By applying Prospect Theory to the escalation of the Vietnam War, I provide a different understanding of why the Johnson administration issued Operation Rolling Thunder. The domestic and...Show moreBy applying Prospect Theory to the escalation of the Vietnam War, I provide a different understanding of why the Johnson administration issued Operation Rolling Thunder. The domestic and international uncertainty of 1963 and 1964 shifted the United States to the domain of loss compared to the reference point, namely the status quo. In line with Prospect Theory, this resulted in a riskier strategy than necessary. Furthermore, South Vietnam’s symbolic status as a front line against communism, in line with the containment politics of the Cold War, provides a complementary explanation for the risky strategy of escalating the war. The irrationality of focusing on a bombing campaign while neglecting the Vietnamese people is explained by the immense risk the United States thought it had to take to save South Vietnam.Show less
This paper examines the way three games embody different trends in the cultural memory of the Vietnam war. It concludes that games offer a unique reflection of the cultural memory by asking players...Show moreThis paper examines the way three games embody different trends in the cultural memory of the Vietnam war. It concludes that games offer a unique reflection of the cultural memory by asking players to adopt, if not agree with, a systematic model of history and in so doing bring deeper layers of understanding to the surface.Show less
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature concerning the relationship between the United States and the Netherlands during the Vietnam War. Specifically, it examines government relations in...Show moreThis paper seeks to contribute to the literature concerning the relationship between the United States and the Netherlands during the Vietnam War. Specifically, it examines government relations in the context of the Tet Offensive. The offensive had a transformative effect on American domestic politics, as Lyndon B. Johnson decided not to seek another term as President of the United States and because America decided to de-escalate the Vietnam War. As such, this paper explores how a combination of American foreign and domestic policy affects the relationship with the Netherlands. The majority of the existing literature is written in the 1980s and therefore, deserves an update. Moreover, current scholarship is predominantly focused on the domestic consequences for the Netherlands, and thus often falls short of describing the American perspective on the Vietnam War. This thesis sets itself apart by specifically examining the relationship between the United States and the Netherlands. Through an extensive analysis of American, Dutch, and South Vietnamese sources this paper will argue that the direct consequences of the Tet Offensive did not significantly affect American-Dutch relations. However, indirect consequences, such as Johnson’s withdrawal from politics, de-escalation of the Vietnam War, and Vietnamisation of the conflict, substantially influenced the relationship between the United States and the Netherlands. Whilst relations between the two countries undoubtedly remained good, the context of the Tet Offensive serves to characterise changing dynamics with which policymaking took place, as the Netherlands took more initiative in maintaining its relationship with the United States.Show less
This thesis deals with the US bombings on North Vietnam in 1972. It answers the question After the Linebacker I campaign in May through October 1972, how did the anti- Vietnam War movement...Show moreThis thesis deals with the US bombings on North Vietnam in 1972. It answers the question After the Linebacker I campaign in May through October 1972, how did the anti- Vietnam War movement influence Nixon’s policy and communication towards the American people, regarding the Linebacker II Operation in December 1972? To answer the question, the thesis was divided into three parts. Firstly, the state of the field was established in the literature review before giving an historical background on the Nixon Presidency, and more particularly, on the role this presidency played in the Vietnam War. The third chapter researches, using primary sources, whether or not the anti-war movement has changed Nixon’s decision to bomb North Vietnam again. The first Linebacker Operation had more support than the second campaign, but still received a lot of protests from the American people. The second Linebacker received a lot of protests, not only within the US itself, but also from other countries. Even though there were protests, they had little influence on Nixon’s decisions on his policy towards Vietnam.Show less
This thesis aims to investigate the American draft resisters’ decision to immigrate to Canada and their experiences there. It assesses the contribution of the American war resisters in Canada to...Show moreThis thesis aims to investigate the American draft resisters’ decision to immigrate to Canada and their experiences there. It assesses the contribution of the American war resisters in Canada to the Canadian anti-war movement. The research question therefore is: what was the experience of the American draft resisters in Canada, and how did they contribute to the anti-war movement? Both secondary and primary are analyzed in order to conduct this research.Show less
Realists are said to paint a bleak, pessimistic view of the world. Their paradigm’s emphasis on power, national interest, and anarchy is said to inevitably result in conflict. As such, it seems...Show moreRealists are said to paint a bleak, pessimistic view of the world. Their paradigm’s emphasis on power, national interest, and anarchy is said to inevitably result in conflict. As such, it seems counterintuitive to think that the most vocal critics of the Vietnam War and Iraq War were realists. Certainly, in public discourse and in the field of political science, there exists a common perception that realists are synonymous with warmongers. However, preeminent realists such as Hans Morgenthau and John Mearsheimer were heavily opposed to the Vietnam War and Iraq War, respectively. The question arises why prominent realists are such vocal opponents of war, while the theory they prescribe to is often conflated with war. This thesis explores the central elements of the realist paradigm in the realist opposition. A qualitative analysis of both the works of Morgenthau and Mearsheimer is done to further contribute to our understanding of the realist lessons on the use of military force and how it can be used to ensure the vital interests and the security of the United States in the 21st century. It finds that that a rational approach is taken within the realist paradigm: The nation's interest lies always in power and all actions should only be taken if its power was to increase or maintained. The Vietnam War and Iraq War both did not pose a threat to the power of the United States. Rather, the United States upset the balance of power by its actions and considerably lost power as defined by realism. With the next decade looking to be under unprecedented strains, the American foreign policy elite would do well to use the valuable insights gained from the earlier wars to steer the country and the world to a just future.Show less
