In the philosophy of logic, Mohanty and Matilal formulate well-nigh identical responses to Husserlian charges that accuse Indian Nyaya logic of being unacceptably psychologistic. Husserl holds that...Show moreIn the philosophy of logic, Mohanty and Matilal formulate well-nigh identical responses to Husserlian charges that accuse Indian Nyaya logic of being unacceptably psychologistic. Husserl holds that logical psychologism regards logic as a branch of empirical psychology. Thereby, logical psychologism cannot, unacceptably so, accommodate the necessity and objectivity of characteristic contents of logical theories, such as logical laws. Since Nyaya logic is centred around the study of mental processes of inference, it may be prima facie classified as unacceptably psychologistic in Husserl’s spirit. In response, Mohanty and Matilal defend Nyaya logic by pointing to its commitment to the existence of intentional structures, that is, universal and formal structures underlying the content of so-called cognitions. In this thesis, I intend to achieve two aims. The first aim is to comparatively explicate conceptual points of connection between Husserl’s framework, logical psychologism and Nyaya logic in more detail compared to Mohanty’s and Matilal’s commentaries on this matter. The second aim is to critically expand Nyaya logic and its given defence by Mohanty and Matilal, so that the Nyaya logician may better resist Husserlian accusations of Nyaya logic being psychologistic. This expansion is based on my own logical realist proposal. According to this proposal, specific mind-independent features of reality account for the necessity and objectivity of certain characteristic contents of logical theories, such as logical laws or certain rules of inference. In the first section, I introduce logical psychologism as well as highlight the key features of Husserl’s framework relative to it. In the second section, I introduce Nyaya logic as it is situated within the Nyaya framework to then explain Mohanty’s and Matilal’s given defence. The third section draws from the first two sections and comprises my critical expansion of Nyaya logic and this defence using my logical realist proposal.Show less
