In this thesis I aspire to contribute to the existing literature on Schelling's 1809 Freedom Essay by providing an interpretation that explicitly focusses on the resulting view on freedom in...Show moreIn this thesis I aspire to contribute to the existing literature on Schelling's 1809 Freedom Essay by providing an interpretation that explicitly focusses on the resulting view on freedom in connection with Schelling’s overarching attempt at a system of freedom. To this end, the thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter aims to bring out the way in which the central problem of Schelling’s Freedom Essay – that is, the task of thinking freedom systematically – is not an isolated phenomenon but rather gradually emerges as the fundamental problem of the philosophical context to which Schelling belongs, that is, of German Idealism. The second chapter aims to introduce the essential elements of Schelling’s attempt at thinking a system of freedom through the lens of the question of a living, as opposed to a dead, philosophy. The third chapter aims to defend the central claim of the thesis, namely that Schelling’s attempt to think freedom systematically transforms the very meaning of system, freedom and necessity. On my interpretation, as developed in this thesis, the meaning of system is not to be understood as a closed totality, springing from a self-evident first principle from which everything follows with mechanical necessity. Rather, Schelling’s system is the whole, a whole within which every part is connected to every other part, grounded by the elusive groundless ground of grounds: the Ungrund. Within this system, human freedom is not merely freedom of choice, that is, the capacity to choose without a determining ground, merely because it is willed, between either A or B. Rather, human freedom is the capacity for good and evil. Each and every individual self-determines her own essence through an eternal act independent from temporal and causal relations. On such a view, freedom and necessity are one. We freely determine ourselves to be the kind of individual that we are, that is, must be. As such, it is not an estranged mathematical necessity that rules Schelling’s system. Rather, the contradiction between freedom and necessity, groundlessly grounded by a fundamental willing, forms the beating heart of Schelling’s living system.Show less