This thesis is an investigation into the ontological basis of pessimism. I develop a Nietzschean interpretive framework of pessimism, based on a distinction Nietzsche makes between two types of...Show moreThis thesis is an investigation into the ontological basis of pessimism. I develop a Nietzschean interpretive framework of pessimism, based on a distinction Nietzsche makes between two types of pessimism in The Gay Science 370: romantic and Dionysian pessimism. According to Nietzsche, this distinction is based on a dynamic articulated using the language of physiology. This dynamic is either expanding or degenerating. The thesis relates this distinction to Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's notions of a 'world of appearance' to test if their ontology testifies to a romantic or Dionysian pessimism. Their ontologies are interpreted as either a transfiguration of romantic or Dionysian pessimism. I then develop a reading of Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy. I argue that Schopenhauer’s notion of representation or appearance is central to his metaphysics. I then interpret his punctum pruriens of philosophy as a priori pessimism permeating the whole of Schopenhauer’s philosophy resulting in an ethics of renunciation. I then lay out Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer in the Genealogy, based on the aforementioned physiological dynamic. In the last chapter, I investigate Nietzsche’s world of appearance, characterized as semblance or ‘Schein’. I relate this to Nietzsche’s aesthetics and art as a transfiguration of Dionysian pessimism. However, the question is whether Nietzsche’s philosophy itself is the transfiguration of Dionysian pessimism. I then explain how Nietzsche does this by means of a project of life affirmation through the notions of perspectivism and the will to power.Show less
In this paper, I discuss the philosophical necessity of Augustine's Privation Theory of Evil as a tool to safeguard the benevolence/goodness of God. I conclude that the Privation Theory is...Show moreIn this paper, I discuss the philosophical necessity of Augustine's Privation Theory of Evil as a tool to safeguard the benevolence/goodness of God. I conclude that the Privation Theory is philosophically necessary in this regard.Show less
Theories of grounding about material objects often take either (1) the small to ground the large, or (2) the large to ground the small. For the first theory, called priority atomism, the smallest...Show moreTheories of grounding about material objects often take either (1) the small to ground the large, or (2) the large to ground the small. For the first theory, called priority atomism, the smallest things – primitives, elementary particles, etcetera – are fundamental. For the second theory, called priority monism, the biggest thing – the universal object, the cosmos, etcetera – is fundamental. I contend, however, that a third option is left largely unexamined. What if the objects in the middle are fundamental? This third theory, a kind of priority midlingism, takes the middle to ground both the large and the small. In this paper, I will argue that priority midlingism is at least plausible, and should be taken seriously.Show less
In this paper we construe a renovative dialogue by placing the conception of morality that follows from Imam Abu Hamid al- Ghazali’s metaphysics in conversation with equivalent ideas from Friedrich...Show moreIn this paper we construe a renovative dialogue by placing the conception of morality that follows from Imam Abu Hamid al- Ghazali’s metaphysics in conversation with equivalent ideas from Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, who are both defining thinkers of the Postmodern current. The dialogue primarily serves to clarify how exactly ideas from the traditional religio- philosophical system of the reviver of the Islamic faith may contribute to the expansion of the Postmodern horizon, whilst keeping an eye on its invaluable insights which promise to advance and enrich traditional thought. The central proposition of this paper is that Imam al- Ghazali’s epistemology is expansive to Postmodern thought in providing the philosophical ground for positive and fruitful deliberations on moral truth by synthesizing the faculty of reason with immediate experience (dhawq) with reference to the spiritual heart (qalb) of humans, which is an epistemic faculty of immediate insight into the nature of reality. We argue that traditional Islamic thought is relevant in the context of Secularism, because it answers to the Western surrender of Metaphysics, offering an experientiably verifiable method by means of which to engage in valid metaphysical and moral inquiry. To achieve this end we give a detailed exposition of Imam al- Ghazali’s multi- faceted, life- oriented ethics, critically examine some of the central propositions of Postmodern thought in relation to morality and place them into a dynamic dialogue with the Imam’s religio- philosophical system. Furthermore we present personal considerations supported by and harmonious with the Imam’s writings which question the validity of the nihilistic claims of its interlocutor. It is the purpose of the present endeavor to capture and deliberate about sensitive ideas which shape contemporary secular ideology in a rigorous manner, whilst opening pathways to the consideration that there might be more to reality than matter and ideology.Show less
