This research investigates China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) engagement in Serbia and Montenegro and has identified two potential conditions which explain the differences in the outcome of the...Show moreThis research investigates China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) engagement in Serbia and Montenegro and has identified two potential conditions which explain the differences in the outcome of the two countries. Between 2013 and 2022, China has engaged through the BRI with Serbia and Montenegro. This led to two different outcomes for the similar-looking countries, where Montenegro seemed less pleased with engagement than Serbia. This research aimed to identify underlying conditions that could explain the differences through a qualitative case study that applies historical institutionalism. The two countries were investigated individually to identify the levels of engagement and whether there were critical junctions in the two cases. The Serbian critical juncture is more of a pattern of (un)taken actions in decision-making by the Serbian government benefitting Chinese engagement. In the case of Montenegro, the Bel-Boljare highway can be identified as a clear critical juncture. However, due to certain assumptions in the media and political landscape, it has been portrayed as a Chinese debt trap. Consequently, the two cases were compared to see the similarities and differences and identify a possible explanation for why the outcomes differed. This study has identified two conditions that can explain the differences: the geographical position of Serbia and the geopolitical position of both countries.Show less
China’s contemporary foreign policy project, dubbed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or the ‘New Silk Road’, which was initiated in 2013 to foster a ‘community of shared destiny’ through...Show moreChina’s contemporary foreign policy project, dubbed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or the ‘New Silk Road’, which was initiated in 2013 to foster a ‘community of shared destiny’ through infrastructure development, has remained a prominent contemporary issue for Southeast Asian states that are situated in one of China’s key geographical areas of interest for the BRI’s designated ‘Maritime Silk Road’. While on the one hand presenting itself as a solution to the region’s infrastructural challenges through investments, it simultaneously continues to clash with a number of states within Southeast Asia over territorial disputes within the South China Sea (SCS). In this sense, what China has gained in means of hard power, it can be argued to lack in soft power within the current regional order – a power vacuum that the implementation of developments under the banner of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) component of the BRI could potentially resolve for China. In attempting to find an answer to the question “How has China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road affected state cohesion within Southeast Asia?”, a comparison has been made between five claimant states within the SCS region (the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam) to see how each of their positions has potentially been altered in light of China’s MSRI, and thereby ultimately their overall cohesion. By applying a congruence analysis, the explanatory power of realist and constructivist theoretical approaches have been tested to determine which variables have been decisive in foreign policy decision-making for the observed cases. While the variables related to realism have been concluded to be more decisive for a decrease in cohesion amongst the claimant states for the time being, developments under the banner of the BRI as well as the SCS disputes are in constant flux. Therefore no definitive conclusion can be drawn yet with respect to the direction of regionalism in Southeast Asia and the most suitable theoretical explanation thereof.Show less
Japan and China are competing for infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia. They have both launched their own international infrastructure development strategies: China’s Belt and Road Initiative...Show moreJapan and China are competing for infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia. They have both launched their own international infrastructure development strategies: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure and Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. This paper will investigate how China and Japan frame their respective strategies and how they occupy different roles in Southeast Asian infrastructure development.Show less
The following research was conducted in order to shed some in depth light on how a "Belt and Road Initiative" project can look like in reality. As China consistently portrays the BRI as mutual...Show moreThe following research was conducted in order to shed some in depth light on how a "Belt and Road Initiative" project can look like in reality. As China consistently portrays the BRI as mutual beneficial and a "win-win" situation for all participants, I was keen on verifying this statement and identify if this proclamation matches reality. For this purpose, the “Special Economic Zone” of Khorgos, which is located in Kazakhstan, was chosen. It is a project along the BRI, at the border of Kazakhstan and China. The project itself has not seen much media coverage and hence turned out to be an insightful research project. The general purpose of Khorgos is to boost the amount of traded goods as well as attract investment into the area. The chosen method of research aimed at analyzing speeches given by officials of both countries regarding the BRI as well as Khorgos specifically and from that derive a possible contrast with reality. The result of the research was, that, as the project came only recently into being, it disclosed several negative aspects such as the lack of information, clarity and entry barrier for third parties outside of China and Kazakhstan. Moreover, it turned out that the business advantages prevail heavily on the Chinese side. Khorgos is furthermore not as fruitful as initially anticipated by both parties. Additionally, it is likely that China will remain the main investor in the region and continue to seek to explore new trade corridors. along the BRI, at the border between Kazakhstan and China, which has not seen much coverage and hence turned out to be an insightful research project.Show less
While its economy desperately needs investments in infrastructure and manufacturing, India not only refuses to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s massive regional interconnectivity...Show moreWhile its economy desperately needs investments in infrastructure and manufacturing, India not only refuses to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s massive regional interconnectivity project, but claims that it violates its sovereignty and serves only China’s power ambitions. Some Indian analysts even argue that by establishing naval facilities in the Indian Ocean and strengthening land connection between China and Pakistan, the BRI is part of China’s encirclement strategy against India. Others downplay such arguments as products of unfounded distrust. Following a structural realist approach to evaluate the BRI’s implications for the economic, military, and geopolitical balance of power between China and India, this thesis presents a more complex picture. It makes the case that the BRI indeed alters the relative distribution of power to China’s advantage, but both alarmist warnings about encirclement and optimistic hopes about the potential economic benefits are exaggerated or require stronger evidence.Show less
