Within Rawls’s theory of justice lies an endorsement of a ‘Property-Owning Democracy’ as a regime-type which has the capacity to meet the institutional demands of justice. In contrast, ‘Welfare...Show moreWithin Rawls’s theory of justice lies an endorsement of a ‘Property-Owning Democracy’ as a regime-type which has the capacity to meet the institutional demands of justice. In contrast, ‘Welfare-State Capitalism’, characterised by redistributive practices, is dismissed as incapable of realising the values of justice as fairness. This thesis presents a challenge to the alleged superiority of a ‘Property-Owning Democracy’ over welfare state regimes. Through an exploration of the concept of predistribution, it is demonstrated that there is conceptual space between ‘Property-Owning Democracy’ and ‘Welfare-State Capitalism’ for a ‘Predistributionist Welfare State’. It is then argued that when a Rawlsian normative framework, consisting of accounts of the values of political liberty, equality of opportunity, reciprocity and social equality, is invoked to evaluate the opposing regime-types, a ‘Predistributionist Welfare State’ performs at least as well as a ‘Property-Owning Democracy’. This leads to the conclusion that Rawlsian philosophers lack a decisive set of reasons to reject the welfare state outright in favour of a ‘Property-Owning Democracy’.Show less
This paper takes a critical look at the conception of John Rawls' original position and illustrates how the conditions for knowledge, and the limitations thereof, set up by the original position...Show moreThis paper takes a critical look at the conception of John Rawls' original position and illustrates how the conditions for knowledge, and the limitations thereof, set up by the original position and the veil of ignorance, are not specific enough to avoid running into the problem of mathematical, semantic, and logical indeterminacyShow less
This thesis makes the claim that the distinction made between positive and negative freedom (as well as between competing claims of freedom more generally) are not, and should not be about...Show moreThis thesis makes the claim that the distinction made between positive and negative freedom (as well as between competing claims of freedom more generally) are not, and should not be about disagreements as to what ‘real’ or ‘true’ freedom is, but are instead expressions of which freedoms align with certain philosopher’s broader ideas of justice. What I believe this means is that it is wrong to claim that only a purely negative or positive concept of freedom is the only coherent concept of liberty, and that instead the disagreement and the distinctions made are in fact done so on disagreements about which freedoms are valuable and why. The overall value of instances of freedom is in turn derived from our theories of justice and the ethical commitments which comprise these theories. Therefore I argue, referring to the work of Carter, that a complete and coherent concept of freedom must be both value-neutral in that it does not give superiority to any particular ethical claims made in regards to freedom, and as value-free in that we do not define freedom as only those instances which are also just. It is because of this that I will defend an altered version of MacCallum’s triadic formulation of liberty, which I believe is most successful at encompassing what it is we mean when we’re talking about freedom, by presenting freedom as a relationship between agent, preventing condition - as well as a fulfilment condition that I have added - and an action or behaviour. In this way my altered version of MacCallum’s concept sets the foundations for what I will argue is a value-neutral and value-free concept of freedom, which gives a structure for us to make sense of all intelligible expressions of freedom and gives a neutral base from which to introduce other commitments and values to argue for certain types of freedom over others.Show less
This thesis critically analyses the success of John Rawls’s political liberalism, which recast his theory of justice from a comprehensive doctrine to a political conception. This analysis into...Show moreThis thesis critically analyses the success of John Rawls’s political liberalism, which recast his theory of justice from a comprehensive doctrine to a political conception. This analysis into Rawlsian political liberalism involves an examination of the way in which political liberals have responded to the objections raised by critics of the theory. Through analysing the problem of asymmetry in political liberalism, this thesis argues that political liberalism is only able to remain viable on the basis of the notion of reasonableness, which characterises the group of highly idealised, reasonable citizens. These citizens are immensely important to political liberalism, since they have the role of deliberating on and justifying the political conception of justice. In order for political liberalism to remain a tenable account of how agreement can be reached on the principles of justice, the idea of reasonableness requires justification. Political liberals attempt to accomplish this by appealing to the public political culture, and the shared political ideas found within it, which all democratically-aligned citizens will endorse. This thesis also argues that such a claim cannot be made, since the political ideas are subject to interpretation and thus not shared. It is also illustrated that political liberals cannot ground their theory in the support of committed democrats, since disagreement over the ideas of democracy and reasonableness are likely. After concluding that political liberalism cannot be defended, the last chapter of this thesis focuses upon a perfectionist liberalism, which Rawls argues must be rejected. This thesis argues that, on the contrary, perfectionist liberalism may be able to overcome the problems that political liberals associate with it.Show less
