In this thesis I aspire to contribute to the existing literature on Schelling's 1809 Freedom Essay by providing an interpretation that explicitly focusses on the resulting view on freedom in...Show moreIn this thesis I aspire to contribute to the existing literature on Schelling's 1809 Freedom Essay by providing an interpretation that explicitly focusses on the resulting view on freedom in connection with Schelling’s overarching attempt at a system of freedom. To this end, the thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter aims to bring out the way in which the central problem of Schelling’s Freedom Essay – that is, the task of thinking freedom systematically – is not an isolated phenomenon but rather gradually emerges as the fundamental problem of the philosophical context to which Schelling belongs, that is, of German Idealism. The second chapter aims to introduce the essential elements of Schelling’s attempt at thinking a system of freedom through the lens of the question of a living, as opposed to a dead, philosophy. The third chapter aims to defend the central claim of the thesis, namely that Schelling’s attempt to think freedom systematically transforms the very meaning of system, freedom and necessity. On my interpretation, as developed in this thesis, the meaning of system is not to be understood as a closed totality, springing from a self-evident first principle from which everything follows with mechanical necessity. Rather, Schelling’s system is the whole, a whole within which every part is connected to every other part, grounded by the elusive groundless ground of grounds: the Ungrund. Within this system, human freedom is not merely freedom of choice, that is, the capacity to choose without a determining ground, merely because it is willed, between either A or B. Rather, human freedom is the capacity for good and evil. Each and every individual self-determines her own essence through an eternal act independent from temporal and causal relations. On such a view, freedom and necessity are one. We freely determine ourselves to be the kind of individual that we are, that is, must be. As such, it is not an estranged mathematical necessity that rules Schelling’s system. Rather, the contradiction between freedom and necessity, groundlessly grounded by a fundamental willing, forms the beating heart of Schelling’s living system.Show less
In this paper, I shall argue that in Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom (Henceforth referred to as the Freedom Essay), Schelling oscillates between two incompatible...Show moreIn this paper, I shall argue that in Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom (Henceforth referred to as the Freedom Essay), Schelling oscillates between two incompatible concepts of freedom: radical and limited. Radical freedom is spontaneous and identical to the agent's own act. It is founded on undetermined intelligibility and stands outside the theological system's domain. Limited freedom is a decided intelligibility that one-sidedly determines human actions. It is located within the domain of the theological system and meets its requirements. I will make the case that these two concepts of freedom are vulnerable to the charge of arbitrariness. First, I shall argue that equating radical freedom with the agent's own act does not provide determinacy for this concept of freedom. Second, I shall contend that the agent's decision on her intelligibility in limited freedom is undetermined, which consequently renders this freedom undetermined. I will suggest the source of Schelling's oscillation in the Freedom Essay is the existence of two incompatible tendencies: a commitment to provide a concept of freedom with unlimited power, and to indwell that freedom in an ordered theological system. I maintain that the simultaneous fulfilment of these two tasks is impossible.Show less
The notion of the will plays an important role in modern German philosophy. In recent years work has been done on developing a general overview of the concept of the will in ethics, politics and...Show moreThe notion of the will plays an important role in modern German philosophy. In recent years work has been done on developing a general overview of the concept of the will in ethics, politics and metaphysics from Kant to 20th century thought. This thesis seeks to give a new impetus for exploring this topic by looking at Schelling’s account of the will in his later philosophy. Schelling is of particular interest for exploring the significance of the will in (post)Kantian thought because he uses the concept of the will to solve the fundamental problem he sees with the Kantian notion of intelligibility. In this thesis I attempt to show how Schelling uses his notion of the will to critically reevaluate the notion of fundamental intelligibility which Kant represents in his discussion of the ideal of pure reason. The main argument of this thesis is that the concept of the will allows Schelling to reconceptualize how the intelligibility of reality is grounded. First Schelling’s distinction between positive and negative philosophy is discussed in relation to what idea of intelligibility is behind modern philosophy. Then, using Markus Gabriel and Wolfram Hogrebe their explications of Schelling’s