The central thesis of this paper is that something exists if and only if it is causally connected to me. Using this as a means to find an answer to the question of what it means to exist, the...Show moreThe central thesis of this paper is that something exists if and only if it is causally connected to me. Using this as a means to find an answer to the question of what it means to exist, the thesis is treated as a principle, which sets up a specific, unorthodox kind of defense. Following a Kantian line of thinking, this principle is first interpreted, then and compared to alternatives, upon which finally the specific, concrete implications of its truth are explained. This leads not only to a clear understanding of existence as defined by a causal connection to us, but also a specific understanding of the nature of principles and their proper philosophical application.Show less
In recent years, the philosophy of Iris Murdoch has seen a rise in attention, both from philosophers who seek to use elements from her philosophy for their ethical theories, and from those more...Show moreIn recent years, the philosophy of Iris Murdoch has seen a rise in attention, both from philosophers who seek to use elements from her philosophy for their ethical theories, and from those more directly interested in understanding her metaphysics. These latter authors have often either criticised or tried to solve the ambiguity of the metaphysical status of the idea of the Good in her writing. I, too, address the problems in her metaphysics: in what sense does Good exist for Murdoch, and is she able to offer a ‘sophisticated’ form of realism? My theses are, first, that Good, for Murdoch, is a transcendental element in consciousness, i.e., a condition of possibility for the experience of the world, and an ideal end point suggested by experience. To answer the second question I will argue that once Good is read as I argue for, and its role in knowing reality is understood, it becomes clear that Murdoch’s view does not fall into subjectivism or any other form of idealism. Important in this account is love, which, attracted by Good, motivates the work needed for a better grasp of the world.Show less
This essay locates the “ontological difference” in Heidegger and Levinas in order to show how this difference presents a limitation in both philosophies. On the one hand, the “ontological...Show moreThis essay locates the “ontological difference” in Heidegger and Levinas in order to show how this difference presents a limitation in both philosophies. On the one hand, the “ontological difference” obstructs genuine thinking of be-ing in Heidegger. On the other, this difference is unable to signify the ultimate in Levinas’ ethics. In transgressing the “ontological difference”, both philosophers introduce the concept of the call that leads into two different notions of responsibility in terms of responding. Whereas Heidegger’s historical thinking of be-ing is an originary ethics in which responsibility is determined as responsiveness of Dasein to be-ing, Levinas’ ethics implies responsibility because of social relationship to the transcendent other person who is otherwise than being. In this essay, it is claimed that these two different notions of responsibility are not mutually exclusive. The very openness of be-ing in which Dasein and be-ing are enowned to each other in the counter-resonance of needing and belonging still admits for a Levinassian ethics of the transcendent other person, albeit not primordially.Show less
In his later work Heidegger introduces a mirror play of four spheres, something which in the first instance seems enigmatic and incomprehensible. This design, what he calls the Geviert (Fourfold),...Show moreIn his later work Heidegger introduces a mirror play of four spheres, something which in the first instance seems enigmatic and incomprehensible. This design, what he calls the Geviert (Fourfold), seems to appear out of nowhere. But on second thoughts it becomes clear that it is a continuation of his earlier work, and it is an answer to the problems of the European thinking. The main question of my study: ‘What includes Heideggers Geviert?’ The thesis consists of four chapters. The first focuses on the conception of the design of the Geviert in Heideggers earlier works, such as Sein und Zeit and Urpsprung des Kunstwerkes. The second one talks about two spheres, the earth and the sky. The third one focuses on the other two spheres, the mortal and the godlike. The fourth chapter treats the relationship and the dynamic between the four spheres. One of the insights is that each sphere contains the dynamic of Heraclit’ phusis-concept. Herewith Heidegger harks back to the origin of the Western thought to address to problems that have sprung into this thinking at the root.Show less
