In this thesis, I will discuss Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice as developed in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Specifically, I will examine his theory of justice in holdings and its...Show moreIn this thesis, I will discuss Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice as developed in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Specifically, I will examine his theory of justice in holdings and its three constituent principles of justice in acquisition, justice in transfer, and the principle of rectification. The core focus of this thesis is, however, on Nozick’s principle of rectification, which ties his entitlement theory together. As part of this analysis, I will also explore questions concerning how far back one must and can go, what a victim may require as rectification for an injustice, and various other complications that cannot be simply ignored in the face of practical real-world applications. Specifically, I will consider the injustice of slavery as it existed in the United States from its foundation in 1776 up until 1865, when the Thirteenth Amendment proclaimed that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, […] shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” For the injustice of slavery during this time period, I will provide an empirical and data driven analysis to quantify the requisite Nozickian rectification. Having examined the question of how large rectification for slavery ought to be, I conclude that it should be minimal or nil if the question is analyzed under Nozickian libertarian principles. My conclusion is based on (a) a review of the conceptual problems with claims for rectification, and (b) an empirical analysis that provides a rough estimate of how much claimants can possibly expect to receive for rectification.Show less
A research on the necessity of the state, following Michael Huemer's conclusion that a stateless society would function more efficiently. The aim of the thesis was to explore whether the conclusion...Show moreA research on the necessity of the state, following Michael Huemer's conclusion that a stateless society would function more efficiently. The aim of the thesis was to explore whether the conclusion given by Michael Huemer was correct. Huemer argues that modern states lack political legitimacy and that citizens cannot be forced to oblige the state’s laws. He is convinced that societies would be better if they are stateless. The thesis followed Huemer's claims. In order to answer the research question, Thomas Hobbes was discussed as a defender of the state. Furthermore, Robert Nozick was used to test Huemer's argument. Nozick has similar claims, but he reaches a different conclusion. This thesis concludes that Huemer is not correct and that even by accepting his optimistic assumptions, the state, be it a minimal one, remains inevitable.Show less
This thesis makes the claim that the distinction made between positive and negative freedom (as well as between competing claims of freedom more generally) are not, and should not be about...Show moreThis thesis makes the claim that the distinction made between positive and negative freedom (as well as between competing claims of freedom more generally) are not, and should not be about disagreements as to what ‘real’ or ‘true’ freedom is, but are instead expressions of which freedoms align with certain philosopher’s broader ideas of justice. What I believe this means is that it is wrong to claim that only a purely negative or positive concept of freedom is the only coherent concept of liberty, and that instead the disagreement and the distinctions made are in fact done so on disagreements about which freedoms are valuable and why. The overall value of instances of freedom is in turn derived from our theories of justice and the ethical commitments which comprise these theories. Therefore I argue, referring to the work of Carter, that a complete and coherent concept of freedom must be both value-neutral in that it does not give superiority to any particular ethical claims made in regards to freedom, and as value-free in that we do not define freedom as only those instances which are also just. It is because of this that I will defend an altered version of MacCallum’s triadic formulation of liberty, which I believe is most successful at encompassing what it is we mean when we’re talking about freedom, by presenting freedom as a relationship between agent, preventing condition - as well as a fulfilment condition that I have added - and an action or behaviour. In this way my altered version of MacCallum’s concept sets the foundations for what I will argue is a value-neutral and value-free concept of freedom, which gives a structure for us to make sense of all intelligible expressions of freedom and gives a neutral base from which to introduce other commitments and values to argue for certain types of freedom over others.Show less
Dit artikel bekritiseert de vorming van de minimale staat van Robert Nozick. De onvervreemdbare individuele rechten staan centraal. Er wordt betoogd dat de theorie van Nozick ten onder gaat aan...Show moreDit artikel bekritiseert de vorming van de minimale staat van Robert Nozick. De onvervreemdbare individuele rechten staan centraal. Er wordt betoogd dat de theorie van Nozick ten onder gaat aan interne inconsistenties, omdat het niet voldoet aan de eisen die hij zelf stelt. Hierbij speelt zijn eigen Wilt Chamberlain argument een centrale rol. Daarnaast wordt er een vergelijking gemaakt met het anarchokapitalisme, waarbij vooral gekeken wordt naar de bescherming van de individuele rechten. De centrale conclusie is dat er een niet-Nozickiaanse argument noodzakelijk om tot de Nozickiaanse minimale staat te komen.Show less
