Over the last 30 years, Somalia has experienced a civil war that has torn the country apart. Countless civilians have lost their lives, almost all public institutions have been destroyed, and large...Show moreOver the last 30 years, Somalia has experienced a civil war that has torn the country apart. Countless civilians have lost their lives, almost all public institutions have been destroyed, and large segments of the Somali society have fled abroad to seek shelter (Mohamud 2020, 115). The country experienced a Hobbesian era of anarchy that symbolized what Robert Rotberg classified as “a rare and extreme version of a failed state. (…). a mere geographical expression, a black hole [where] there is dark energy, but the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided some semblance of order and other vital political goods to the inhabitants (no longer the citizens)” (Rotberg 2004, 9). To end Somalia’s acute state of anarchy and its protracted inter-tribal warfare’s, international multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and Somalia’s neighbouring countries have sought to mediate relations between the contesting factions that were exercising inter-tribal politics within the country. Three major peace and reconciliation conferences sponsored by the international community have been held to resolve the Somali impasse: the first summit took place in Borama (Somaliland) in 1993, the second in Arta (Djibouti) in 2000, and the third in Mbagathi (Kenya) in 2003. The Borama conference in particular is what led to the self-determination of Somaliland, which is not the theme of this thesis. The topic of this research is to look at the differences between these peace processes. By comparing the nature of these three conferences it is possible to identify practices and models of peacebuilding for Somalia, a country that is seeking stability to this day. Despite these costly peace-making conferences as it cost the United Nations (UN) and donor countries to spend enormous sums of money and resources, Somalia remains fragmented and unstable, with the current federal government barely able to control its capital, Mogadishu (Ingiriis 2020, 10). Through a top-down peace-making approach, the so-called international community (IC) has attempted to solve disputes between powerful actors without incorporating local values, history, expertise, and the everyday experiences of the wider Somali population into the peacemaking processes and ultimately these efforts have failed to produce effective dispute resolution (Ansems 2011, 99). Given these failures, this research attempts to investigate the underlying factors that explain the UN’s liberal peacebuilding approach (which applies a predefined conceptual top-down framework that neglects Somalia’s everyday experiences) and why it failed to bring forth any genuine reconciliation (Glawion 2020, 66). Due to the disconnect between the top-down peacebuilding framework and Somalia and democracy, this paper investigates how an alternative framework called the “pragmatic peacebuilding approach” which moves beyond traditional liberal peace, can facilitate a more practical approach to peacebuilding that is sustainable, reconciliatory and context-specific. This thesis will endeavour to test the following research question and hypothesis. The research question is quite straightforward: the UN’s top-down peacebuilding process has been taking place in Somalia for more than 20 years, why then have the UN’s efforts failed to yield plausible peace results in Somalia? The answer to the research question is based on the following hypothesis: in Somalia, top-down peacebuilding has prevailed over grassroots-level peacebuilding and this is why peacebuilding in Somalia did not succeed. The hypothesis is based on both a historical account of what has happened in Somalia, including Somaliland, since the early 1990s and on the review of the literature on the Somali problem as well as on peacebuilding in general. Somaliland achieved peace vis-à-vis a grassroots model of peacebuilding, while in the rest of Somalia the UN used a top-down approach.Show less
Introduction There are many political and socio-economic developments that have shaped Somalia’s past and continues to the present. One such example is the rise of ‘pan-Somali nationalism’,...Show moreIntroduction There are many political and socio-economic developments that have shaped Somalia’s past and continues to the present. One such example is the rise of ‘pan-Somali nationalism’, otherwise known ‘Soomaalinimo’, which can be described as a political and ideological belief system that rests upon ethno-Somali nationalism. Those who adhere to pan-Somali nationalism specifically yearn for the establishment of a unified ‘Greater-Somalia’, whereby the five regions which historically had been inhabited by ethnic Somalis are reunified under a single Somali nation. The five territories encompassed the Italian Somaliland, the British Somali land, French Somaliland of Djibouti, The Ogaadeen region in Ethiopia and northern frontier district which British colonial administers incorporated into Kenya (Taylor 2014, 91). The discourse of pan-Somali nationalism