This thesis researchs the Russian invasions in and conquest of Central-Asia in the second half of the 19th century and specifically the role of the man on the spot, in this case general Chernyaev...Show moreThis thesis researchs the Russian invasions in and conquest of Central-Asia in the second half of the 19th century and specifically the role of the man on the spot, in this case general Chernyaev and later governor-general Kaufman.Show less
In deze scriptie wordt gepoogd een overtuigend argument te maken voor het bestaan van een langer, gedeeld, ideologisch conflict tussen Amerika en Rusland, waarmee de Koude Oorlog te beschouwen valt...Show moreIn deze scriptie wordt gepoogd een overtuigend argument te maken voor het bestaan van een langer, gedeeld, ideologisch conflict tussen Amerika en Rusland, waarmee de Koude Oorlog te beschouwen valt als slechts een gemilitariseerde, maar absoluut unieke, piek in een langere geschiedenis van ideologische antipathie. In dat opzicht sluit het betoog zich impliciet enigszins aan bij de school historici die de oorzaken van de Koude Oorlog primair, vaak in antwoord op revisionistische theorieën, zoeken in de rol van ideologie. Het antwoord wordt gezocht in bronnen die verhalen over de visie van voornamelijk Amerikaanse diplomaten, hoogwaardigheidsbekleders, journalisten, schrijvers, politici en academici in verschillende lezingen, publicaties en briefwisselingen. De nadruk ligt op de late negentiende eeuw.Show less
Why is it that states that are best endowed with power resources do not always achieve the outcomes they desire? This phenomenon is what Baldwin (1979) calls the “paradox of unrealized power”. Dahl...Show moreWhy is it that states that are best endowed with power resources do not always achieve the outcomes they desire? This phenomenon is what Baldwin (1979) calls the “paradox of unrealized power”. Dahl (1957) famously defines power as A getting B to do something that B would otherwise not have done. An example of this paradox is the outcome of the battle between the European Union and the Russian Federation over Ukraine. Since 2004 both the EU and Russia have sought closer integration with Ukraine (Wilson and Popescu 2009). In 2014 Ukraine signed an Association Agreement with the EU, while regions in east Ukraine declared independence and Crimea even acceded to Russia (AlJazeera 2014; BBC 2014a; Reuters 2014a; Centrum for Strategic and International Studies 2014). Paradoxically, although the EU in total possesses more power resources than Russia, it was the Kremlin that achieved their desired outcome of closer integration in the east of Ukraine. In the literature on power two major explanations aim to account for such phenomena: A’s faulty power conversion strategies and A’s failed contextual analysis (Baldwin 1979). Yet one crucial element that is absent in the contextual explanation is a theoretical model about what ultimately motivates B to comply. In order to assess whether the combination of the power conversion and the refined contextual explanation accounts for the paradox, the causal process behind the outcomes of the Ukrainian crisis of 2013/2014 is analyzed using process-tracing. The analysis of behavioral motivations suggests that B’s self-identification determines the boundaries within which A can realize its power, and that B’s identity is largely beyond the control of A. The results also indicate that A’s power conversion strategy needs to include tangible means of power to achieve the goal of territorial expansion.Show less
A study on the small state of Estonia and the relationship with its predatory neighbour Russia, as well as the security policy that Estonia implements because of this relationship.