In modern political philosophy, utilitarianism is often considered a road once tried and found wanting. A major reason for this is the eminence of John Rawls' Theory of Justice, which provides a...Show moreIn modern political philosophy, utilitarianism is often considered a road once tried and found wanting. A major reason for this is the eminence of John Rawls' Theory of Justice, which provides a number of arguments against it. One of them is the separateness of persons objection, which accuses utilitarianism of viewing separate persons as one, and thus considers the happiness of individuals freely aggregateable and interchangeable. This, it is thought, results in unacceptable consequences in matters of distribution. Similar criticisms are found in the works of Scanlon and Nozick. In this thesis I argue that the separateness of persons argument only works if interpreted as a weak argument against moral aggregation, and that a type of utilitarianism, restricted to political domain and informed by the practical limitations of human nature and the possibilities available to the utilitarian state, can deal with this objections.Show less
In de huidige tijd van polarisering, technologisering en digitalisering zijn onze liberale vrijheden niet meer zo vanzelfsprekend. Onze democratische rechtsstaat staat onder druk. Voor een...Show moreIn de huidige tijd van polarisering, technologisering en digitalisering zijn onze liberale vrijheden niet meer zo vanzelfsprekend. Onze democratische rechtsstaat staat onder druk. Voor een oplossing kijkt men al snel naar het onderwijs, maar dat gaat zelf gebukt onder de gevolgen van het economisch rendementsdenken. Hoofdvraag in deze scriptie is: Hoe kan het toekomstig Nederlands onderwijs vorm en inhoud worden gegeven om te bewerkstelligen dat we, als mens en als burger, onze vrijheden beter leren bewaken en dat onze liberale democratische rechtsstaat wordt versterkt? Om een antwoord op deze vraag te formuleren bespreek ik allereerst om welke vrijheden het gaat en noem ik een aantal ontwikkelingen waardoor ze onder druk zijn komen te staan. Ook Plato’s beschrijving van de democratie komt aan de orde. Vervolgens bespreek ik wat de doelen van onderwijs zijn. Vertrekpunt daarbij is de visie van Aristoteles. Vervolgens wordt besproken wat in Nederland zwaarder moet wegen, het algemeen belang of individuele vrijheden. Daarbij ga ik in op de reikwijdte van de vrijheid van onderwijs. Vervolgvraag is in hoeverre het wenselijk is om burgerschapsonderwijs en/of persoonsvorming verplicht onderdeel te maken van het curriculum en zo ja, hoe dat kan worden gerechtvaardigd in een politiek liberaal land als Nederland, omdat dergelijk verplicht onderwijs op gespannen voet staat met de liberale waarden. De meningen hierover lopen uiteen, zo laat ik zien aan de hand van de visies van onder anderen Fowler, Brighouse en Rawls. Tevens ga ik in op de Capability Approach en de benadering van Nussbaum. Aan de hand van onder andere de theorieën van Rawls en Nussbaum zal ik verdedigen dat het wenselijk is het algemeen belang boven de vrijheden van het individu te stellen en bepaalde grenzen te stellen aan onze vrijheden, juist om deze te beschermen. Daarna bespreek ik drie onderwijsmodellen die Robeyns onderscheidt en ga ik in op de vraag welk onderwijsmodel het meest geschikt is voor Nederland. In het laatste deel beoordeel ik de plannen voor het toekomstig onderwijs zoals geformuleerd in het eindadvies van Platform 2032 en beargumenteer ik waarom deze slechts gedeeltelijk tegemoetkomen aan de in het voorafgaande deel door mij geformuleerde wensen.Show less
Mental disorders: living with it is a challenge in and of itself. But life with a mental illness is made even more difficult by systematic injustice sufferers have long faced. Political philosophy...Show moreMental disorders: living with it is a challenge in and of itself. But life with a mental illness is made even more difficult by systematic injustice sufferers have long faced. Political philosophy can give us an example of how to organise our societies, but often fails to address the struggles of the mentally ill. Can we find a politically philosophical theory that can explain how we should address problems regarding the ‘mad’?Show less
Given that self-respect plays an incredibly important role in our lives, the aim of this thesis is to determine what place it should have in a theory of justice. In order to do so, it first...Show moreGiven that self-respect plays an incredibly important role in our lives, the aim of this thesis is to determine what place it should have in a theory of justice. In order to do so, it first examines the existing philosophical literature on this concept. It argues that this literature does not offer us a proper understanding of self-respect, treating it as an exclusively normative notion, while failing to consider its non-normative, empirical facet. By drawing on recent scientific research, it shows that there is an essentially natural component to self-respect, thereby pointing out a gap in the existing philosophical literature. Moreover, it argues that this natural component has to be taken into account, not just in order to properly understand this concept, but also to determine its place in a theory of justice. So, what is the place of self-respect in a theory of justice? Zooming in on John Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, this thesis shows that Rawls only focussed on securing the social bases of self-respect, but failed to properly acknowledge its essentially natural component. Consequentially, Rawls failed to fully comprehend the fundamental difference between selfrespect and other social primary goods, failed to recognise the limits to treating self-respect as a distribuendum, and most seriously, failed to properly compensate citizens suffering from a natural deficiency of self-respect. This leads to the view that self-respect should be understood as a metric of justice instead of as a distribuendum. Lastly, this thesis asks how a theory of justice should treat those who are pessimistically predisposed, and as a result lack self-respect. It shows that these citizens can to at least some extent develop their self-respect. However, it also shows that in order to properly support citizens’ self-respect, one should not think and speak in terms of compensating them for some ‘disadvantage’, but in terms of affirming their equal worth and allowing them to live a worthy life. It concludes that while Dworkin’s luck egalitarian theory fails on the ideal and non-ideal level, and Anderson’s relational egalitarian theory fails on the non-ideal level, incorporating the constructive critique offered by Sen’s capabilities approach would make Rawls’ theory of justice optimally conducive to securing citizens’ self-respect.Show less
