This thesis aimed to explain the differences between the substitutional and the referential quantifier. It did so firstly by presenting an analysis of the discussion between Wallace and Kripke,...Show moreThis thesis aimed to explain the differences between the substitutional and the referential quantifier. It did so firstly by presenting an analysis of the discussion between Wallace and Kripke, secondly by analysing Tarski’s reasons for introducing satisfaction, and finally by looking at whether Kripke’s definition manages to avoid the issues that motivated Tarski. It concluded that an essential part of the recursive truth-definition given by Kripke is the assumption of a pre-given truth-definition for an atomic language. However, if this atomic language is of infinite size, satisfaction is needed to provide this definition. Rather than differing in whether they make use of satisfaction, this thesis argues that the substitutional and the referential quantifiers differ in where in the definition of truth they make the connection between truth and the world.Show less