilosofische inzet ten aanzien van het tijdsbegrip.Show less
In voorliggend werkstuk staat de vraag naar Kants tijdsbezinning centraal. Het doel van dit werkstuk is om helder te krijgen wat Kant onder tijd verstaat en aanvullend, aan de hand van de kritiek...Show moreIn voorliggend werkstuk staat de vraag naar Kants tijdsbezinning centraal. Het doel van dit werkstuk is om helder te krijgen wat Kant onder tijd verstaat en aanvullend, aan de hand van de kritiek van de jonge Dilthey op Kants tijdsanalyse, om een kritische evaluatie te geven van Kants ontwikkelde tijdsbegrip.Show less
