Elections provide the primary mechanism through which representatives are authorized to act. This dissertation asks which conditions the authorization must satisfy in order to have legitimate,...Show moreElections provide the primary mechanism through which representatives are authorized to act. This dissertation asks which conditions the authorization must satisfy in order to have legitimate, properly authorized representatives. In particular, it asks which design of the electoral system – the set of rules concerned with the aggregation of votes – best satisfies minimum conditions for authorizing legitimate representatives. The answer to this question lies at the interface of normative democratic theory and electoral design. It is, furthermore, both a response to and an extension of The Concept of Constituency by Andrew Rehfeld. Rehfeld is the first author to show that electoral design defines and shapes the electoral constituency, that group of people who authorize a representative. The objective electoral constituency – i.e., the group of voters who are eligible to vote for a particular representative – should be distinguished from the subjective electoral constituency – i.e., the group of voters who voted for a particular representative. This dissertation responds to Rehfeld by arguing that the purpose of authorizing legitimate representatives requires electoral design to define objective constituencies not as randomly and permanently assigned groups but rather as a single nation-wide group. This dissertation extends Rehfeld’s work by analyzing how three key components of electoral design – the electoral formula (plurality/majority/proportional), the ballot structure (categorical/ordinal vote) and the district magnitude (number of seats per objective constituency/district) – shape the formation of subjective constituencies that are successful in electing a representative of their choice. The analysis shows that, rather than a U.S.-like system with single-seat plurality/majority districts, the Dutch system of proportional representation with a nation-wide objective constituency is the most justifiable for the purpose of authorizing legitimate representatives.Show less
Level of representativeness of electoral systems have polarised the academia between the Proportional Representation (PR) and First-Past-the-Post (FPTP). The UK is one of the few examples in Europe...Show moreLevel of representativeness of electoral systems have polarised the academia between the Proportional Representation (PR) and First-Past-the-Post (FPTP). The UK is one of the few examples in Europe that uses FPTP as an electoral system and it has heavily been criticised by the scholars about the lack of representativeness of such system. The 2010 General elections have triggered the debate on the level of representativeness when Liberal Democrats could not obtain the expected number of seats when compared to the vote they have won. The 2015 General election have resulted in the traditional way of having two parties dominating the parliament, but this time UKIP obtained 12% but only 1 seat, which is an example of disproportionality.This paper also calculates the possible outcome of 2015 elections if the UK was using PR as a system. Then the comparison between the two systems are conducted by using diagrams and concrete number of seats under each system. In the end, comparison of each system on the basis of representativeness is discussed with the help of the vote/seat relation.Show less
