Democracies face a crisis of self-preservation: how to defend against internal threats without sacrificing core values? This thesis explores militant democracy, a theory allowing limitations on...Show moreDemocracies face a crisis of self-preservation: how to defend against internal threats without sacrificing core values? This thesis explores militant democracy, a theory allowing limitations on freedoms to safeguard the system. While justifications exist that focus on democratic processes or core values, this thesis argues that the latter struggles with defining those values objectively. Can a democracy claim moral superiority without universal moral truths? Additionally, Rijpkema's (2018) concept of democracy as self-correction, another justification for militant democracy, remains unexamined. This research addresses these gaps by analyzing the limitations of defining core substantive democratic values and the challenges posed by the absence of objective morality. The Böckenförde Dictum will be used to support my argument. Furthermore, it provides a critical analysis of Rijpkema's theory. By examining these underexplored aspects, this thesis aims to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the tension between militant democracy and core democratic principles. Ultimately, it argues that there is an inherent contradiction within militant democracy, as actions against non-violent anti-democratic voices can contradict the will of the people, the very essence of democracy.Show less
In this dissertation I will be evaluating whether and how moral-concept abolitionism can be a satisfactory answer to the now-what question for moral-error theory. The version of error-theory most...Show moreIn this dissertation I will be evaluating whether and how moral-concept abolitionism can be a satisfactory answer to the now-what question for moral-error theory. The version of error-theory most people will be familiar with was forwarded by Mackie (1977). Error-theorists are committed to the idea that first-order moral claims are truth-apt, they are trying to refer to some fact out there in the world, but since an ontological investigation does not provide one with moral facts, all moral claims are wrong by default. This leads into the ‘now-what’ question: what are we to do with our moral language once we accept the error-theory. I will forgo arguing that the known version of the error-theory is plausible or true, since I expect those interested in the now-what question to already have accepted the error-theory. Moral-concept abolitionism is one among the possible answers to the now-what question. It recommends we jettison moral concepts from our language for diverging reasons. I start my investigation with Anscombe’s ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) in which I argue she forwards an error-theory and her own answers to the now-what question. Her error-theory follows from a historical analysis, rather than an ontological one like Mackie’s (1977). Second, I will evaluate how Anscombe’s abolitionism compares to the work of abolitionists that are responding to Mackie, as well as show their significant differences, their incommensurability. These differences lead me to demarcate two distinct forms of abolitionism. Anscombe’s version, soft-abolitionism, recommends we jettison moral language, but also provides criteria to meaningfully reacquire moral thoughts and talk. I argue these criteria would not be accepted by modern abolitionists for multiple reasons: moral language, as well as the positive account of virtue Anscombe envisions, is at risk of being elitist, authoritarian, and ineffective, which is detrimental to time-sensitive issues such as climate change. I call the position that recommends jettisoning moral language, full stop, hard-abolitionism. I will compare the nuances of both soft- and hard-abolitionism and conclude that while they offer different merits as an answer to the now-what question, the concerns raised by hard-abolitionists lead me to conclude that, at least when deciding between forms of abolitionism, the modern hard-abolitionist version holds the better cards. I conclude that while both forms of abolitionism could be a satisfactory answer to the now-what question, hard-abolitionism is the more viable abolitionism in the face of our current problems.Show less
In this thesis I start with the assumption that politics equals normative ethics and argue to what extent politicians that do not use moral concepts (and thus endorse the abolitionist answer to the...Show moreIn this thesis I start with the assumption that politics equals normative ethics and argue to what extent politicians that do not use moral concepts (and thus endorse the abolitionist answer to the “Now what?” question within the Moral Error Theory) are able to communicate with people that do use moral concepts. As such, it focuses on whether abolitionists can engage in normative ethics without using moral concepts. Schwarz’s theory is posed which provides a framework for doing so and I argue that this theory comes with flaws as seen in problematic scenarios. I also argue that some of these problematic scenarios are solvable by adding to her theory and that her theory comes with two problematic scenarios that are theoretically unsolvable. The proposed solutions are meant to show how these can enhance the relevance of the theory. It is also argued that a possible solution to the theoretically unsolvable problematic scenarios is that abolitionist politicians, when adhering to Schwarz’s theory, can temporarily divert from her theory by conceding to using moral concepts just to be able to communicate with people that do use moral concepts. This thesis uses the case of the COVID-19 pandemic to demonstrate how these problematic scenarios can occur in practice. This thesis concludes that, while Schwarz’s theory provides a framework that allows abolitionist politicians that do not use moral concepts to effectively communicate with people that do use moral concepts, Schwarz’s theory comes with problematic scenarios for which I show how her theory can be improved. Furthermore, it is also concluded that her theory sometimes fails to provide these abolitionist politicians the full ability to effectively communicate within the practice of normative ethics without using moral concepts. Additionally, I propose further research is needed to improve the shortcomings of Schwarz’s theory that arise whenever her criteria C1 comes into play, which is often inevitable.Show less
Moral Error Theory is the metaethical theory that argues that moral claims are truth-apt, but systematically false. Upon the acceptance of this view, one might wonder what to do with traditional,...Show moreMoral Error Theory is the metaethical theory that argues that moral claims are truth-apt, but systematically false. Upon the acceptance of this view, one might wonder what to do with traditional, flawed moral language. This puzzle is commonly called the "now what?" question. This essay extrapolates insights from a 3rd-2nd century BCE Chinese thinker, the Zhuangzi. A novel answer to the "now what?" question, namely "wu wei-ism," is created based on these insights. Lastly, it is argued that wu wei-ism successfully passes the tests some researchers have set to evaluate answers to the "now what?" question.Show less
Ian Carter identifies a philosophical dispute about whether either all political concepts necessarily express ethical evaluation, or some can be ethically detached. Establishing the truth of the...Show moreIan Carter identifies a philosophical dispute about whether either all political concepts necessarily express ethical evaluation, or some can be ethically detached. Establishing the truth of the latter is especially interesting, since ethically loaded accounts often generate confusions and misunderstandings within moral and political discourse. Carter suggests that it is possible to provide largely ethically detached accounts of certain political concepts, especially freedom, namely in being to a certain extent value-free or value-neutral. I scrutinize his proposal through examining three examples of partly ethically detached concepts of freedom, and ask whether such concepts are indeed possible and useful for both normative and conceptual theorizing. I conclude that overall, beside some remarks, Carter’s theory makes sense and provides an original and useful insight in the nature of ethical theories and their concepts, especially concepts of freedom.Show less
