Ian Carter identifies a philosophical dispute about whether either all political concepts necessarily express ethical evaluation, or some can be ethically detached. Establishing the truth of the...Show moreIan Carter identifies a philosophical dispute about whether either all political concepts necessarily express ethical evaluation, or some can be ethically detached. Establishing the truth of the latter is especially interesting, since ethically loaded accounts often generate confusions and misunderstandings within moral and political discourse. Carter suggests that it is possible to provide largely ethically detached accounts of certain political concepts, especially freedom, namely in being to a certain extent value-free or value-neutral. I scrutinize his proposal through examining three examples of partly ethically detached concepts of freedom, and ask whether such concepts are indeed possible and useful for both normative and conceptual theorizing. I conclude that overall, beside some remarks, Carter’s theory makes sense and provides an original and useful insight in the nature of ethical theories and their concepts, especially concepts of freedom.Show less
