The implementation of an Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) would eradicate poverty, reduce inequality, enhance welfare and help us face automatization. However, one of the main objections is that...Show moreThe implementation of an Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) would eradicate poverty, reduce inequality, enhance welfare and help us face automatization. However, one of the main objections is that people will free ride on a UBI, making it morally unacceptable and economically unfeasible. The moral objection holds that it is unfair for anyone to receive a UBI at the expense of others who contribute to it, without being obligated to make some proportional contribution in return or be condemned otherwise. The economic objection holds that a UBI is not feasible, because rational people will stop working or attempt to evade taxes; both of which are needed to finance a UBI. Advocates of a UBI have argued that the number of free riders is expected to be limited, but they have failed to offer a theoretical framework of human behaviour which supports these arguments. The so-called Logic of Reciprocity is such a framework. Therefore, we ask the question in this thesis ‘How can we find a solution to the collective action problem of economic feasibility of a UBI if we follow the Logic of Reciprocity? Does this model of human behaviour allow us to overcome the free rider objection of economic feasibility against a UBI?’. Subsequently, we ask the question ‘Can the moral benefits of a UBI outweigh the violation of the reciprocity principle to mitigate the moral free rider objection?’. We defend the claim that a UBI is economically feasible under high levels of trust. In addition, we defend the claim that this mitigates the weight of the moral free rider objection. In the first chapter, we establish that a UBI faces a collective action problem of economic feasibility; a UBI is a desirable collective good which cannot be achieved through collective action due to the rational free riding behaviour not to work or pay taxes. In the second chapter, we discuss two models of human behaviour to review the underlying assumptions of the collective action problem of economic feasibility. The Logic of Collective Action supports the core assumption that humans behave rationally and will always defect. The alternative Logic of Reciprocity argues that humans are moral and emotional reciprocators who defect or cooperate based on the perceived behaviour of others. We conclude that the Logic of Reciprocity offers a more accurate prediction of human behaviour in collective action. In the third chapter, we apply the Logic of Reciprocity to the collective action problem of economic feasibility of a UBI. We conclude that under high levels of trust, the majority of people will be motivated to be seen as good and cooperative and feel reassured that they will not be taken advantage of. Thus, the majority of people will continue to work and pay taxes upon receiving a UBI, making the implementation of a UBI economically feasible. Subsequently, we argue that, once a UBI is economically feasible, the harm caused by the limited number of free riders is minor compared to the harm caused by free riding behaviour in the absence of a UBI. We conclude that the moral benefits of a UBI outweigh the violation of the reciprocity principle, thus mitigating the moral objection. To achieve and maintain a high level of trust, we recommend a positive narrative, transparency of cooperation levels and limited social incentives targeted clearly at dedicated free riders.Show less
