Sun Tzu’s Art of War, written in the 5th century BC, is widely considered one of the most important guides to warfare and military strategy ever written. In order to evaluate this book’s...Show moreSun Tzu’s Art of War, written in the 5th century BC, is widely considered one of the most important guides to warfare and military strategy ever written. In order to evaluate this book’s contemporary relevance to the field of strategic studies, this thesis sought to apply the Art of War’s teachings to the modern-day case study of the United States’ (US) war in Afghanistan. Criticisms of the US’s strategy in this conflict are widespread. By applying Sun Tzu’s knowledge to this case study, valuable insights are gained as to the exact nature of the US’s mistakes in Afghanistan. This thesis concludes that the US in Afghanistan should have been more mindful of preventing civilian casualties, that domestic US politics interfered detrimentally in military affairs, that the Taliban were severely underestimated as an enemy, and that the US should have taken measures to prevent the war from lasting as long as it did. Understanding the lessons offered by the Art of War on the Afghanistan case study can lead to more effective military strategy in future conflicts.Show less
The professional military organisations of states generally find it hard to implement military change. Rebel groups, on the other hand, have been depicted as more flexible and adaptive actors than...Show moreThe professional military organisations of states generally find it hard to implement military change. Rebel groups, on the other hand, have been depicted as more flexible and adaptive actors than state militaries. This thesis probes the plausibility of this proposition by conducting an illustrative case study of the Chechen separatist rebel movement. It will be demonstrated that several factors that complicate and impede rebel military change can be identified and that resultantly the effectuation and implementation of military change, especially at the strategic level, is unlikely to be a straightforward process for rebel groups. In this way, the thesis points at the need for the field of military change studies to move beyond its state-centric focus.Show less
In this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic)...Show moreIn this thesis, the author observes the puzzle of escalation and de-escalation in irregular war, accounting for both the strong and weak actor, using a Strategic Theory (i.e. Clausewitzian logic) narrative. He focuses on two arguments: (1) domestic politics cause friction for both actors, (2) international pressure (from state and non-state actors) causes friction for both actors. This international pressure also includes image. Using a variety of observation techniques and limited quantitative analysis, the author finds that (1) domestic political rivalry facilitates escalation for the strong and the weak actor and has no bearing on de-escalation; escalation erodes and diminishes domestic political rivalry. (2) International pressure and image facilitates de-escalation on both sides in order to maintain a positive image. (3) The weak actor must start de-escalating in response to the strong actor’s de-escalation; else it may very well damage its own capacity to achieve its political objectives. He then discusses the policy implications that this conclusion has, most notably (1) the way that policy-makers may change their behavior in order to improve their own image, or the image of the actor they represent. (2) They may or may not be more cautious when dealing with domestic rivalry, as they may seek to avoid escalating, and would rather tackle the actual cause of domestic rivalry. Opportunities for future research in the thesis. Most notable opportunities for future research include (1) the relationship between strong actor de-escalation and weak actor de-escalation and the way the former enables the latter. (2) The effect of the situation on the ground, rather than on the purely political level, on each actor’s decision to de-escalate.Show less
