The Covid-19 pandemic has altered how countries project and gain soft power. Within the context of this global crisis, most researchers followed the conventional trend to investigate soft power as...Show moreThe Covid-19 pandemic has altered how countries project and gain soft power. Within the context of this global crisis, most researchers followed the conventional trend to investigate soft power as a resource (i.e., health diplomacy). Yet, scant studies have approached soft power as an outcome. The present thesis fills this gap by examining how countries’ (i.e., United States’ and New Zealand’s) Covid-19 response affected their attractiveness abroad (i.e., in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands). In order to address this inquiry, the theoretical lenses of rational and social attraction are amplified with socio-psychological literature on the Similarity-Attraction Theory. The theories are tested by means of minimalist process-tracing, combined with a cross-case analysis. The findings support the proposition that (in)competencies (demonstrated through the Covid-19 response) sparked rational attraction (or aversion) among foreign audiences. While support indicating the presence of social attraction (or aversion) is detected, it warrants a more cautious interpretation due to case-specific alternative explanations. The findings challenge the assumption that “likeness goes with liking”, by underscoring how dissimilarities tied to success appeared to elicit attraction. Further research should investigate whether this effect is still present when the scope condition is not met.Show less
Why is it that states that are best endowed with power resources do not always achieve the outcomes they desire? This phenomenon is what Baldwin (1979) calls the “paradox of unrealized power”. Dahl...Show moreWhy is it that states that are best endowed with power resources do not always achieve the outcomes they desire? This phenomenon is what Baldwin (1979) calls the “paradox of unrealized power”. Dahl (1957) famously defines power as A getting B to do something that B would otherwise not have done. An example of this paradox is the outcome of the battle between the European Union and the Russian Federation over Ukraine. Since 2004 both the EU and Russia have sought closer integration with Ukraine (Wilson and Popescu 2009). In 2014 Ukraine signed an Association Agreement with the EU, while regions in east Ukraine declared independence and Crimea even acceded to Russia (AlJazeera 2014; BBC 2014a; Reuters 2014a; Centrum for Strategic and International Studies 2014). Paradoxically, although the EU in total possesses more power resources than Russia, it was the Kremlin that achieved their desired outcome of closer integration in the east of Ukraine. In the literature on power two major explanations aim to account for such phenomena: A’s faulty power conversion strategies and A’s failed contextual analysis (Baldwin 1979). Yet one crucial element that is absent in the contextual explanation is a theoretical model about what ultimately motivates B to comply. In order to assess whether the combination of the power conversion and the refined contextual explanation accounts for the paradox, the causal process behind the outcomes of the Ukrainian crisis of 2013/2014 is analyzed using process-tracing. The analysis of behavioral motivations suggests that B’s self-identification determines the boundaries within which A can realize its power, and that B’s identity is largely beyond the control of A. The results also indicate that A’s power conversion strategy needs to include tangible means of power to achieve the goal of territorial expansion.Show less
