The democratic legitimacy of political representation is not obvious. In the literature, however, it is often treated as such, mostly because the alternative of direct democracy is deemed...Show moreThe democratic legitimacy of political representation is not obvious. In the literature, however, it is often treated as such, mostly because the alternative of direct democracy is deemed unfeasible. In this thesis, I approach this issue based on the fundamental critique of representation as made by Rousseau, according to which democracy and representation are mutually exclusive, and representative democracy thus a contradiction in terms. I compare Rousseau’s position, supported by a more modern argument by Hanna Pitkin, to an attempt by modern authors in defending representation, which started with David Plotke. I support Plotke’s ideas with those put forward by Nadia Urbinati and Mark Warren, and also look at a more extreme position as argued by Frank Ankersmit. Comparing these positions to the critique by Rousseau and Pitkin, it becomes clear that defence of representation is lacking democratic justification that can withstand Rousseau’s fundamental critique. Finally, I discuss a potentially strong argument at providing such a justification, based on arguments by Laura Montanaro and Clarissa Hayward, which emphasizes the constructive role that representation plays in the shaping of people’s interests. Until the representative turn provides a substantial argument that people do not have politically relevant interests prior to representation, I argue, Rousseau’s critique remains intact, and we need to be more careful in ascribing democratic properties to representative systems.Show less
In this analysis into political and moral philosophy, the author argues that non-state actors could, under the right conditions, be considered morally and politically legitimate in carrying out a...Show moreIn this analysis into political and moral philosophy, the author argues that non-state actors could, under the right conditions, be considered morally and politically legitimate in carrying out a humanitarian intervention. This is done by assuming a minimal theory of universal human rights and then looking further into the contemporary literature surrounding humanitarian intervention as well as its history and application. In doing so, there does not seem to be moral, conceptual, or legal boundaries that would disallow such an intervention if carried out under the specified conditions. The implications of such a non-state humanitarian actor could change the way in which humanitarian interventions are carried out and remove or reduce the primacy of the state oriented nature of such interventions. Alec J. Bowie (2016) “The Legitimacy of Non-State Actors in Humanitarian Intervention”, Leiden Student RepositoryShow less