This thesis has been done on the research question: what influence did U.S. public opinion have on the decisions made by the Johnson administration regarding U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam during...Show moreThis thesis has been done on the research question: what influence did U.S. public opinion have on the decisions made by the Johnson administration regarding U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam during and shortly after the Tet offensive (January 31, 1968 – March 31, 1968)? This research has been done through a literature analysis, including official documents. After this analysis, it became clear that the public did have an influence on the decisions to not send more troops to Vietnam, since it was mentioned many times in the official documents. However, this has been an indirect influence on state officials, who subsequently, chose to not send more troops to Vietnam, after the TET offensive.Show less
This thesis focuses on the portrayal of American exceptionalism in American cinema. Particular attention is paid to exceptionalism during times of war with different chapter covering World War II,...Show moreThis thesis focuses on the portrayal of American exceptionalism in American cinema. Particular attention is paid to exceptionalism during times of war with different chapter covering World War II, the Vietnam War and the War on Terror respectively.Show less
Rhetorically, President Johnson presented his Vietnam intervention as part of an international war on poverty. ‘The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even...Show moreRhetorically, President Johnson presented his Vietnam intervention as part of an international war on poverty. ‘The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA,’ LBJ held during his televised speech at Johns Hopkins University of April 1965, informing the audience of the United States’ benevolent ambition in Vietnam. But the desired effect of LBJ's rhetoric was not solely limited to sanctifying foreign affairs: rather, Johnson’s remarks underlined the universalism embedded in Great Society reform, and extrapolated the Democratic platform into a global context - justifying the president's agenda in both the foreign and domestic contexts. Thus, this thesis argues that LBJ’s early Vietnam rhetoric was intimately linked with his public defense of Great Society reforms, and challenge the conceptual dichotomy between domestic and foreign affairs by closely scrutinizing several key speeches of the Johnson presidency.Show less
This thesis investigates the U.S. Air Force's reaction to the Vietnam War, focusing on the period between 1975 and 1991. It explores how Air Force officers assessed the war during this time, and to...Show moreThis thesis investigates the U.S. Air Force's reaction to the Vietnam War, focusing on the period between 1975 and 1991. It explores how Air Force officers assessed the war during this time, and to what extent the experience of Vietnam led to concrete changes in the Air Force. The thesis finds that the Air Force's deeply ingrained institutional culture prescribed particular views about the use of airpower, and that this prevented them from conducting proper evaluations of the war. This adherence to their institutional culture was not a new development. Rather, it was a continuation of Air Force attitudes from the time between World War II and the Vietnam War.Show less
The end of the Cold War marked the realisation that the global order is in a constant state of flux. The ultimate aim of this research was to assess ability of the most influential nation in the...Show moreThe end of the Cold War marked the realisation that the global order is in a constant state of flux. The ultimate aim of this research was to assess ability of the most influential nation in the world to navigate the changing world order in a way that precedes mutually beneficial international relations, using the interesting example of its tumultuous relationship with Southeast Asia. In order to approach such an overwhelming topic, the framework for this thesis draws upon the ideas of Samuel P. Huntington's expressed in his work The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking the World Order, and uses it to identify three areas where change has manifested itself most in the region since the early 1990s – religious diversity, rise of alternative powers and economic integration. The next step was to link the findings to the wider discussion on how shifting dynamics have given rise to the different power strategies. Using the conclusions from these findings, we can assert that, in the case of Southeast Asia, the US might have decided on the pivot of interest just in time. Indeed, it is very possible we could see more positive American presence in the future in the Asia-Pacific region in the form of ‘smart power’.Show less
ABSTRACT George W. Ball, his dissent on the War in Vietnam and his failure to prevent its escalation On July 28 1965, President Johnson announced during a televised press conference, that the...Show moreABSTRACT George W. Ball, his dissent on the War in Vietnam and his failure to prevent its escalation On July 28 1965, President Johnson announced during a televised press conference, that the United States would take over the war from the South-Vietnamese government. The President ‘Americanized’ the war in South Vietnam choosing ‘a path which turned Vietnam into America’s Nightmare’ (Larry Berman). President Johnson took his decision after long and intensive deliberations with his advisers, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball was the only one who disagreed. On July 28, he lost the fight that he had begun in October 1964. That George Ball was a dissenter and had strongly argued against the dispatching of troops to Vietnam only became known generally after the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971. Why did George Ball dissent on the war in Vietnam? Why did he fail to prevent the escalation? Was he naïve or disingenuous? Was he playing the role of devils advocate? Did President Johnson use him to let everyone believe that all sides were covered? Why did he not resign immediately after the July 28? Why did President Johnson not fire him? This paper seeks answers to these questions.Show less
