The volunteers dilemma is an often occurring social situation in which an individual has to choose whether to sacrifice some self-interest to benefit the group. In this study we investigate...Show moreThe volunteers dilemma is an often occurring social situation in which an individual has to choose whether to sacrifice some self-interest to benefit the group. In this study we investigate changing costs and social value orientation (SVO). Rising volunteering costs and decreasing group benefits are conditions in which the subjective value decreases fast over time in comparison to the starting position. The comparison between the starting point and the deteriorated position could be a reason to volunteer while it stops the position from worsening or even prevent it from happening. In an incentivized online experiment it was tested whether increasing volunteering costs and decreasing group benefits leads to more and faster volunteering. Furthermore the role of SVO with regard to volunteering frequency was investigated. Results indicated a faster but less frequent volunteering pattern as a result of the changing costs and furthermore showed a positive relation between SVO score and volunteering frequency. The possible explanations are discussed as well as future research and limitations.Show less
Social dilemmas arise when individual and collective interests conflict. Some crises-like social dilemmas, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, comprise two parts: people must cooperate to prevent a...Show moreSocial dilemmas arise when individual and collective interests conflict. Some crises-like social dilemmas, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, comprise two parts: people must cooperate to prevent a disaster (public bad) but once prevented, i.e., a turning point was reached, positive externalities are generated (public good). Our study aims to expand the literature by studying cooperation, coordination, and motivation in such crises-like situations. We formulated the Adversity-Opportunity model (AOM) as a modified public goods game, introducing a negative initial group account to model "turning a bad into a good” and the turning point. In a mixed-factorial experiment, we measured participants' social value orientation and afterwards allocated them into three conditions. While contributions in the AOM condition could leave/turn the group account negative/positive, it could only remain negative (Public Bad condition) or is only shared when positive (Public Good condition). Within subjects, we varied the negative initial group account, while prompting expected and most appropriate contribution after each decision. Our results showed consistently high cooperation in the AOM across turning points, while social dispositions were a significant predictor of cooperation. We argue that when cooperation always is continuously beneficial, coordination is not required, and people cannot deduct a convergent collective and individual interest. A common interest to avoid over- or underspending could have enabled participants to form expectations and thus partially coordinate their choices. A public bad fostered marginally larger contributions than a public good interaction, after accounting for dispositions. Further research is necessary to confirm our findings and assess follow-up questions.Show less