implies that Somalis are hostages of a neo-colonial project and that the current boundaries of the Somali state are artificial. As such, these borders were critiqued because they were arbitrarily drawn up by colonialists and baselessly divide Somalia into five distinct states (MacArthur 2019,118). In its early stages in the second half of the 20th century, pan-Somali nationalism played a critical role in unifying different tribes and ethnic denominations that had historically been hostile to one another due to clashes over natural resources and grazing land. In fact, for the first time in history, Somalis became more nationalistic and began to share a common ‘Somali’ identity, consequently strengthening the existing Somali nationalist movements in the 1950s and 1960s (Schraeder 2006,87). Anti-colonial sentiment drove them to seek the establishment of a pan-Somali nation-state, whereby the homogeneous Somali society with its common culture, creed and ethnicity could be unified under one state (Schraeder 2006,85). The rise of pan-Somali nationalism can be specifically attributed to the emergence of a new political class of elites between 1940 and 1950. This group of elites advocated for complete independence from Italian and British colonial rules and urged the formation of a unified pan-Somali state (Lewis 2002,116). Nevertheless, within a relatively short period of time, these nationalist elites became more concerned with preserving their own tribal identities and interests than achieving national unity within the state. As such, discussions concerning discourses around Pan-Somali nationalism and Greater-Somalia become a political instrument that enabled the newly-emerged political class to maintain power (Lewis 2002,118). The dysfunctionality of PanSomali nationalism became increasingly evident in the aftermath of the 1977 Ethio-Somali war as clashes between nationalist leaders caused them to retreat in defence of their clan interests. Such events, in combination with additional historical developments, eventually culminated in the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1992 (Alasow 2010,25). This paper investigates how ‘Pan-Somalism’ ushered in a unique euphoria that created a decisive force of shared national identity within the fragmented Somali society that had previously never experienced any sort of centralised functioning bureaucracy This paper attempts to explore how pan-Somali nationalism and its path towards modernisation clashed with Somalis’ traditional agnatic clan system. As such, this paper will demonstrate the clash between modernisation and traditional fundamentalism amongst Somalis led to the collapse of the central government. henceforth, this thesis seeks to answer the following question: How did ‘Pan-Somali nationalism’ and tribalism undermined the formation and lead to the collapse of the Somali state in the period between 1950 and 1992? The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 highlights the historical underpinnings of pan-Somali nationalism and its effectiveness in creating a shared identity, geographical specificity and solidarity within Somali society. Chapter 2 presents the methodologies and theoretical approaches used to answer the research question. Chapter 3 examines how clannism infiltrated the Italian administration and how it derailed Somali politics, leading the country to encounter divisive tribal-based politics. Chapter 4 emphasizes the challenges of a post-independent Somalia where clannism became Some form of political source. Chapter 5 addresses the consequences of pan-Somali nationalism, putting forth a new paradigm called ethnoconsociationalism as a potential lasting solution to the Somali impasse.Show less
The Kurdish question of statehood has been relevant for centuries, and the debate has especially flared up in light of the Kurdish assistance against ISIS, and the 2017 referendum for a Kurdish...Show moreThe Kurdish question of statehood has been relevant for centuries, and the debate has especially flared up in light of the Kurdish assistance against ISIS, and the 2017 referendum for a Kurdish state. Up to this day, and for over a century, the Kurdish tribes have struggled to find a structure of self-governance in the form of an autonomous state. Despite having been a culture present in the Middle East in history and tradition from before the arrival of both the Turks and the Arabs, they seem to have been left out when cultures such as the two latter transformed their respective social structures to statehood. During the creation of many Middle Eastern states, and afterwards during the period in which these consolidated their domestic structures, the Kurdish tribes were involuntarily assimilated into a number of “new” states after the fall of the Ottoman empire. Once in submission of their new boundaries, the Kurdish peoples had to accept a variety of foreign realities concerning their own political, economic, and social beliefs. This thesis concerns itself with the relationship between Tribalism and Democracy, and how 'the tribe' as both a social structure and a signifier of identity can be both a stimulant and an impediment to nationalism.Show less