ontology, the concept of the will is introduced as the only way to think the ground of existence as self-grounded. In the last part of the thesis, I show how this notion of the will allows Schelling to rethink the transcendental ideal in a way which combines the affirmative nature of external reality with the fact that thought itself comes to constitute the potency for thought. In this way the will can help us rethink the notion of intelligibility, which is grounded in fundamental affirmation, as not merely ideal, as in Kant or negative philosophy, but as an actual element grounding all conceptual and ontological determinations. The conclusion of my research is that Schelling’s notion of the will in his late philosophy reveals an important way of reconceptualizing Kant’s insights in his discussion on the transcendental ideal of reason which makes the idea presented there, of the necessary fundamental affirmation by reality of all concepts, more ontologically plausible and true to actual knowing. This reinterpretation of the transcendental ideal shows Schelling’s relevance in the attempt to make Kantian thought of greater importance for modern philosophy in both its analytic and continental forms.Show less
In this thesis I will make a critical assessment of the Kantian formal conception of the will in light of Schelling and Cohen. My research question is twofold: how to assess the Kantian concept of...Show moreIn this thesis I will make a critical assessment of the Kantian formal conception of the will in light of Schelling and Cohen. My research question is twofold: how to assess the Kantian concept of will, given its notorious 'formality'? And under which conditions could Schelling's and Cohen's conception of the will meet the (assumed) flaws of the Kantian notion of the will? How could we evaluate Kant’s concept of the will in terms of its ‘formality’? What is the strength of Kant’s concept of the will and what is its weakness? Kant has provided us with a theory of how every rational human being can be ethical. We universally derive our ethical obligation, Kant claims, from the pure form of reason. This form of reason, motivating our will to act well, keeps our will formal. How can we assess this formality? On the one hand, the form of reason ensures that the individual can autonomously will and correspond to the ethical laws of a rational subject. This is the strength of Kant’s formal ethics. On the other hand, the form of reason makes our will lifeless, because Kant eliminates everything material. According to Kant, the will ought not be motivated by emotional inclinations nor serve a material purpose. Kant is not concerned with the matter of the action or what is to result from it, but solely with the form and the principle from which it does itself follow (Kant, 1984, 61). Kant’s morality is based on the presupposition that there ought to be a purely formal disposition to do good. Is there also a practical and vital disposition to do good? In other words, what would make the will dynamic? Could Schelling and Cohen perhaps solve the issue raised here? The problem of the lifelessness of the will lies in the transcendental nature of Kant’s will. The faculty of thinking and willing are united in Kant’s practical philosophy. In both Schelling and Cohen a new road is opened for a will that is not limited by reason. They both propose that there is a spirit that motivates the will, instead of reason. They also allow a dynamic power that has a disposition towards this spirit of the will. Both philosophers have a vital concept that replaces Kant’s formal concept of disposition, namely the concepts of Yearning and tendency. These concepts are not a motive of thinking but purely a motive of willing. Under the condition of making the will independent of the faculty of thinking, Schelling and Cohen are able to meet the flaws of Kant’s notion of the will.Show less
Wie vraagt naar wat hetzelfde en anders is, vraagt naar wat is en hoe dat is. Wie vraagt naar identiteit en differentie vraagt ook naar hetgeen laat hetzelfdezijn en verschillen, naar wat deze...Show moreWie vraagt naar wat hetzelfde en anders is, vraagt naar wat is en hoe dat is. Wie vraagt naar identiteit en differentie vraagt ook naar hetgeen laat hetzelfdezijn en verschillen, naar wat deze elementaire principes mogelijk maakt. En daarmee vraagt deze vraag ook naar het heersende denken in de huidige tijd, dat altijd betrokken is in de mogelijkheid van wat nu is. Dat degene die denkt, de mens, zodoende altijd al een rol speelt in het wezen van identiteit en differentie, weet Martin Heidegger maar al te goed. Maar ook F.W.J. Schelling, aan wie Heidegger enorm schatplichtig is, wist al van deze betrokkenheid. De onderhavige scriptie poogt de oorsprong ervan op te helderen. Dat gebeurt door middel van een interpretatie van Heideggers belangrijkste tekst over het onderwerp, Identität und Differenz. Deze wordt vergeleken met een tekst van Schelling. Vanuit Schelling worden de zwaktes in Heideggers betoog aangeduid; tegelijkertijd zien we in hoeverre Schelling al op Heideggers wijze dacht. Uiteindelijk zal, door een vergelijking en combinatie van de standpunten van beide denkers, ook het belang van de vraag naar identiteit en differentie überhaupt worden aangetoond.Show less
