While the 2014 annexation of Crimea was a complete success for Russia, Russia’s involvement in the Donbas conflict only a month later proved a failure despite the use of similar tactics. Previous...Show moreWhile the 2014 annexation of Crimea was a complete success for Russia, Russia’s involvement in the Donbas conflict only a month later proved a failure despite the use of similar tactics. Previous academic discourse has alluded to these kinds of tactics, here presented as ‘ambiguous warfare’ operations, being implemented in future conflicts. Yet, little attention has been awarded to which factors facilitate successful implementations of ambiguous warfare. The case study presented in this research has set out to determine if the conditions that facilitated ambiguous warfare’s success in Crimea were present in the Donbas. It is additionally explored which differences in the two operations denied Russia a favourable outcome in the Donbas. Results show that four out of six success conditions for ambiguous warfare were not present in the Donbas. Additionally, ambiguous warfare in the Donbas was hindered by ill-suited strategic goals for such operations and insufficient planning. The findings suggest that favorable conditions for ambiguous warfare rarely occur, with the Donbas conflict producing no lasting success for Russia. Yet, states should increase their resilience against ambiguous warfare threats, as such operations may remain appealing options for Russia. This research paper complements the academic understanding of ambiguous warfare.Show less
Russian actions in the Russo-Ukrainian War have been widely interpreted as a holistically coordinated, integrative approach to war – dubbed hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare has, in recent decades,...Show moreRussian actions in the Russo-Ukrainian War have been widely interpreted as a holistically coordinated, integrative approach to war – dubbed hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare has, in recent decades, been accepted as a strategic concept into the doctrinal documents of key Western military actors, including NATO and the EU. This paper argues that analysts misinterpret Russia’s operational, context-dependent opportunism in Ukraine as a holistic strategic method. So, in order to examine the extent to which Russian actions in Ukraine are actually strategic and whether the contemporary hybrid warfare concept improves or stifles that understanding, this paper examines the following: to what extent is Russian so-called hybrid warfare in Ukraine strategic? Three key events in the Russo-Ukrainian War are analysed using classical theory on strategy as a guiding framework, making use of a thematic case study analysis. It is shown that Russian actions in Ukraine are classically strategic to a highly limited extent because (1) battle is not always central and (2) Russian political coordination is either absent or opportunistic. Russian actions in Ukraine thus do not indicate a holistically integrated strategic method – which Western observers have eagerly dubbed hybrid warfare. Rather, the reality shows a method of operational opportunism enabled by a permissive political and battlespace-context. Hybrid warfare therefore does not merit adoption as a strategic concept, because it is not strategic. Using hybrid warfare as a strategic concept thus dilutes what we perceive to be strategic – and what we perceive to be warfare – proving the importance of testing new concepts against classical wisdom.Show less
The term hybrid warfare has often been associated with Russian operations in Ukraine, yet academia is in disagreement on the relevance and viability of this term. This thesis puts Russian hybrid...Show moreThe term hybrid warfare has often been associated with Russian operations in Ukraine, yet academia is in disagreement on the relevance and viability of this term. This thesis puts Russian hybrid methods and ‘hybrid warfare’ into a new perspective by determining the extent of which Russian hybrid operations have aided Russia in achieving its aims in the Ukraine conflict in a strategic manner. In order to do so, a strategic value assessment model was developed and applied to Russian hybrid operations in the context of the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent conflict in Eastern Ukraine. This thesis has found that, despite seeing relative success in Crimea, Russian hybrid operations cannot be considered as highly strategic. This is mostly due to the heavy reliance on the use of Russian proxy forces in the form of separatist groups, which have proven to be difficult to control in the long term and have acted out of line with Russian national policy on some occasions.Show less