While Cappelen successfully argues in Fixing Language that conceptual engineering partially consists of making changes in the intension and extension of a term and partially on the object level, I...Show moreWhile Cappelen successfully argues in Fixing Language that conceptual engineering partially consists of making changes in the intension and extension of a term and partially on the object level, I will argue that the degree to which conceptual engineering is possible very much depends on the sort of term in question. Conceptual engineering depends on certain semantic and metaphysical factors, these factors are for example the way in which meaning and reference are fixed or to what kind of entity the term refers. The aim of this paper is to firstly point out that mere stipulation will not suffice to achieve semantic change. Secondly, that for a term t, depending on the sort of kind it refers to, natural kind or social kind, conceptual engineering is either metaphysically impossible or we have no real idea how to achieve it. Thirdly, I will argue that it is unclear how philosophical terms are to be understood, whether conceptual engineering is possible for philosophical terms depends on that. Finally, the importance of conceptual engineering as a philosophical methodology depends on how distinct it is from conceptual analysis. I will show that some cases labelled as conceptual engineering are part of analysis.Show less