Het utopisch denken in de politieke filosofie wordt gekenmerkt door idealiseringen van de werkelijkheid. Dit type theorie wordt daarom ideaaltheorie genoemd. Buiten het mooie plaatje dat het...Show moreHet utopisch denken in de politieke filosofie wordt gekenmerkt door idealiseringen van de werkelijkheid. Dit type theorie wordt daarom ideaaltheorie genoemd. Buiten het mooie plaatje dat het schetst wordt de ideaaltheorie verweten dat het geen impact heeft op de politieke realiteit, vanwege de grote conceptuele afstand. Er zou meer rekening moeten worden gehouden met reële feiten en gebreken, zodat de normen daadwerkelijk kunnen worden toegepast in de huidige samenleving. Het utopisch ideaaldenken wordt daarom door critici als nutteloos beschouwd. Deze kritiek van nutteloosheid berust echter op verkeerde verwachtingen van de ideaaltheorie. In feite zijn er twee verschillende vragen die moeten worden beantwoord door een normatieve politieke theorie. De ideaaltheorie beantwoordt de vraag naar het ideaal, en de non-ideaaltheorie de vraag naar de toepassing. Beide antwoorden hebben we nodig, maar zij hebben ook elkaar nodig. Er is geen sprake van een strijd tussen het ideaal en het non-ideaal, maar van een noodzakelijke wisselwerking.Show less
Abstract: Since four decades actual liberal democracies are characterized by the development that material wealth increasingly concentrates in the hands of a small fraction of society. This...Show moreAbstract: Since four decades actual liberal democracies are characterized by the development that material wealth increasingly concentrates in the hands of a small fraction of society. This development is especially problematic for the most central value of liberal societies: liberty. This is because individuals enjoy liberty only if they are guaranteed equal democratic codetermination. In the first chapter I argue, that massive concentrations of material wealth undermine the democratic process because material power can be transferred to political power. To safeguard liberty new economic institutions have to be found that guarantee equal political codetermination necessitating the prevention of massive concentrations of wealth in the hands of a minority of society. In the second chapter I introduce Alan Thomas’ proposal that aims at giving a feasible solution for liberal societies that face the threat of a loss of liberty by dominating economic elites. Thomas suggests rearranging the economic institutions such that democratic equality is guaranteed. This he sees met by the institutions of a property-owning democracy that characterises especially by the widespread dispersion of capital among citizens. Thomas claims that a property-owning democracy is superior to other types of economic organization because it is not only structuring social interaction such that outcomes are just, but he also sees it mastering the task to reconcile economic efficiency with democratic equality. The feasibility of Thomas’ proposal to safeguard liberty are centre of the discussion in the third chapter.Show less
Our economic activities have great effect on the life sustaining systems of our earth. The prevention of rising above a critical ecological ceiling is an important social goal. Simultaneously, a...Show moreOur economic activities have great effect on the life sustaining systems of our earth. The prevention of rising above a critical ecological ceiling is an important social goal. Simultaneously, a focus on providing all people with a social foundation should be a central endeavour. These goals are inextricably linked; a breach of the ecological ceiling, through human activity, has detrimental effects on the social foundation. In my analysis of these issues in the areas of philosophy and economics I have arrived at the following requirements, which serve as an addendum to Rawls’ principles of justice and his just savings principle. In order to aid the pursuit of intergenerational justice, in particular in the face of anthropogenic climate change, we should: 1. adopt a positive savings rate, so as to explicitly define the obligation to focus our policies on providing for the least well-off transgenerationally; 2. adopt a policy of agnostic growth, where we focus on good climate policy instead of steering for growth, allowing for a Pareto-efficient balance between growth and social welfare from the economic production processes, and 3. embed these policies in circular economy, where resources are protected and a sustainable social environment is nurtured.Show less
In dit artikel wordt onderzocht of Rawls zijn rechtvaardigheidsprincipes uit A Theory of Justice toepast op de familie, en zo gender gelijkheid bevordert. Ik beargumenteer dat Rawls zijn principes...Show moreIn dit artikel wordt onderzocht of Rawls zijn rechtvaardigheidsprincipes uit A Theory of Justice toepast op de familie, en zo gender gelijkheid bevordert. Ik beargumenteer dat Rawls zijn principes niet toepast op de familie. De familie creëert een dilemma in de theorie van Political Liberalism. Om het reasonable pluralism van Political Liberalism te handhaven ziet Rawls af om zijn rechtvaardigheidstheorie toe te passen op de familie.Show less
