Bachelor thesis | Griekse en Latijnse taal en cultuur (BA)
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My thesis has brought to light two Arabic translations of Proclus' De Aeternitate Mundi and argues their substantial text-critical value, given that our current edition by Rabe (1899) is derived...Show moreMy thesis has brought to light two Arabic translations of Proclus' De Aeternitate Mundi and argues their substantial text-critical value, given that our current edition by Rabe (1899) is derived from a single Greek manuscript, which is not only younger than the Arabic ones but also merely based on quotations from Philoponus' refutation. The primary focus of my research is the Arabic rendition by the renowned translator Isḥāq b. Ḥunayn. For the first time, I provide an English translation of this work and conduct a comparative analysis of the Arabic with Rabe's Greek edition and the Arabic version by Anonymus. The first chapter of my thesis delves into Isḥāq's approach to the text and his translation technique. In the second chapter, I undertake a comprehensive text-critical analysis, including a critical apparatus. My findings address the question of a probable Vorlage of the two Arabic versions and whether they were translated directly from Proclus or from Philoponus' Contra Proclum, culminating in a stemma (Lachmann) of De Aeternitate Mundi.Show less
This thesis constitutes an inquiry into the foundations and implications of Neoplatonic metaphysics in and between Proclus (fl. AD 412-485) and the pseudonymous ‘Dionysius the Areopagite’ (fl. c....Show moreThis thesis constitutes an inquiry into the foundations and implications of Neoplatonic metaphysics in and between Proclus (fl. AD 412-485) and the pseudonymous ‘Dionysius the Areopagite’ (fl. c. AD 485-528). I propose that the systematic coherence of either of these philosophers depends upon a logic originating in and dependent upon a theological grammar revealed by a First Principle beyond Being. This is accomplished by first establishing the Parmenidean identification of logic and Being with its various implications as necessitating a First Principle beyond Being. From this foundation, I reconstruct Proclus’ and Dionysius’ deductive account of the declension of Being from this Principle. I show that in both cases an aporia arises with respect to reconciling the absolute unity of the One and the multiplicity of Being. This, I argue, can only be resolved through recognizing the common revelatory source of logic and a theological grammar that permits speech about a multiplicity beyond Being. In doing this, I outline the differing forms this takes for the Hellenic Pagan Proclus and the Christian Dionysius as well as the implications that this bears for the relation between philosophical reason, revelation, and theurgic activity.Show less
